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Preface 
Many of my family, friends and acquaintances somehow share the view that a Ph.D. 
project is a long, never-ending story. Another association these people have with 
researchers is that researchers stem from another planet and live isolated from all other 
human beings. Both these views are also part of my personal experience, although I 
would rather suggest a far more positive association with research and researchers. 
One of the most exciting opportunities has been, for example, my attendance of the 
triple AAA Conference on Auditing Research in New Orleans. Approximately half a year 
later, this city and region were destroyed by the hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately, joy and 
sorrow often are close to each other. I have experienced my research project as an 
enjoyable journey, discovering lots of new things and producing new things. However, 
this has not been merely the result of my own efforts. Many people have functioned as a 
“Lonely Planet” guide during all stages of the project. I would like to express my thanks 
to everybody who has helped me in this regard.  
 
First of all, many thanks go to the supervisors of this thesis. With the ‘risk’ of under-
accentuating other favorable features of them, I have very much appreciated the 
methodological and theoretical insights of Tom Groot, the practical and managerial 
insights of Caren van Egten, as well as the overview on auditing practice of Roger 
Dassen. Ernst & Young, under supervision of Hans Verkruijsse, has provided me with 
both financial and content support. In particular I owe many thanks to Luc Quadackers, 
not only for being a colleague within both ARCA and Ernst & Young, but also for his 
energy spent on my project, his insights and overview of auditing research literature and 
auditing theory, and last but not least for being a warm friend.  
 
I have also appreciated the peaceful atmosphere at the accounting department of the 
Vrije Universiteit, both in terms of the absence of uncomfortable telephone calls as well 
as the presence of stimulating colleagues, who never hesitated to spend time on many 
statistical issues. In particular I would like to mention the efforts of Eelke Wiersma, 
Martijn Schoute, Henri Dekker, and Tjerk Budding. 
 
Many people have contributed in developing the research questionnaire. I highly 
appreciate the comments of Albert Bosch (Ernst & Young/Vrije Universiteit), Tjerk 
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Budding (Vrije Universiteit), Hanne Veldman (BDO CampsObers/Vrije Universiteit) and 
Hans Bijvoet (Ernst & Young). A special contribution to my thesis came from the 
‘Business Leaders’ of the Big4 audit firms in the construction industry, who participated 
in the expert panel: Erik Roelofs (Deloitte), Jack van Rooijen (KPMG), Wim Kerst (Ernst 
& Young), and Hans ter Borgh (PriceWaterhouseCoopers).  
 
At this place, I also want to express my sincere thanks to my parents, and other family 
members and friends, who have showed interest in my research, and to whom I often 
had to say sorry for being absent at social events. In that regard, the ‘communis opinio’ 
on researchers (namely, that they live in isolation) has been true to a certain extent.  
 
Without the help, support and love of my wife Marga, and my sons Roger and Marc, this 
thesis would never have been finalized. They must have suffered a lot from it and I am 
really very thankful for their understanding.  
 
Last but certainly not least, my Creator gave me the talents and opportunities to work on 
and finalize this thesis. His name shall be glorified forever! 
 
 
“And by knowledge shall the chambers be filled with all precious and pleasant riches. A 
wise man is strong; yea, a man of knowledge increaseth strength” (Proverbs 24: 4 and 
5) 
 
“And further, by these, my son, be admonished: of making many books there is no end; 
and much study is a weariness of the flesh” (Ecclesiastes 12:12) 
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1 Introduction 
During the 1990s, the major audit firms reengineered their audit approach. This new 
audit approach has been referred to as the ‘Strategic Systems Audit’ (e.g., Bell et al., 
1997) or the Business Risk Audit (Eilifsen et al., 2001). Before these new audit 
approaches were introduced the audit approach evolved from a primary substantive 
testing-based audit approach to a primary systems-based audit. Under the systems-
based audit approach, the auditor tests the internal controls which have been designed 
and put into operation by the audit client. A basic assumption under this approach is that 
the client’s internal control system improves the reliability of the general ledger resulting 
in improved fairness of the financial statements. The purpose of the systems-based 
audit approach – as compared to the primarily substantive testing based approach – is 
to rely on the company’s internal controls and to reduce the amount of substantive 
testing. From the 1970s onwards, the systems-based audit approach incorporated the 
audit risk model. The audit risk model is often presented as follows:  
 
AR = inherent risk * control risk * detection risk. 
 
Where: 
• Inherent risk is defined as the susceptibility of an assertion to misstatement that could be material, 
either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, assuming that there are no related 
controls (ISA200, IFAC, 2003). 
• Control risk is defined as the risk that a misstatement could occur in an assertion and that could be 
material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be prevented, or 
detected and corrected, on a timely basis by the entity’s internal control (ISA200, IFAC, 2003). And 
• Detection risk is defined as the risk that material misstatements are not detected by the auditors’ 
audit procedures (ISA200, IFAC, 2003). 
 
Although the audit risk model has been criticized since its introduction (e.g., the 
multiplicative formula of the model suggests that the components are dependent of each 
other where it has been argued that the components are independent of each other), the 
model is still widely used in audit practice (e.g., IFAC, 2003). The Business Risk Audit 
did not abolish the audit risk model, but added a new concept to the methodology, 
namely ‘client’s business risk’. Client business risk is defined as “the risk that the audited 
entity will fail to achieve its objectives” (Lemon et al., 2000, p.1). From this definition of 
client’s business risk no direct reference is made to the audited entity’s financial 
statements. For example Bell et al. (Bell et al., 1997; Knechel, 2001) argued that many 
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clients’ business risks in the end may result in a material financial statement 
misstatement. In addition, integrating the manner by which the company manages its 
own business may result in higher-level internal controls that may reduce audit risk (e.g., 
Van Buuren, 2006).  
 
Audit firms have argued that the introduction of this new approach would also result in 
improved audit quality (see Erickson et al., 2000). Audit quality has increased 
significantly in importance in the past ten years, because of – amongst other reasons – 
business failures and audit failures. The fall of Enron and later on the fall of the audit firm 
Arthur Andersen may serve as an example. In Chapter 2 the historical developments 
which gave rise to a reengineered audit approach and other modifications to this 
approach (in addition to adding the concept of ‘client business risk’) will be further 
described.  
 
Both the introduction of a new audit approach and the enlarged focus on audit quality 
were reasons for a new study of the quality of the auditor’s judgment performance. This 
area is currently scarcely explored. Prior studies of the auditor’s judgment performance 
mainly started in the 1980s. These studies have increasingly made use of concepts and 
methodologies from cognitive psychology, e.g., concepts such as consensus as a 
measure of the quality of judgment performance and methodologies such as the policy-
capturing models stemming from the psychology field of science. One of the elements of 
prior research that has extensively been investigated is the relationship between the 
length of the auditor’s tenure with an audit firm and the quality of judgment performance 
(see for example Wright, 1988). Some of these studies do not show that the auditor’s 
judgment performance increases with an increase in experience (e.g., Verkruijsse, 
2005). However, other studies provide evidence that auditors for example seem to be 
open to client persuasion in early years of the client-auditor relationship. It is suggested 
that this phenomenon may be due to “recouping the start-up costs” of the audit firm (see 
for example, Venkataraman and Rama, 2004).  So, mixed evidence has been reported 
in this regard. 
 
The main research question of this thesis is whether and to what extent, the auditor’s 
judgment performance in conducting some tasks of the Business Risk Audit is 
associated with the auditor’s experience. Experience will be used as independent 
variable in this empirical study and will be distinguished into three categories of 
experience: general experience (as measured by the number of years the auditor has 
experience in the auditing field), industry experience (as measured by the number of 
hours spent on the audit of industry-specific audit engagements over the past three 
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years), and task-specific experience (as measured by the number of times the specific 
audit tasks investigated in this thesis have been performed as well as the number of 
hours spent on these tasks). The auditor’s judgment performance has a relationship with 
organizational controls within the audit firm (Van Kuijck, 1999). To what extent these 
controls are of importance related to the Business Risk Audit has been largely 
unexplored until now. Of these controls, one specific control (the perceived level of 
feedback) is added as the fourth independent variable in this thesis. The fifth 
independent variable examined in this thesis is ‘level of risk-aversion’. This variable 
measures the (general) level of risk-aversion in a gamble game. It will be investigated 
whether this type of general risk-aversion influences the auditor’s judgment performance 
in an audit risk assessment task.  
 
In sum, the research questions are as follows: 
1 Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s level of general 
experience, and if so to what extent? 
2 Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s level of industry 
experience, and if so to what extent? 
3 Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s level of task-
specific experience, and if so to what extent? 
4 Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s perceived level 
of feedback when performing a Business Risk Audit task, and if so to what extent? 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the audit profession in the sense that the auditor’s 
judgment performance relating to the Business Risk Audit is largely unexplored. 
Delivering high quality audits is of significant importance to audit firms, specifically in the 
current (litigious) audit environment. This thesis also contributes to audit research 
literature for the same reason. In addition, this thesis incorporates the simultaneous 
examination of various measures of judgment performance (both in terms of accuracy 
and consensus) and various measures of the auditor’s experience (general experience, 
task-specific experience, and industry experience).  
 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, firstly the historical development and 
content of the Business Risk Audit will be described. Secondly, prior research studies 
will be reviewed related to the research questions as set out above. Based on these 
prior research studies, research hypotheses will be developed. Chapter 3 provides an 
exposé on the various elements of the research design and hence provides the context 
and setting in which the research questions have been embedded. The results of the 
empirical study will be described in the Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 is focused on the 
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empirical results related to the task ‘Identification of client’s business risks and entity-
level controls’ while Chapter 5 is focused on the empirical results related to the task 
‘Assessing the impact of client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk’. 
This thesis concludes in Chapter 6 with a summary the findings and addresses the 
implication of these findings from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
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2 Previous literature overview and research hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing audit research literature relating to the 
research questions as described in the previous chapter. These research questions 
focus on the auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the business risk audit 
approach. Regarding the business risk audit approach the focus of this empirical study is 
on the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls’ as 
well as on the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risks and client’s entity-
level controls on audit risk’. Chapter 2 discusses how this empirical study contributes 
both to existing research literature on auditing as well as to the current auditing practice. 
Additionally, in considering previously conducted research studies the arguments 
underlying the research hypotheses of this empirical study are developed.  
 
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. In section 2.2 an overview is provided of the main 
themes of the business risk audit approach and the development of industry-
specialization within audit firms. This will be helpful in selecting specific audit procedures 
for the research design. Section 2.3 describes the auditors’ judgment process when 
performing the procedures investigated in this empirical study. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 
existing literature concerning the auditors’ judgment performance on these audit 
procedures will be discussed.  
 
2.2 Developments in audit methodologies and audit firm’s industry-
specialization 
2.2.1 Developments in audit methodologies 
Financial statement audits comprise the process of evaluating the quality of assertions 
(e.g., completeness or accuracy) versus specific criteria which in the end result in the 
auditors’ opinion on the reliability of the financial statements (Solomon and Shields, 
1995, p. 138). Individual auditors perform audit procedures which are derived from or 
based on the audit methodology as developed by the audit firm where they are 
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employed. Audit methodologies should follow the latest available rules and regulations 
as provided by both national (e.g., NIvRA in the Netherlands) and international 
institutions (e.g., IFAC). However, audit methodologies are also influenced by other 
developments like expectations from the audit market, firm-specific interpretations of 
auditing standards, et cetera (Lemon et al., 2000). Although audit methodologies are 
likely to change over time, in the 1990s audit firms changed their audit methodology 
significantly (Bell et al., 1997; Choy and King, 2003). The following reasons for changing 
the existing audit methodology into the business risk audit methodology can be 
mentioned (see also Lemon et al., 2000): 
• Improving the effectiveness of the financial statement audit (Erickson et al., 2000). 
The previous audit methodology (“systems-based audit approach”) did in some 
cases not detect material misstatements (a.o., detection of going concern 
problems) resulting from the business context (e.g., changing business 
environments, globalization and technological changes). These authors argue that 
industry knowledge would have provided better input into the analytical procedures 
which would have resulted in a signal that the financial statements contained an 
error1. This argument which has recently found some support in the study of 
Blokdijk et al. (working paper, 2004) related to the Dutch audit market place. 
• Improving the efficiency of the financial statement audit. By placing more emphasis 
on the planning stage of the audit, audit firms suggested that this would result in 
opportunities for reductions in substantive testing (Lemon et al., 2000) although 
Kotchetova stated that “the Report of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness emphasized 
the lack of guidance regarding UCB (‘Understanding the client’s business’) 
processes and risks, and linking the nature, timing, and extent of substantive tests 
to risk assessments (Kotchetova, 2002, p.4; POB, 2000, p.19/37).” The previously 
mentioned study of Blokdijk et al. (2004) did not find support for this argument in 
The Netherlands, at least not for Big5 audit firms.  
• Marketing arguments. The auditor’s focus in the financial statement audit is to 
assess the fairness of the financial statements. As a result of this, the auditor is 
likely to find areas where the audit client’s system of internal controls can be 
improved. Since the start of the accounting profession, the auditor has a ‘natural’ 
advisory function to client management in providing recommendations for 
improvement of the client’s control system. The business risk audit approach 
places the auditor even more in the position of sparring with client management 
about the client’s business, which probably results in client management 
requesting additional (assurance) services from the audit firm.  
                                                 
1
 This is what Solomon et al. (1999) call ‘error’-knowledge as distinguished from ‘non-error’ knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge that is helpful in, e.g., understanding the client’s business which is not related to errors). 
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• Changes in technology is suggested to result in data records that are inherently 
less exposed to routine errors and, thus, modern information systems are deemed 
to be more reliable (Bell et al., 1997).  
• Other arguments. Other arguments favorable to the business risk audit approach 
are the increased emphasis of regulators regarding corporate governance (which is 
an argument for a more holistic audit approach), internationalization (internationally 
consistent audit approaches), product differentiation amongst audit firms (since the 
financial statement audit is deemed to be a commodity product, audit firms search 
for opportunities to differentiate themselves from other firms), and better 
understanding of the auditors’ business risk (engagement risk). Auditors’ business 
risk is the risk that “the audit firm will suffer a loss resulting from the engagement, 
via litigation, loss of reputation, or engagement costs exceeding engagement fees 
(Bell, 2001, p. 97; AICPA 1983, AU 312.02).” For example, by understanding that 
the audit client operates in an environment that involves high business risks, the 
auditor evaluates whether and to what extent this potentially impacts the auditors’ 
reputation assuming for example audit failures. In this thesis, the focus is on 
client’s business risk, not on auditors’ business risk. As a result, the concept of 
auditors’ business risk will be ignored in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
In auditing literature the audit firm methodologies were since then named ‘business risk’ 
audit methodology as distinguished from the (primarily) substantive, systems-based and 
audit risk audit methodology. The business risk audit methodology relies “much more 
explicitly than previously on concepts of business analysis and the identification of 
business risk, defined as the risk that the audited entity will fail to achieve its objectives, 
as a means for structuring the audit process” (Lemon et al., 2000, p.1). Admitted, earlier 
textbooks on auditing (e.g., Frielink and De Heer, 1999 and earlier editions) stressed the 
importance of ‘understanding the client’s business’, but theoretical concepts like Porter’s 
(1998) theory of the competitive forces, were not prescribed or recommended to be used 
as standardized tools. Audit firms that already implemented the business risk audit 
approach anticipated international auditing standards. Not earlier than the year 2003 the 
international auditing standards incorporated the concept of ‘business risk’ (e.g. ISA 315, 
330, IFAC, 2003). Lemon et al. (2000, p. 23) argue that regulators may have been 
reluctant to accept the business risk approach since they perceived the business risk 
audit approach to be less effective compared to the conventional audit risk model. 
However, the implementation of a business risk audit approach does not exclude the 
use of this risk model but rather extends the audit risk model as the auditor will also 
assess the impact of identified business risks on assertion-specific audit risks. This is 
visualized in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Relationship between business risk audit and audit risk model (adapted from 
Kotchetova, 2002, p.83) 
 
Client acceptance/ 
retention
Engagement risk/ 
auditor's business risk Audit risk
Understanding the 
client's business Client's business risk Inherent risk
Understanding the 
control environment
Client's entity-level 
internal controls Control risk
Detection risk
Preliminary audit plan
 
 
 
The audit risk model has – despite its criticisms – been used as a generally accepted 
judgment model in the financial statement audit (see also IFAC, 2003). Auditors 
generally do not apply this model as a calculation model (although audit risk has initially 
been presented as a multiplicative formula of inherent risk, control risk, and detection 
risk), but instead have shown that they use the audit risk model as a structured means of 
considering those areas where risks of material errors are likely to occur and to design 
specific audit procedures to detect those (if any) material errors (e.g., Messier and 
Austen, 2000). In addition, Dilla and Stone (1997) reported that auditors are most likely 
to express the audit risk judgments in terms of words and not in terms of numbers (Dilla 
and Stone, 1997, p.712).  
 
The audit process of gathering evidence on the quality of the management assertions in 
the financial statements consists of several phases and each phase consists of several 
tasks or audit procedures. The following phases can be distinguished during the course 
of an audit engagement (Arens et al., 2005; Hayes et al., 2004): 
1 Plan and design an audit approach; 
2 Perform tests of controls and substantive tests of transactions;  
3 Perform analytical procedures and tests of details of balances; 
4 Complete the audit and issue an audit report.  
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Part of the planning stage is to develop an understanding of the client’s business. ISA 
315 (IFAC, 2003, section 6, p.4) states in this regard: “obtaining an understanding of the 
entity and its environment, including its internal control, is a continuous, dynamic 
process of gathering, updating and analyzing information throughout the audit”. This 
information may be used by the auditor as audit evidence to support assessments of the 
risk of material misstatements (in Figure 2.1 described as audit risk). The auditor 
engages in several cognitive processes in the planning phase of the financial statement 
audit, e.g. searching for information regarding the client environment both from sources 
like memory as well as outside sources (Bonner and Pennington, 1991). For planning 
tasks, knowledge is required with respect to understanding the client’s business, which 
comprises factors like economic and industry forces to which the audit client is exposed, 
as well as company-specific factors, e.g. the company’s strategy and objectives, 
business processes, personnel, and financial information systems, etc. The auditor 
should perform the following audit procedures when gaining an understanding of the 
client’s business (ISA315, IFAC, 2003, p.5): 
• Inquiries of management and others within the entity; 
• Analytical procedures;  
• Observation and inspection procedures. 
 
Although these audit procedures basically do not differ from more traditional audit 
approaches, Lemon et al. (2000, p.21) argue that the evidence gathering process in the 
business risk audit approach is different. In the first place, more and other types of 
judgment are necessary in order to get an understanding of the client’s business. E.g., 
the auditor is required under the business risk audit approach to identify at least those 
client’s business risks (both strategic and operational risks) that can impact the fairness 
of the financial statements. Additionally, the auditor needs to identify those internal 
controls (both on an entity-level and a transactional level) that are designed to mitigate 
business risks and audit risks2. These judgments necessarily need to result in a decision 
on the impact of the identified client’s business risks and internal controls on the 
remaining audit procedures (audit work-program). In the second place, and as a result of 
                                                 
2
 See for example ISA 315, section 32 (IFAC, 2003): “Most business risk will eventually have financial 
consequences, and, therefore, an effect on the financial statements. However, not all business risks give 
rise to risks of material misstatement. A business risk may have an immediate consequence for the risk of 
misstatement for classes of transactions, account balances, and disclosures at the assertion level or the 
financial statements as a whole. For example, the business risk arising from a contracting customer base 
due to industry consolidation may increase the risk of misstatement associated with the valuation of 
receivables. However, the same risk, particularly in combination with a contracting economy, may also 
have a longer-term consequence, which the auditor considers when assessing the appropriateness of the 
going concern assumption.” 
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the complex judgments3 to be made, it is expected that more senior levels within the 
audit firm are involved in the evidence gathering process. Since there is more focus on 
the planning phase and inquiries with client management, and given the complexity of 
the client’s environment (including higher-level internal controls), the audit mix will 
necessarily change to more audit manager and audit partner involvement at an early 
stage of the financial statement audit. Thirdly, the evidence gathering process has 
changed in recent years because of increased documentation requirements, e.g. 
PCAOB 3 (PCAOB, 2004). Based on audit documentation standards, the auditor is 
required to transparently document a structured analysis of client’s business risks and 
audit risks, which a document link to the audit procedures planned and conducted (Van 
Buuren, 2005).  
 
Getting an understanding of the client’s business is a separate audit task primarily in the 
planning phase, although risk analysis in general can be found in more phases of the 
audit since the auditor preliminarily assesses audit risks in the planning phase (based on 
prior year knowledge of the client and its environment) and evaluates audit risks after 
having performed tests of controls and substantive tests of transactions. Within the 
planning phase, the following audit tasks have been selected for further examination: 
• The identification of client’s business risks. The auditor searches for those client’s 
business risks that may imply an important threat to the client’s strategy and 
objectives. These business risks may also imply the risk of a material error in the 
financial statements (i.e., audit risk). Inputs in this information search may be prior 
year knowledge of the client’s business, industry-specific templates, client’s risk 
analyses, discussions with the client, etc.  
• The identification of client’s entity-level controls. Having identified the most 
important client’s business risks, the auditor identifies those controls implemented 
by the audit client that are deemed to mitigate or monitor the client’s business risks. 
Controls can be distinguished (see, e.g., PCAOB 2004, AS2 including the control 
deficiency evaluation framework issued December 20, 2004) into entity-level 
controls and transaction-level controls. Entity-level controls have a pervasive effect 
on the organization as a whole and are often – based on COSO (1992) 
distinguished into the following components: (1) control environment, (2) risk 
assessment, (3) information and communication, (4) control activities, (5) 
monitoring. In this thesis, the identification of entity-level controls task will be 
included in the research design. Transaction-level controls are internal controls that 
                                                 
3
 Bell et al. (1997, p.2) state: “It (the strategic Business Measurement Process) guides the focus, breadth 
and depth of the auditor’s knowledge acquisition and the integration of business knowledge into 
expectations about financial-statement assertions.” 
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“must be in place to see that records accurately and fairly reflect transactions in 
and dispositions of a company’s assets; to provide assurance that the records of 
transactions are sufficient to prepare financial statements in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and that receipts and expenditures are 
made only as authorized by management and directors; and to make sure that 
steps are in place to prevent or detect theft, unauthorized use or disposition of the 
company’s assets… (PCAOB, AS2, 2004, p.2).” The identification of transaction-
level controls task is not included in the design of this empirical study. The reason 
for including entity-level controls in the research design is because entity-level 
controls and entity-level knowledge acquisition are viewed as highly important 
aspects of the Business Risk audit approach (e.g., Bell et al., 1997, p.13), 
potentially even more important compared to transaction-level controls.  
• The assessment of the impact of both client’s business risks and entity-level 
controls on audit risk. From Figure 2.1 it follows that the identified client’s business 
risk factors are input for the inherent risk assessment (which is a separate 
component of the audit risk model) and that the quality of the identified controls are 
input for the control risk assessment (which is another component of the audit risk 
model) (see also Taylor, 2000, p.698; Eilifsen et al., 2001, p. 194). The auditor, 
having identified client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls, hence, 
needs to determine their impact on audit risk. This task implies that the auditor 
attaches importance weights to the business risks and controls irrespective 
whether an audit firm makes use of a verbal audit risk model or a numerical audit 
risk model.  
 
Examination of the auditors’ judgment performance regarding the audit tasks selected in 
this thesis in particular is crucial to understanding the impact of any decision errors on 
the auditor’s remaining audit procedures (e.g., tests of controls, analytical procedures 
and substantive testing). The majority of other research studies has been focused on 
these latter stages of the audit and has reported that audit working programs are not 
truly risk-based (e.g. Mock and Wright 1999). Bedard and Graham (2002) suggest that 
specific risk factors (instead of risk assessment) may provide this causal linkage. Recent 
international auditing standards have recognized this point in introducing the concept of 
‘significant risk’ (ISA315, IFAC, 2003, p. 25 and following) for which special audit 
consideration (specific audit procedures) is required. The current empirical study might 
shed more light on this matter.  
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Task characteristics 
Superior performance requires task-specific knowledge (e.g., Bonner, 1990; Tan and 
Libby, 1997). In applying the concept of task-specific knowledge in this thesis, it is 
important to distinguish audit tasks based on specific task-characteristics. In Table 2.1 
the differences in task characteristics between the tasks ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’, and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ on the one hand and 
‘audit risk assessment’ on the other hand are compared. This distinction also bears 
relevance for the research hypotheses, since different hypotheses will be developed for 
identification and assessment tasks. Differences in task structure are expected to have 
different implications for the relationship between experience and the auditor’s judgment 
performance. See further section 2.4 where research hypotheses will be described in 
more detail. 
 
Table 2.1 Audit task characteristics (adapted from Abdolmohammadi, 1999) 
 
Tasks  
Identification of 
client’s business 
risks 
Identification of 
client’s entity-level 
controls 
Assessing impact of 
business risks and 
controls on audit risk 
 
Less well defined 
cues 
Less well defined cues Number of cues 
dependent on previous 
two tasks. 
Number of cues 
unknown 
Number of cues 
unknown 
Number of cues 
dependent on previous 
two tasks 
Requires much 
judgment 
Requires much 
judgment 
Requires much 
judgment 
Nature of task: 
search process 
(both internal and 
external sources) 
Nature of task: search 
process (both internal 
and external sources) 
Nature of task: 
judgment process 
related to importance of 
cues 
Task characteristics 
Output: list of 
significant cues 
Output: list of 
significant cues 
Output: risk 
assessment 
 
Conclusion Relatively 
unstructured 
Relatively 
unstructured 
Relatively structured 
 
Table 2.1 suggests that the identification tasks selected in the experiment are 
categorized as relatively unstructured while the assessment task is categorized as 
relatively structured. With respect to the audit task ‘identification of client’s business 
  
   21 
risks’ auditors may make use of decision aids like business industry-specific risk-
frameworks. The auditor, however, needs to tailor these frameworks to a client-specific 
case-setting since each audit client has its own specific strategy, organizational 
objectives, competitive position, and resulting business risks. This tailoring process 
requires substantial professional judgment. According to section 31, ISA 315 (IFAC, 
2003, pp. 10), the auditor does not have the responsibility to identify or assess all 
business risks based on the argument that business risks are by definition broader than 
the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements. However, the identification 
of business risks increases the likelihood of identifying the risks of material 
misstatement. In addition, ISA 315 (‘Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and 
Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement’, 2003, Appendix 3) provides examples of 
conditions and events (business risks) that may indicate the existence of the risk of a 
material misstatement.  
 
The audit task ‘identification of entity-level controls’ is – in conformity with the 
classification of the task ‘identification of client’s business risks – categorized as 
relatively unstructured. These two tasks share the same task characteristics although 
the potential for judgment errors with respect to the identification of client’s entity-level 
controls may differ from judgment errors with respect to identification of client’s business 
risks because the inputs for the tasks differ. For the identification of client’s business 
risks, the auditor’s judgments is based on, for example, industry-specific knowledge 
databases, experiences with other audit engagements, and interviews with key 
personnel of the audit client. For the identification of client’s entity-level controls, inputs 
to the auditor’s judgments are, for example, client’s business risks identified in an earlier 
stage, descriptions of client’s control framework etc. So, the auditor’s judgments on 
client’s controls may be dependent on the auditor’s judgments on risk identification. 
Given complexities and dynamics in the client’s control environment, the identification of 
controls is a difficult task. Prior research ( e.g., Dirsmith et al. (1991, p.268) suggested 
that independent auditors may not be well equipped to fully understand the role, nature 
and implications of the strategic planning process in dynamic and complex client 
contexts. At the time of their study, it appeared that contemporary independent auditing 
standards were deficient in their neglect of client strategic planning. Recently, auditors 
have been provided with more guidance compared to the beginning of the nineties, both 
in terms of new issued international auditing standards and in terms of auditing 
textbooks (e.g., Knechel, 2001) and firm-specific guidance. Nonetheless, the task is by 
nature difficult, given the dynamics and complexity of the client’s business environment.  
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According to prior research studies related to complex, unstructured audit tasks (e.g., 
Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987; Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Bonner 1990), it is 
expected that domain or task-specific experience contributes to increased judgment 
performance with respect to the audit tasks selected in the experiments. In addition to 
examining the impact of task-specific experience on the auditors’ judgment performance, 
this thesis also investigates the impact of industry-specific experience on the auditors’ 
judgment performance. Auditors with more industry-specific experience potentially have 
developed a more thorough understanding of the client’s industry and – hence – 
potentially identify more or more accurate business risks and mitigating controls.  
 
From the previous discussion on task-characteristics, it follows that examination of the 
audit tasks selected in the experiments is expected to be of benefit to audit practice 
(because of the relative novelty of the business risk audit approach in the area of the 
selected audit tasks in particular) and to auditing research. Given the relatively little 
number of research studies published with respect to the business risk audit approach 
(e.g., Kotchetova, 2002; O’Donnell and Schultz, 2003), the research study in this thesis 
will also contribute to existing auditing research literature.  
 
 
2.2.2 Audit firms’ industry-specialization 
Concurrently, with developing the business risk audit approach, audit firms organized 
themselves along industry-service lines (Gramling and Stone, 2001, p.1). Craswell et al. 
(1995, p.304) reported that only Big8 audit firms in Australia were to some extent 
specialized in certain industries (see also Solomon et al., 1999, p.191). A later study 
(DeFond et al., 2000) reported that at least one non-Big8 firm also is specialized in a 
specific industry, namely the Property-industry (Hong Kong). Specialization in industries 
can result in economies of scale for audit firms, although this not automatically results in 
lower audit costs. Even the opposite seems to be true. Fees of industry-specialists show 
on average premiums of 30% compared to non-specialized firms (Craswell et al., 1995; 
Ferguson et al., 2003). Economies of scale can also be found in terms of an improved 
auditors’ knowledge base and experience effects are likely to occur (see section 2.3). 
Hence, industry specialization potentially impact both audit efficiency and audit 
effectiveness. To the extent that accounting policies are industry-specific (e.g., the 
industry of financial services with complex financial instruments or finance 
arrangements), industry-specialization is necessary in order to conduct effective audits. 
Hogan and Jeter (1999, p.15) state that “the benefits of industry expertise or 
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specialization are likely to increase with the complexity of the industry.” They also 
reported greater audit firm concentration in regulated industries compared to non-
regulated industries. Craswell et al. (1995, p.304) argue that industry-specialization is 
not necessarily connected to a specific (Big8) audit firm as a whole, but the level of 
industry-expertise is determined by (unique personnel of) a specific office of the audit 
firm. Industry-expertise is acquired through experience when auditing specific industry-
related clients. These authors argue that it is unlikely that networking externalities are 
determinant to industry-specialization.  
 
Relevant for our study is the question to what extent industry-specialization contributes 
to audit quality or the auditors’ judgment performance4. An overview of existing literature 
on this relationship will be described in the following sections of this Chapter. In 
paragraph 2.2 we have provided an introduction into the business risk audit approach 
and the development of industry-specialization. These two topics provide the context of 
this empirical study. The central research question of this study is concerned with the 
auditor’s judgment performance regarding the business risk audit approach. Derived 
from this general research question is the question to what extent experience (general, 
industry-specific, and task-specific experience) contributes to the auditors’ judgment 
performance on specific tasks of the business risk audit approach. With that objective in 
mind, the next section deals with the auditors’ judgment process in general.  
 
2.3 Judgment performance of the auditor 
This section is concerned with the quality of the auditors’ judgment process. An 
important goal of examining the auditors’ judgment process is to detect areas where 
these judgments can be improved (e.g., Ashton, 1985, p.173). Since the seventies of the 
last century, many accounting research studies have been published dealing with the 
auditors’ judgment process. In 1984, Gibbins stated that “we do not yet have a good 
understanding of what happens when experienced people, such as public accountants, 
use their judgments to make decisions that matter, amid the pressures, constraints, 
dangers, and opportunities of their everyday environment (Gibbins, 1984, p.103). Since 
1984, researchers in the auditing discipline have learned a lot more about judgments 
and decisions of auditors although much still is left open for further investigation. The 
                                                 
4
 If auditees voluntarily contract with higher-priced industry specialists even though any licensed auditor 
can legally perform audits, then this is evidence that quality-differentiated audits based on industry-
expertise are economically demanded” (Craswell et al., 1995, p.299). 
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current empirical study aims at contributing to the auditing research literature by 
examining aspects of the auditors’ judgment process with regard to the business risk 
audit approach.  
 
Since the introduction of the business risk audit approach, only a few studies were 
published, In particular regarding the task ‘identification of risk factors’ (Bedard and 
Graham, 2002, p.40) relatively little empirical studies were published. In section 2.2 it 
was argued that the business risk audit approach in particular involves significant 
judgment and broad skills of the auditor. The auditor should for example be able to 
“assess the position of a business in its environment, matters of strategy, operation and 
finance (Lemon et al., 2000, p.22).” Practicing auditors have not been made familiar with 
these topics in the CPA courses. Given the fact that professional standard setters 
recently came up with guidance regarding the business risk audit approach (e.g., 
ISA315, IFAC, 2003), auditor’s knowledge and skills before 2003 are expected to be 
highly generated by practical experience and firm-specific guidance. Prior to 2003, 
generally applicable guidance regarding the concept of ‘business risk’ was not made 
available to the audit firms.  
 
Judgment biases in general 
The auditor’s judgment performance is directly concerned with audit quality. It is known 
from psychological research studies that every individual – whether expert or not – is 
prone to biases (i.e., systematic errors, Conlisk, 1996, p.670; see also Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1981) in judgment and decision-making processes. Conlisk (1996) for example 
provides an extensive list of such biases in which people: “display intransitivity, 
misunderstand statistical independence, mistake random data for patterned data and 
vice versa, fail to appreciate law of large number effects, fail to recognize statistical 
dominance, make errors in updating probabilities on the basis of new information, 
misunderstand the significance of given sample sizes, fail to understand co-variation for 
even the simplest 2*2 contingency tables, make false inferences about causality, ignore 
relevant information, use irrelevant information, exaggerate the importance of vivid over 
pallid evidence, exaggerate the importance of fallible predictors, exaggerate the ex ante 
probability of a random event which has already occurred, display over-confidence in 
judgment relative to evidence, exaggerate confirming over disconfirming evidence 
relative to initial beliefs, and give answers that are highly sensitive to logically irrelevant 
changes in questions.” With respect to the business risk audit, O’Donnell and Schultz Jr. 
(2005, p.921) reported a so-called ‘halo-effect’ which is a “marked tendency to think of 
the person in general as rather good or rather inferior and to color the judgments of the 
person’s specific performance attributes by this general feeling.” With respect to the 
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business risk audit, O’Donnell and Schultz jr. examined the question whether auditors 
who conduct a business risk audit (specifically the strategic risk assessment as part of 
the holistic perspective of the business risk audit approach) are less likely to adjust 
account-level risk assessments for inconsistent fluctuations. These authors found 
support for this hypothesis. This study hence clarifies how procedures in the planning 
phase may have consequences for the judgment process in later phases of the financial 
statement audit.  
 
Judgment biases in auditing 
Auditors are prone to the same biases compared to other individuals. However, biases 
are often task-specific. In the next sections we will deal with judgment biases - specific 
to the tasks selected in this empirical study – we expect to be present in the dataset of 
this study.  
 
An objective of research regarding judgment processes is to provide directions for 
improvement of judgment and decision-making. If we compare the list of biases above 
with the perception of auditing standards which state that the auditor exercises 
professional judgment and professional skepticism, the question rises whether and to 
what extent audit firms and individual auditors have learned from previous research 
results. Audit firms have put controls in place in order to mitigate the biases to an 
acceptable level. The following examples (not limitative) are provided. First of all, 
auditors show learning from experience5. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 this topic will be 
discussed in more detail, as experience is not always a good predictor of improved 
performance. Secondly, part of the quality control procedures of audit firms is the 
(internal) review process (e.g., Libby and Trotman, 1993; IFAC, ISQC1, 2003) and the 
concept of ‘accountability’ (review awareness) although accountability can also 
contribute to another bias in judgment, for example conservativeness (Glover 1997). As 
a sub-aspect of the second argument, judgments can be formed by individuals and by 
groups of auditors. In recent years, there is a tendency towards more group judgment 
and decision-making. Examples of group- or team-based judgment processes are team 
planning events, team meetings in the period between preliminary and final audit, and 
team wrap-up events (after final audit has taken place). A third example of an audit firm 
control is the use of decision aids like checklists, industry-specific templates, etc. Audit 
firms have to consider carefully how decision aids are composed, since decision aids 
also can result in other judgment biases. Bedard and Graham (2002) provide, for 
                                                 
5
 “Learning is promoted by favorable conditions such as rewards, repeated opportunities for practice, 
small deliberation cost at each repetition, good feedback, unchanging circumstances, and a simple 
context. Conversely, learning is hindered or blocked by the opposite conditions (Conlisk, 1996, p.670).” 
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example, evidence of the impact on auditors’ judgment performance of differences in 
positively and negatively used wordings. Another example might be whether risk 
assessments in a decision aid are presented in words (e.g., low, medium, high) or in 
numbers (e.g., 0-9) (Dilla and Stone, 1997). A final example of audit firm controls is the 
required partner rotation from an engagement after seven years. These controls can all 
serve as mechanisms to mitigate bias in individual judgment and decision-making. 
Despite these control mechanisms, research studies still report biases in auditor’s 
judgments (e.g. Tubbs et al., 1990; Tuttle and Stocks, 1998).  
 
Judgment biases related to audit tasks selected in this thesis  
The identification of client’s business risks task and the identification of client’s entity-
level controls task share the characteristic of searching for information and selecting it 
for further consideration during the audit. Compared to for example the audit risk 
assessment task, identification tasks are more complex because of making a selection 
of those risks and controls which are deemed to be relevant to the financial statement 
audit. Assessment tasks as defined in the design in this thesis, however, are based on 
identified risk factors and entity-level controls in an earlier stage of the audit and only 
ask for judgment regarding the impact of those risk factors and entity-level controls on 
audit risk. The identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls comprises 
both information search and storage in memory (Einhorn and Hogarth (1981, p.10). In 
the search for information a potential bias in the auditor’s judgment process is ‘selective 
attention’. I.e., the auditor will not pay equal attention to each of the potentially relevant 
cues (risks and/or controls). A second potential bias is the so-called ‘dilution-effect’ 
(Glover, 1997). A dilution-effect occurs when an individual ignores relevant information 
and/or selects or over-emphasizes irrelevant or less-relevant information. It is 
imaginable that the business risk audit approach results in more cues to be dealt with, 
and that the ‘dilution’ bias more frequently occurs compared to the more traditional audit 
approaches. This judgment bias might be mitigated to a certain extent by the use of 
checklists (e.g., Bonner and Pennington, 1991) developed by the audit firm, allowing 
auditors to better identify the relevant client’s business risks and entity-level controls. A 
third potential judgment bias with respect to identification tasks is the presence of 
‘anchoring’. Based on prior experiences, an individual develops “strong initial views 
which are resistant to change because they influence the way that subsequent 
information is interpreted (Slovic, 1987).” New information which is contrary to this initial 
view is not appropriately considered in the auditor’s judgment process 
(confirmation/disconfirmation bias) because this is viewed as unreliable, inaccurate, or 
not representative. ‘Novice’ auditors may be more prone to confirmation bias compared 
to ‘expert’ auditors (Kaplan and Reckers 1989; Bonner and Pennington, 1991), although 
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even experts can ignore or overlook relevant information (see for example Ballou et al., 
2002). Ballou et al. reported that auditors typically overlooked or underweighted critical 
information when a client’s strategic position was consistent with industry averages (see 
also Early, 2002).  
 
The auditor is expected to frequently draw experiences of events from his/her long-term 
memory given the presence of time- and budget pressure. These events originate both 
from the audit client for which the business risks are identified as well as from other 
client’s environments. In addition, the auditor derives risk-information both from the 
knowledge databases available within the audit firm and client-specific information 
sources (like strategic plans, information from interviews with key personnel, etc.). Once 
the appropriate risks and controls have been identified, the auditor is required to assess 
the impact of these cues on one single variable (audit risk) which is both a more 
traditional task with which the auditor is experienced as well as a relatively easy task.  
 
2.4 Development of research hypotheses 
In this section, existing auditing research studies will be described which are relevant to 
the research questions of this empirical study, which are:  
• Is the auditors’ judgment performance influenced by the level of the auditors’ 
experience? 
• Is the auditors’ judgment performance influenced by the perceived level of 
feedback when performing risk assessment tasks? 
• Is the auditors’ judgment performance influenced by the level of risk-aversion? 
 
Subsequently, the research hypotheses following these research questions will be 
discussed. 
2.4.1 The potential impact of experience on judgment performance 
From the seventies to approximately the midst of the eighties in previous century most of 
the experience-related auditing research has used general experience – measured as 
the number of years the auditor is experienced in the auditing field – as measure of the 
potential impact of experience on judgment performance. Based on the mixed results 
these research studies presented, it was suggested that experience was only a useful 
concept when it was specified to the audit task selected in experiments. Indeed, an 
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auditor can be employed an entire life at an audit firm, but during this employment 
probably can conduct only a selective number of audit tasks. Since the midst of the 
nineties, when the worldwide (in The Netherlands then Big6) audit firms specialized in 
specific industries, research studies emerged which used industry-specific experience 
when measuring the impact of experience on judgment performance. In this empirical 
study, the impact of the three categories of experience on judgment performance will be 
considered. In this section, a review of studies related to these categories of experience 
will be subsequently discussed.  
 
General experience 
Gibbins (1984, p.105) argues that “experience, whether direct or indirect (as via 
education), is crucially important in bringing structure to the judge’s psychological 
process”. Gibbins (1984, p.106) continues with proposing that experience is helpful in 
producing a pre-structured guide to the auditor’s judgment. These guides are based on 
the fact that knowledge is stored in and retrieved from long-term memory. More 
experienced auditors have relatively better developed knowledge structures in their long-
term memory, making it more efficient to retrieve this knowledge from memory. On the 
other hand, it is expected that more experienced auditors form judgment based on 
intuition compared to less experienced auditors, because more knowledge is available 
which can be used and less time is needed to think in judgment processes. Auditing 
research literature has – however – produced mixed results on the impact of experience 
on the auditor’s judgment performance (e.g. Bonner, 1990). In earlier studies (before 
1990), the main conclusion was that general experience did not contribute to judgment 
performance (e.g., Ashton 1974, Hamilton and Wright 1982; Slovic, 1972). See Wright 
(1988) for a complete review of these and other related studies. This makes Trotman 
(1998) conclude that “with hind-sight there was little reason to expect experience effects 
in these studies” (Trotman, 1998, p. 136) because many of the research studies referred 
to included relatively well-structured audit tasks, such as internal control evaluation. 
Trotman (1998, p.136) specifically points out that many of these tasks “did not include 
components such as cue selection where knowledge is likely to improve performance.” It 
was suggested (e.g., Hamilton and Wright, 1982) that the auditor’s judgment 
performance would be positively associated with the auditor’s years of experience with 
respect to semi-structured and unstructured tasks (e.g., Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 
1987).  
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As described in section 2.4, the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’ and 
‘client’s entity-level controls’ are less structured compared to ‘assessment tasks’. With 
respect to the relatively unstructured task of materiality and disclosure judgments, 
Messier (1983) reports that audit partners with more than 15 years of experience show 
higher levels of consensus compared to less experienced audit partners.  
 
Abdolmohammadi and Wright (1987) also examined the auditor’s judgment performance 
with respect to determining the appropriate disclosure for a proposed audit adjustment, 
and reported differences in judgment performance between more experienced and less 
experienced auditors. They found that experienced auditors were significantly less likely 
to require an adjustment or a qualified opinion compared to the less experienced 
auditors.  
 
Kaplan and Reckers (1989) examined the initial planning process of auditors. Auditors 
were provided with the results of analytical tests and were asked to assess the likelihood 
that fluctuations were caused by accounting errors or environmental changes (initial 
belief). Subsequently, auditors were asked to indicate the information they would seek in 
response to the test results. Kaplan and Reckers found that auditors’ initial beliefs were 
systematically associated with experience which provides an indication that experience 
contributes to judgment performance in an information selection task (i.e. more 
experienced auditors were less prone to anchoring effects in this task). Kaplan’s and 
Reckers’ study provides support for a positive association between the auditor’s 
judgment performance and general experience. 
 
In an experiment, Bonner (1990) reported judgment out-performance for more 
experienced auditors in selecting analytical risk factors. Her study compared a relatively 
structured task (control risk procedures) with a less structured task (analytical risk 
procedures). This provides evidence that the task-structure is of relevance when 
assessing the impact of general experience on the auditor’s judgment performance. 
General experience alone is, hence, insufficient as an explanatory variable for 
differences in judgment performance across auditors.  
 
A comparable result has been reported by Frederick (1991) with respect to the task 
‘retrieval of internal control knowledge from memory’. Frederick (1991) concluded that 
experts and novices differ with respect to knowledge structures and memory. In domains 
where specific knowledge is required for performing an audit task appropriately, experts 
are assumed to outperform novices. Experts differ from novices with respect to internal 
control knowledge in making use of both taxonomy knowledge structures (e.g., 
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knowledge ordered by control objectives) and schematic knowledge structures (e.g., 
significant classes of transactions). This enables experts to retrieve more cues and/or 
better order retrieval of cues.  
 
Additionally, Simnett (1996) reports that in an information selection task, information 
load (the number of cues included in experiments) is a limiting factor for predictive 
judgment accuracy, but that this information load was partly mitigated by experience 
effects. The information selection task in his experiment constituted the selection of 
financial ratios out of a menu of potential ratios which were of relevance in predicting a 
corporate bankruptcy. Of particular interest to the current empirical study, is Simnett’s 
finding that this effect did not occur for an information processing task (i.e., assessing 
the likelihood of a corporate failure based on financial ratios).  
 
A more recently conducted study of Bedard and Graham (2002, p.53) reports that 
general experience in auditing did not improve the auditors’ judgment performance in 
risk factor identification and audit planning. Repeated engagement experience on the 
other hand was found to improve the auditors’ judgment performance in these tasks. 
Bedard and Graham particularly examined the impact of the wording of decision aids on 
the auditors’ judgment performance in identifying client’s risk factors. Their results 
indicate that negatively worded decision aids resulted in more risk factors being 
identified compared to those auditors who use a positively worded decision aid. 
Appropriately designed decision aids hence can be helpful in realizing improved 
judgment performance which potentially has a positive impact on audit effectiveness.  
 
This section provided an overview of research studies related to the impact of the 
auditors’ general experience in auditing on judgment performance. Mixed results have 
been reported. However, many of these studies (e.g., Trotman, 1998) also indicated that 
general experience may not be an appropriate measure of auditor expertise given the 
specific environment and personal attributes of auditors. A common finding in these 
studies is also that task structure potentially provides an explanation of the mixed 
findings (e.g., Early, 2002; Wright 1988). In a verbal protocol study, Biggs and Mock 
(1983) found evidence that suggested explanations for the supposed lack of association 
between general experience and judgment performance. In the first place, in the 
information acquisition phase of the audit, the search for relevant information may be 
incomplete, and secondly auditors prematurely close the judgment processes and do not 
assess all alternatives accordingly. In addition, auditors use different criteria in the 
evaluation of audit evidence (for example: efficiency criteria and/or effectiveness 
criteria). Biggs and Mock (1983) also argue that because of lack of normative solutions, 
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consensus between auditors is not naturally reached. Trotman (1998) adds to this by 
arguing that often relatively simple tasks were selected in research designs, making 
insufficient distinction between task components. As a result, experience differences 
related to relatively simple tasks cannot be expected. An additional argument of Trotman 
(1998) is that auditors with the same general experience have different specific 
experiences. An increase of general experience is, hence, expected to result in 
deviations from optimal decision making. As a result, a negative impact of general 
experience on judgment performance in assessment tasks is expected. For more 
unstructured tasks like identification tasks, the auditor is expected to benefit from 
general experience, since the auditor’s performance is driven by his/her abilities (and is 
expected to be less driven by client-specific experiences since the auditor does not 
make use of general frameworks or knowledge databases in an assessment task) which 
are expected to have benefit in the process of searching for information and storage of 
information in the auditor’s memory.  
 
Analysis of prior research on the impact of the auditors’ experience in auditing gives rise 
to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of 
client’s business risks’ and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ correlates 
positively with general experience.  
 
H1b: The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the task ‘assessment of the 
impact of client’s business risks’ and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk’ 
correlates negatively with general experience.  
 
Industry-specific experience 
In recent years, steadily more research has been conducted regarding the impact of 
industry-specific experience on the auditor’s judgment performance. However, the 
impact of industry-experience on the auditors’ judgment performance related to the 
specific tasks selected in the current research design has received little attention.  
 
Taylor (Taylor, 2000, p.698-699) provides a summary of the knowledge base 
characteristics of auditors who specialized in a specific industry: 
1 Knowledge of specific errors related to the account and the relative frequency of 
those errors (Owhoso et al., 2002; Ashton 1991); 
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2 Knowledge of the types of procedures and policies that are typically in place to 
prevent, detect, and correct such errors (Libby 1985; Libby and Frederick 1990); 
3 Knowledge of error (Bédard and Biggs 1991) and non-error explanations of 
unexpected analytical review results (Solomon et al., 1999); 
4 Knowledge of unique industry audit risks (Wright and Wright 1997); 
5 Knowledge of environmental, economic, and contextual factors that influence the 
likelihood of errors (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986); and 
6 Knowledge of the dynamics of the industry and how those dynamics may affect 
incentives to misstate financial information in general (Solomon et al., 1999). 
 
One of the first studies regarding the impact of industry-experience on auditors’ 
judgment performance was Bedard and Biggs (1991a). This study examined an 
analytical procedures task in the context of manufacturing industry experience and 
domain-specific experience (experience related to the account inventory). They reported 
that industry-experienced auditors were better able to identify seeded errors in client’s 
data.  
 
Wright and Wright (1997) conducted an experiment with auditors specialized in the retail 
industry. They included four material errors in the case, of which three errors were 
related to the retail industry. Results of the experiment indicated that industry experience 
significantly enhanced hypothesis generation in error identification but did, however, not 
result in expected risk assessments.  
 
In their experiment with banking and health care industry specialized auditors, Solomon 
et al. (1999) reported that industry-experience resulted in relatively more non-error-
knowledge (e.g., a better understanding of client’s business), but did not significantly 
contribute to error-knowledge (e.g., knowledge of occurrence and categories of financial 
statements errors across or within industries).  
 
Taylor’s (2000) study revealed that non-specialized auditors were more conservative 
and showed less self-confidence in their industry-specific decisions compared to 
industry-specialized (banking) auditors. His results further indicated that auditors 
experienced in the banking industry showed higher judgment performance in an inherent 
risk assessment task for an industry-specific financial statement account (loans 
receivable) compared to non-industry-experienced auditors. Differences in judgment 
performance, however, related to a not-industry-specific financial statement (property 
and equipment) were not as great as those related to the selected industry-specific 
account.  
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Erickson et al., (2000) analyzed the Lincoln Savings & Loan (LSL) audit failure. Their 
main conclusion regarding the audit failure was “that the most significant shortcoming in 
the LSL audit was the auditor’s failure to obtain and use knowledge of LSL’s business, 
the industry in which it operated, and the economic forces that influenced this 
industry/business (Erickson et al., 2000, p.168).” From this argument, it can be derived 
that these authors assume that an increase in industry knowledge and experience would 
result in higher judgment performance, which in the LSL case even might have 
prevented audit failure. Hence, they argued that industry experience potentially would 
constitute the most important determinant of auditor expertise.  
 
Comparable with Erickson et al. (2000), Gramling and Stone (2001) argue – based on 
Kwon (1996) – that auditors experienced in a specific industry, are better positioned to 
assess the reasonableness of clients’ estimates and other financial representations, 
thereby reducing the client’s discretion in applying accounting principles.  
 
Since no previous research studies were directed towards investigation of the impact of 
industry-experience on judgment performance regarding the identification of client’s 
business risks and entity-level controls task, our research hypothesis has to be 
developed by “reasoning by analogy with other audit tasks”. For the majority of studies, 
a positive contribution of industry-experience to the auditors’ judgment performance has 
been reported.  
 
Based on the literature review presented in this section, the following hypothesis will be 
tested: 
 
H2: The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of 
client’s business risks’, ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and 
‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business risks and client’s entity-level 
controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with industry-experience.  
 
Task-specific experience 
Provided the mixed results which have been reported in previous research studies 
regarding the impact of general experience on judgment performance, Hamilton and 
Wright (1982) suggested that adding more domain-specific information to background 
materials in case settings, experience might significantly more influence the auditors’ 
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judgment performance. Later studies (e.g., Colbert 1989; Bonner 1990) have used this 
as an argument to develop other measures of expertise related to experience: domain-
specific or task-specific experience. This was based on the argument that auditors with 
the same level of general experience are likely to have different specific experiences 
(like task-specific experience) and training (Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Libby 1989). 
Additionally, different auditors show different learning patterns over time. Domain-
specific knowledge is gained through experience and instruction (Solomon et al., 1999). 
In the cognitive psychology discipline, Alba and Hutchinson (1987) found that generally 
an increase in task-familiarity contributed to judgment performance showed in that task.  
 
Bonner and Lewis (1990) reported that experienced auditors showed higher judgment 
performance compared to less experienced auditors. Further investigation of the 
composition of this experience effect showed that general experience only explained 
10% of the variance. In contrast, most of the proportion of variance was explained by 
task-specific training and task-specific experience.  
 
Bonner was one of the first researchers who examined the concept of task complexity 
for which no well-accepted definition exists (Bonner and Pennington, 1991, p.38-39). In 
one of her studies (Bonner, 1990), she conducted an experiment with two tasks (control 
risk assessment and analytical procedures risk assessment) which differed in task 
complexity. Analytical procedures risk is a sub-set of detection risk and is defined as: the 
risk that analytical procedures will fail to detect a material error. Bonner (Bonner, 1990, 
p.77) argues that the control risk assessment task is performed by relatively 
inexperienced auditors where analytical procedures risk assessments are performed by 
more experienced auditors. In other words, relatively inexperienced auditors are 
assumed to have a good developed knowledge base regarding control risk 
assessments, and are also assumed to develop their knowledge base through 
experience regarding analytical procedures risk assessment. For each of these tasks, 
both the selection of cues (identification of the factors impacting the assessment 
decision) and the impact assessment were included in the experiment. Results indicated 
that task-specific knowledge was positively associated to the auditors’ performance only 
in the analytical procedures risk assessment task (the complexity of this task was higher 
compared to the control risk assessment task). Although this study has highly 
contributed to the existing research literature, Bonner’s experiment in the selection tasks 
was limited to selecting risk factors from a pre-defined list of risk factors which contained 
both targets and distracters. Experiment participants were requested to select the most 
appropriate risk factors from this list where judgment performance was measured in 
terms of the number of accurately selected targets. From a real-world perspective the 
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selection task is quite more complex than ‘ticking boxes’ on a pre-defined list. It is hence 
questionable whether and if so, to what extent, similar results would occur if the 
experiment had come more close to real-world settings. In the current study, no pre-
defined list of risk factors and entity-level controls will be provided to the participants. 
This research design issue may, as a result, contribute to existing research literature, by 
providing more clarity regarding the auditors’ judgment performance regarding the 
complex task of identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls. 
 
Researchers examined the impact of task-specific experience (others – e.g., Solomon et 
al., 1999 use the term ‘domain-specific’ experience) in a variety of tasks. For example, 
Bedard and Biggs (1991a) investigated the task of evaluating management 
representations, based on recognition and recall, related to the analytical procedures 
task. Management representations may constitute audit evidence, although this type of 
audit evidence is generally less persuasive compared to inspection of documentation 
and management’s response in explaining deviations or fluctuations in financial results, 
might be biased. In this experiment, Bedard and Biggs reported that domain-specific 
experience was more highly associated with improved judgment performance compared 
to experience in general. In another study, Bedard and Biggs (1991b) found that 
managers were better than seniors in explaining a recognized pattern of cues. This 
suggests that general experience (as proxied by rank) indeed can be an important 
determinant of the auditors’ judgment performance. However, general experience as 
such was not sufficient to produce accurate judgments, since many of the participating 
managers did not generate correct hypotheses. In accordance with Davis and Solomon 
(1989) it is proposed that specialized experience (here meant as task-specific or 
domain-specific experience) is more likely to result in more rapid, efficient accumulation 
of representative error patterns.  
 
Based on these studies – although the tasks investigated in previous research studies 
are not fully matching to the tasks examined in the current study – it can be preliminary 
concluded that previous research indicates that task-specific knowledge for some audit 
tasks contributes positively to the auditors’ judgment performance. Later studies (e.g., 
Solomon et al., 1999) have not produced dissimilar results. This resulted in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of 
client’s business risks’, ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and 
‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business risks and client’s entity-level 
controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with task-specific experience.  
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2.4.2 The potential impact of feedback on judgment performance 
Section 2.4.1 provided an overview of existing research studies regarding the impact of 
experience on judgment performance. However, the auditor not only gets experience 
from direct practical experience, e.g. by conducting an audit task, but also acquires 
expertise by receiving feedback from supervisors and indirect education requirements 
(Colbert 1989, p.137).  
 
Feedback 
People generally are limited in their ability to process information in uncertain 
environments (Balzer et al., 1989, p.410). What mechanisms may be in place to deal 
with this limitation? Among others, feedback mechanisms may enhance learning from 
past judgments (e.g., Davis and Solomon, 1989). Feedback has been defined as “the 
process by which an environment returns to individuals a portion of the information in 
their response output necessary to compare their present strategy with a representation 
of an ideal strategy” (Balzer et al., 1989, p.410).  
 
Feedback and identification tasks 
In an identification task (e.g., the identification of client’s business risks), auditors - 
besides using other knowledge sources - retrieve information from their long-term 
memory. As described in section 2.3 the auditor probably experiences bias in this recall 
process (for example confirmation/disconfirmation bias). Libby and Trotman (1993) 
conducted an experiment examining whether a review (feedback) mechanism would 
result in adequate consideration of evidence that was inconsistent with initial judgments. 
It is assumed that the initial decision maker and the reviewer use the same evidence in 
the working papers. An auditor (in his/her role of initial decision maker) compares 
current evidence with evidence recalled from prior audits of the engagement under 
consideration and evidence from other engagements. If this recall mechanism does not 
work appropriately (the initial decision-maker can either recall consistent or inconsistent 
evidence), the reviewer’s judgment process potentially will be influenced. The results of 
Libby’s and Trotman’s experiment suggested that a review process indeed can serve as 
an appropriate control mechanism by increasing the likelihood that inconsistent evidence 
is sufficiently considered, suggesting that the review mechanisms serves as an effective 
control (Libby and Trotman, 1993, p.559). This finding is consistent with cognitive 
psychology research which suggests that, because of their more well-developed 
knowledge structures, more experienced reviewers will be better positioned to detect 
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and recall inconsistent information (e.g., Alba and Hutchinson, 1987). Ballou (2001) 
conducted an experiment in which auditor characteristics in the review process were 
examined. The dependent variable in this study was the number of review notes made 
by the participants. Review notes were distinguished into evidence-oriented and 
documentation-oriented review notes. Evidence-oriented review notes referred to those 
review notes in which the reviewer requests the preparer of the audit documentation 
seeking additional evidence to sufficiently corroborate or refute management’s 
explanations. Documentation-oriented review notes referred to those review notes which 
ask for additional documentation where the conclusion of the preparer of the 
documentation is not at stake. Of interest to the current study is that Ballou (2001) 
reported a negative association between the number of evidence-oriented review notes 
and general experience (no significant association between the number of evidence-
oriented review notes and task-specific experience). On the other hand, a significant 
positive association was reported between the number of documentation-oriented review 
notes and task-specific (review) experience. Note that the number of review notes is in 
Ballou’s study a dependent variable, while feedback in the current study is an 
independent variable (measured in number of times a specific task has been performed 
and number of hours spent on a specific task). It would require further examination 
whether and, if so, to what extent general experience and task-specific (review) 
experience are inversely related to each other; this would imply that the review task is 
more often performed by less experienced auditors in audit practice.  
 
Feedback and accountability 
Tan (1995) conducted an experiment in which he investigated the preventive effect of an 
announced review that would take place. Professional guidance (e.g. AICPA 1988, sec. 
320.02) addresses the importance of such reviews as quality control device. From 
previous research it has been documented that the ‘threat’ of an upcoming review6 
(whether internal or external to the audit firm) will result in increased cognitive effort in 
the recall process (Tan, 1995, p. 115). On the other hand, previous research suggested 
that auditors, e.g. because of time pressure, rely more on their memory than on previous 
year’s working papers, which potentially results in the bias of selective attention (the bias 
that relevant information will be ignored and irrelevant information will be over-weighted). 
Tan found support that accountability resulted in higher levels of judgment performance 
as measured by consensus and self-insight. Compared to the study of Libby and 
Trotman (1993), there is evidence that both the actual review process as well as the 
threat of a potential review result in improved judgment performance.  
                                                 
6
 This refers to the concept of ‘accountability’. 
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Feedback and providing instructions 
Feedback mechanisms may be related to individual audit tasks (written or verbal 
comments of the reviewer) and feedback at the end of the audit. The quality of feedback 
is dependent on the level of knowledge of the superior, time constraints and the 
superior’s motivation for reviewing (Bonner and Pennington, 1991). Bonner’s and 
Pennington’s study focused on feedback related to individual tasks. Better judgment 
performance of the auditors is associated with tasks in which they receive more 
instruction compared to the tasks in which auditors receive no instruction. In addition, 
these researchers found that “expert performance tends to be better for tasks with good 
learning environments for the initial acquisition of the knowledge needed. These learning 
environments include extensive instruction prior to practice and feedback that is timely, 
accurate, complete and useful”.  
 
Feedback and assessment tasks 
In a study, conducted by Ashton (1990), it is suggested that feedback might contribute to 
increased judgment consensus related to audit risk assessments, but only in the case-
setting where no decision-aid is used. A typical difficulty in audit practice in providing 
feedback on audit risk assessments is that no accuracy criterion is available which 
poses constraints on the type of feedback that supervisors are able to provide to the 
reviewees, because a high level of audit risk for a specific account and/or assertion does 
not always result in material financial statement errors.  
 
Based on the review of prior literature, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H4: The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of 
client’s business risks’, ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and 
‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business risks and client’s entity-level 
controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with feedback received from supervisors 
when conducting audit risk assessments. 
 
2.4.3 The potential impact of risk-aversion on judgment performance 
The sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 were concerned with experience and feedback as potential 
determinants of the auditor’s expertise. This section deals for the current empirical study 
with a final potential determinant of expertise, namely the level of risk-aversion. As 
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opposed to the previously described determinants, this determinant is viewed as a 
personal trait which would apply to all people, not the group of auditors in particular.  
 
In every day’s life, individuals are faced with uncertainty and with exposure to risk. In 
addition, people are living in an environment in which their perceptions are influenced by 
family and friends’ perceptions, and events that take place in their lives (Slovic, 1987). In 
cognitive psychology, often a distinction is made between novices and experts. Given 
the uncertainty in every day’s life, even experts’ decisions may be based on their 
intuition, rather than on evidence or rationality. In section 2.3, it was argued that even 
experts are prone to judgment biases. In this section we will examine existing literature 
regarding the impact of risk-aversion on judgment performance.  
 
The level of risk-aversion as potential determinant of expertise has until now received 
little attention in auditing research.  
 
Slovic (1987) stated, based on earlier research, that “disagreements about risk should 
not be expected to evaporate in the presence of evidence. Strong initial views are 
resistant to change because they influence the way that subsequent information is 
interpreted. New evidence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one’s 
initial beliefs; contrary evidence tends to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or 
unrepresentative (Slovic, 1987, p.281).” This tendency is also known as “anchoring”. 
From the perspective of the audit task which is subject of the current empirical study, 
auditors show a conservatism bias (Smith and Kida, 1991). Shelton (1996) suggests that 
this conservatism bias may be enhanced by accountability. Conservatism may be 
defined in terms of sticking to prior beliefs (which is a form of ‘anchoring’) but also to 
being risk-averse in general. With regard to the audit task ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ auditors may for example show that they identify more risk factors than 
would be appropriate for the sake of completeness of documentation. The business risk 
audit approach is indeed a risk-based approach, but from a theoretical perspective risk 
identification is not an objective in itself, but rather should direct the auditor’s attention to 
areas for more specific audit consideration. ISA 315 (IFAC, 2003) even states explicitly 
that the auditor does not have a responsibility to identify or assess all business risks. 
Nonetheless, from an accountability perspective, the auditor may have a drive to search 
for negative information (i.e., risk factors) (see for example Anderson and Maletta, 
1999). Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) reported that less experienced auditors 
assessed risk higher based on information which was negative by nature compared to 
the more experienced auditors. Cohen and Kida (1989) suggested that auditors 
insufficiently take positive evidence into account in an analytical procedures task. If their 
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results would also apply to an identification task setting, it can be argued that risk-averse 
auditors would pay less attention to identification of the most appropriate control 
mechanisms, which can be viewed as ‘positive’ evidence.  
 
The concept of risk-aversion is not assumed to have a direct relationship with the 
auditor’s judgment performance related to the identification tasks selected in the 
research design. Hence, research hypotheses were not developed. With respect to the 
auditor’s judgment performance in the assessment task, it is expected that risk-aversion 
will have some impact. For example, more risk-averse auditors may assess inherent risk 
higher compared to less risk-averse auditors when asked to decide on the impact of a 
given set of risk factors on inherent risk. Similarly, more risk-averse auditors may assess 
control risk higher (implying that they perceive relatively little control risk-reducing impact 
of a set of controls) compared to less risk-averse auditors. This, however, does not tell 
us beforehand in what direction the level of risk-aversion may impact judgment 
performance as measured by the auditor consensus. Thus, the direction of this 
relationship cannot be hypothesized. As a result, the statistical analyses will be 
exploratory by nature.  
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
In Chapter 2 an outline of previously conducted research related to the research 
questions of this empirical study has been provided. For each of the research questions, 
gaps in existing research were identified and research hypotheses were developed. 
These research hypotheses predict for both the identification and assessment tasks the 
impact of the independent variables on the auditor’s judgment performance, except for 
the ‘level of risk-aversion’ which will be exploratory examined. In the next chapter, the 
research design will be described, which will include a detailed description of the 
measurement of the research variables.  
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3 Research design 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has presented an overview of existing literature relevant to the research 
questions of this thesis. The overall research question is concerned with the auditors’ 
judgment performance with respect to the identification of client’s business risks and 
entity-level controls and assessing their impact on audit risk in an assessment task. 
Specifically, this empirical study examines the impact of the following independent 
variables on the auditors’ judgment performance: 
• The auditor’s level of experience; 
• The auditor’s perceived level of feedback when performing audit risk assessments; 
• The auditor’s level of risk-aversion.  
 
In Chapter 2 research hypotheses were developed which were embedded in the existing 
research literature related to the research questions of this thesis. The purpose of the 
current chapter is to describe the research design of the empirical study. In addition, 
dependent and independent variables will be developed with the purpose of testing the 
hypotheses described in the previous chapter. Figure 3.1 presents the structure of 
Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of research design of empirical study to assess the auditors’ 
judgment performance 
Research 
methods Sample
Dependent 
variables Independent variables 
Sections (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
Expert panel • Audit task Accuracy • Experience
• Participants       • General experience in auditing
• Industry       • Industry-specific experience
• Account       • Task-specific experience
• Business risks
• Controls • Feedback
• Validity
• Consensus
Experiment • Cue-usage • Risk-aversion
• Stability
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3.2 Research methods 
The purpose of the empirical study is to examine the auditor’s judgment performance 
with respect to the identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls as well 
as to the assessment of the impact of client’s business risks and entity-level controls on 
audit risk. The majority of behavioral accounting studies in judgment performance have 
chosen either an experiment or a survey design (Brownell and Trotman, 1988, p.331). 
This empirical study does not take surveys into consideration but uses instead 
experiments. Brownell and Trotman (1988, p.332) suggest that “true experiments are the 
most appropriate means of scientific inquiry which permit the researcher to confidently 
conclude ‘this caused that to happen’. “True” experiments, making use of random 
assignment of experimental subjects to experimental treatments, provide the ability to 
make causal inferences. Some other advantages of experiments are (as opposed to for 
example case studies and archival studies): 
• Participants in the experiment usually make judgments concerning the same cues, 
and hence, the internal validity of judgment comparisons is enhanced. This is 
particularly important because of typical complexities and specificities in the audit 
client environment which makes it more difficult to generalize findings resulting from 
case studies. 
• Participants generally make judgments within the same time frame. Judgment 
differences as a result of observations at different points in time need not be 
considered. 
• In an experiment the confounding factors can be excluded making the research 
design more controllable.  
 
An important disadvantage of experiments compared to other types of studies is the 
decreased external validity, “the generalizability of experimental findings to the “real” 
world” (Babbie, 1995, p.245). In addition, internal validity needs specific consideration 
when constructing the research design. In order to deal with both validity types the 
research design has been carefully constructed, for example, (1) the case-setting used 
in the questionnaire has been pre-tested before it was distributed to participants, (2) 
measurement of participant’s judgment performance – as measured by accuracy – in the 
first experiment and selection of cues in the second experiment was designed making 
use of expert panel’s judgment’s. Other design considerations will be discussed 
hereafter in the following sections (see for example section 3.3.6).     
 
For each of the two distinguished audit tasks (the identification task and assessment 
task respectively) this study constructed an experiment.  
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Experiment 
The first experiment is concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance in an 
identification task of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls. Bonner 
(1990) examined the role of task-specific knowledge on the auditors’ judgment 
performance with respect to an identification task. She conducted a 2*2 between-
subjects experiment by varying both the level of experience (experienced-inexperienced) 
and the task (control risk assessment - analytical procedure risk assessment). 
Participants were provided with a pre-defined list of risk-factors which were either a 
relevant or an irrelevant cue to the decisions to be made. This setting, however, does 
not accurately measure the auditors’ recall capabilities as participants are provided with 
a pre-defined list of risk factors. The empirical study presented in this thesis makes use 
of a free - not pre-defined - format for the identification (recall) of client’s business risks 
in a hypothetical case-setting. Hence, participants are not randomly assigned to different 
treatments.  
 
The second experiment is concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance in an 
assessment task, assessing the impact of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level 
controls on audit risk). Of primary interest in this assessment task is the auditor’s 
judgment performance as measured by a consensus variable. The majority of existing 
consensus studies has used an experiment design in audit risk assessment task (e.g., 
Ashton, 1973; Ashton, 1985; Meixner and Welker, 1988; Bonner 1990).  
 
Both experiments were contained in one questionnaire. For each Big4 audit firm, a firm 
representative was selected. Each Big4 audit firm representative (partner at the firm’s 
technical department) received 30 questionnaires. The representative sent the 
questionnaires to selected participants. Firm representatives were specifically requested 
to select participants of the level of audit manager and to equally distribute the 
questionnaire to audit managers with a high level of industry-specific experience in the 
construction industry and to audit managers without such experience. The objective of 
this procedure intermediation of technical departments was twofold: 
1. Technical departments have an authoritative position within the audit firm. Hence, 
involvement of the technical departments contributed to timely responses and a 
high response rate. 
 44 
2. The technical partners were provided with criteria regarding the selection of 
participants. Without their intervention and helpfulness it would not have been 
possible to select both industry-specific auditors and non-industry-specific auditors. 
This selection criterion is related to one of the independent variables (namely, the 
level of industry-specific experience) and, hence, was of crucial importance for 
getting a usable dataset.  
 
Both experiments are concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance. Examination 
of the auditors’ judgment performance is often a difficult task since in many cases no 
objective performance criterion is available (e.g., Wright, 1988; Bonner 1990). For that 
reason the auditors’ judgment performance in the second experiment (assessing the 
impact of client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk assessment) will 
be measured by a consensus variable. Given the absence of an external accuracy 
criterion, the consensus variable is the best possible way of measuring judgment 
performance in this task. With respect to the client’s business risk and client’s entity-
level control identification task, a judgment performance criterion (accuracy) has been 
developed (see for example Asare and Wright, 1995). An expert panel has been 
composed in order to develop this external performance criterion. A second objective of 
the expert panel is to improve the external validity of the experiment design, particularly 
with respect to the second experiment in the selection of cues representing real world 
settings. The expert panel – as a research method – will be described in the following 
section. The way in which the external performance criterion has been developed will be 
illustrated in section 3.3.1. 
 
Expert panel 
Relatively little research has been performed concerning the business risk audit 
approach as a whole or specific audit tasks of this approach in particular (O’Donnell et 
al., working paper, 2004). Lemon et al. (2000) concluded that large audit firms had 
implemented comparable, minor exceptions left aside, (business risk-based) audit 
methodologies in the nineties of the previous century7. Given the relative novelty of 
these audit approaches, no standardized case descriptions of specific industries existed 
                                                 
7
 Exceptions concern, amongst others: (1) whether inherent and control risks are separately assessed or 
combined, (2) the use of tools (checklists, computer aids, etcetera) can differ, and (3) the objectives of 
implementation can differ (e.g. marketing-objectives, audit quality objectives, added-value objectives 
etcetera).  
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at the time of the current empirical study8. We have developed a case description of a 
construction company which has been pilot tested. From existing literature on behavioral 
accounting research, a distinction has been made between expert, experienced, and 
novice auditors (e.g., Wright, 1988). Wright (1988) stated that “the judgment formulation 
process (information search, lines of reasoning, number of hypotheses generated and 
considered) may be different” for these distinguished categories of auditors. In sum, 
experts (as compared to novices) have organized their knowledge in integrated 
schemata and as a result have meaningful information readily available in their mindset. 
Expert auditors - in general - show higher levels of judgment performance compared to 
less experienced or novice auditors. In this empirical study, an expert panel is used as a 
construct to benchmark the respondent’s judgment performance in the experiment. 
Specifically, the expert panel’s assessments will be used to calculate accuracy (i.e., 
judgment performance) scores of experiment participants.  
 
By analogy with existing literature (e.g., Solomon et al., 1999), the following conditions 
have been established in this thesis in order to make sure that the panel would consist 
of auditors with high-level task-specific experience: 
• The experts are junior audit partners in a Big4 audit firm. Solomon et al. (1999) 
used senior partners as condition to qualify as an expert. The level ‘partner’ has 
been used in this thesis to contrast with the experiment participants’ level ‘manager’ 
since partners are assumed to have more business knowledge compared to 
managers. Hence, partners’ judgment and decision-making might serve as best 
possible benchmark. The condition ‘junior partner’ should ensure that the expert 
panel members are heavily involved in the audit team, including involvement with 
risk identification and risk assessment tasks. Within Big4 audit firms two partner 
roles are distinguished: lead or coordinating partners and concurring partners. In 
many cases, the lead partner role is performed by a senior partner, who has – in 
addition to the role of coordinating the audit – a specific role in developing and 
sustaining a good relationship with client management and others involved like the 
Supervisory Board and General Meeting of Shareholders. The role of the concurring 
partners which can be performed by both senior and junior partners is to bear 
responsibility for the quality of the audit. In this role, these partners are heavily 
involved in conducting the audits including getting all audit and accounting issues 
timely solved. 
                                                 
8
 In the recent past, more standardized case descriptions have in the meantime been developed. Refer, 
for example, to the Business Measurement Case Development and Research Program, 
www.business.uiuc.edu/kpmg-uiuccases.  
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• The expert is business leader in the industry under consideration, i.e. the 
construction industry. The objective of the criterion is to ensure that the expert both 
has an overview of and steers developments within a certain industry (e.g., 
developments in regulatory environment, accounting policies, audit approaches and 
training programs). Solomon et al. (1999) used membership of AICPA industry 
committees as a condition, which is similar by nature. 
 
Big4 audit firms were requested to assign one firm representative to the expert panel 
based on the conditions above.  
 
An expert panel meeting has been arranged, which took place in 2003. The materials 
used in the expert panel meeting have been pilot-tested by seven experienced auditors 
and researchers. The expert panel instrument has been included in the appendices of 
this thesis.  
 
This section has discussed the most important elements of the research methods of the 
empirical study. Section 3.3 deals with the selection of elements of the research sample.  
 
 
3.3 Description of research sample 
Subsequently the following elements of the research sample will be described: 
• Audit tasks; 
• Participants; 
• Selection of industry; 
• Selection of financial statement account; 
• Client’s business risks and entity-level controls selected in the second experiment 
(assessment task); 
• Internal validity. 
 
 
3.3.1  Audit tasks 
In Section 2.2.1, it was described that the business risk audit approach encompassed 
two elements which are more prominently present in this approach compared to the 
traditional audit approach (Bell et al., 1997; Bell et al., 2005): 
1 The business risk audit approach has a focus on understanding the client’s 
business including an assessment of the client’s business viability and profitability. 
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Based on this understanding, the auditor develops “knowledge-laden hypotheses”, 
hypotheses stating what the auditor expects to see in the financial statements in 
terms of, for example, development in financial results of the client’s company 
versus competitors.  
2 The business risk audit approach is a holistic, top down approach which is based 
on the argument that although individual financial statements may be valid, the 
entity as a whole might not be viable (and hence the consolidated financial 
statements) due to complex interdependencies within the firm.  
 
Key issues in the selection of audit tasks are:  
 From existing research literature on behavioral accounting (e.g., Tan and Libby, 
1997) it follows that auditors show differences in task-specific knowledge. Hence, the 
audit tasks to be included in the experiment need to be as specific as possible in 
order to be able to detect which knowledge differences attribute to differences in 
judgment performance. 
 Although the two elements of the business risk audit approach are not entirely new, 
these elements at least mark a deviation from the traditional financial statement audit 
since a serious attempt has been undertaken to provide field auditors with guidance 
in applying concepts like ‘understanding the client’s business’ (Bell et al., 1997). We 
have developed research questions in Chapter 2 relating to the business risk audit 
approach. Particularly in this thesis, the quality of the auditors’ judgment performance 
with respect to the identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls as 
well as assessing the impact of these risks and controls on audit risks will be 
examined.  
 
Audit tasks selected in the experiment 
Based on these key issues, the following audit tasks have been selected for the 
experiments: 
• Identification of the (most important) client’s business risks for the hypothetical client 
setting; this task is part of the audit procedures with respect to ‘understanding the 
client’s business’. 
• Identification of the (most important) client’s entity-level controls deemed most 
appropriate in mitigating the identified client’s business risks; this task has been 
selected as it constitutes the major element of applying a holistic approach in the 
financial statement audit.  
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• Assessing the impact of two specific client’s business risks and two specific client’s 
entity-level controls on the level of audit risk; this task follows the previously 
described audit tasks. Errors in judgment performance related to the identification of 
client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls potentially result in judgment 
errors in assessing audit risk. It is thus of interest to include this task also in the 
experiment.  
 
The first two tasks are identification tasks in a free format. Behavioral studies of audit 
risk (e.g., Colbert, 1988; Bonner, 1990) typically make use of formats containing client 
risk factors presented by the researcher to the participant (Bedard and Graham, 2002). 
Bedard and Graham argue that ‘these studies bypass the difficult step of risk 
identification, in which an auditor must draw specific facts from a large knowledge base 
of client and industry data acquired in the field’. The identification of client’s business 
risks is crucial to understanding the client’s business. The last two tasks are assessment 
tasks, which imply that risk and control cues are given and the auditor will be asked to 
assess their impact on audit risk. Hence, in these assessment tasks the focus shifts from 
understanding the client’s business to the (impact of client’s risks and controls on the) 
financial statements.  
 
Task content of experiments 
For all audit tasks selected in the experiment, participants were provided with the 
following case-description of a hypothetical audit client.  
Case introduction 
Since ten years you have been engaged to the financial statement audit of construction 
company ABC. Currently, it is April 1, 2002. In the near future, the interim (process) 
audit will start and now you are preparing this audit by considering the most important 
points of attention relevant to the audit. Until now, you have conducted a systems-based 
audit approach, based upon risk assessments. You have always been able to provide an 
unqualified audit opinion, without notable discussion issues in the discussion meeting 
with client management. As a result, you have always delivered a short-sized 
management letter. 
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Organization chart of construction company ABC 
Construction company ABC B.V. is a medium-sized construction company, with 
operations in the centre of The Netherlands, and executes primarily regular projects in 
the segments ‘civil constructions’ and ‘commercial/industrial buildings’. In 2001 revenues 
were generated of approximately € 50 million with a positive net result of € 1 million 
(2%). In recent years, both revenues and net result were consolidated at the current 
levels. Construction company ABC has organized the firm as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Objectives and strategy of the company 
Construction company ABC B.V. was founded 40 years ago by the father of the current 
general director. Since then, the company has gradually expanded to her current size. 
Formalized objectives and strategies have never been put on paper. At local billboards 
the company regularly advertised with the slogan ‘ABC aims for the lowest costs’. The 
founder’s device was always: ‘we perform those activities where we have always 
excelled in’. The commercial director regularly gets into contact with the five most 
important principals in the region.  
Management (general director; 
commercial director) 
Human Resources (1 employee) 
Engineering (5 employees) 
Technical Department (45 
employees) 
Finance administration (3 employees) 
ICT department (1 employee) 
Calculation, Purchase, Project 
planning (5 employees) 
Project control (4 employees) 
Maintenance department (5 
employees) 
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Projects 
Projects are characterized by serial production. Projects are regularly executed with 
fixed fee contracts. The duration of the projects is two years at a maximum.  
 
Processes 
Having received a request for proposal the Calculation department prepares the 
calculation, which is based on the project specifications. This calculation takes into 
account a premium of 1% with respect to general risks (this percentage is based on 
experience). After being engaged by the principal the calculations are further specified, 
the project is planned, a project-number is opened in the project-administration and the 
contract is prepared.  
 
Based on the detailed project forecast the Purchase Department enters into contracts 
with suppliers (materials) and with sub-contractors. 
 
The forecasted and realized costs and revenues are recorded in the project-
administration which is part of the finance administration. The costs include direct labor 
hours and all directly attributable travel and accommodation expenses of the employees 
(base don weekly timesheets). Recorded hour rates are task- and function dependent 
and are based on the yearly forecasts of the company. All materials used are recorded 
on specific project-engagement numbers by employees of the finance department. 
 
Deviations of original contract 
Contract-variations are executed after oral assignment by the principal. Only in cases 
where the contract-deviations are substantial a new project-forecast is prepared. 
Because of his frequent contacts with the principal and project-managers the general 
director is rapidly informed on specific developments regarding the projects in execution. 
 
Project funding 
Results realized in the past have annually been passed to private accounts of the 
company’s founder. From the time of the sale of the company from the founder to his 
son some years ago, the current general director has aimed to raise the company’s 
capital to a required minimum level. As can be seen from the Appendix (financial 
information) this objective has reasonably been realized in the meantime.  
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Safety and environmental issues 
Construction company ABC strives for good working condition regarding her employees 
and complies with all relevant rules and regulations with respect healthiness, safety and 
environmental conditions. Illness percentages are low and in recent years no specific 
accidents occurred.  
 
ICT 
The level of computerization is low.  
 
Management information 
Periodically a financial overview per project is being composed based on calculations, 
receipts of goods received, time-sheets and production reports. The financial overview 
contains a comparison between forecasted and realized costs per project phase (which 
takes into account the contract deviations) and also shows the invoiced installments. In 
addition, the general director periodically receives an overview of the realized general 
costs (compared to the budgeted costs). The general director only consults the manager 
of the Finance department only in case this overview shows striking deviations between 
forecast and realization. The commercial director himself is responsible for regularly 
contacting the principals and regularly visits projects in execution. 
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Financial information construction company ABC B.V. 
Balance sheet as at December 31
(* € 1,000)
Fixed assets
Tangible fixed assets 500 500
Current assets
Equipment 400 350
Work in Progress 10,000 8,300
Trade receivables 100 100
Other current assets 50 250
10,550 9,000
Cash and cash equivalents 450 500
Total assets 11,500 10,000
Equity 8,000 7,000
Provisions 1,500 1,500
Long-term liabilities 1,000 900
Current liabilities 1,000 600
Total liabilities 11,500 10,000
December 31, 2001
Forecast December 31,
2002
 
Profit and loss
(* € 1,000)
Forecast 2002 2001 2002 2001
€ € % %
Revenues
Net revenues 48,000 48,900 96.00% 97.80%
Change WIP 1,700 1,000 3.40% 2.00%
Other revenues 300 100 0.60% 0.20%
50,000 50,000 100.00% 100.00%
Costs
Costs of materials 41,000 41,210 82.00% 82.40%
Salaries 3,940 3,700 7.90% 7.40%
Depreciation fixed assets 100 100 0.20% 0.20%
Other costs 3,360 3,400 6.70% 6.80%
48,400 48,410 96.80% 96.80%
1,600 1,590 3.20% 3.20%
Financing expenses -60 -50 -0.10% -0.10%
Pre-tax income 1,540 1,540 3.10% 3.10%
Tax -540 -540 -1.10% -1.10%
Net result 1,000 1,000 2.00% 2.00%
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Participants, having read the case-description were subsequently requested to perform 
the audit tasks selected in the experiment.  
 
Task content ‘Identification of client’s business risks’ 
The participants were first requested to identify the five most important and appropriate 
client’s business risks based on the case-description. The task was limited to a 
maximum number of five client’s business risks. This limitation comes close to real-world 
settings in the sense that the auditors’ list of identified business risks typically ends up in 
a list of significant business risks which require specific consideration in the financial 
statement audit (ISA 315, section 108, p 25). This is also in conformity with ISA 315, 
section 31 (IFAC, 2003), which states that the auditor does not have responsibility to the 
identification of all business risks. Limiting the number of business risks to be identified 
to the most important ones is assumed to result in an appropriate measure of judgment 
performance. It can be argued that participants - identifying a number of five appropriate 
business risks - would show higher judgment performance compared to participants with 
less than five appropriate business risks (showing the latter participants obviously would 
have overseen an important business risk). ‘Appropriate’ means in the context of this 
empirical study: ‘in conformity with the expert panel’s list of the most important client’s 
business risks.” The task content of the expert panel meeting is first described before 
the description of the task content of the experiment will be continued.  
 
Task content of the expert panel’s meeting 
The expert panel meeting took place in 2003. Prior to the expert panel’s meeting, the 
experts (business leaders of the construction industry within Big4 audit firms) received a 
confirmation letter, in which the experts were asked not to talk with their audit colleagues 
about the content of the expert’s meeting. This procedure was performed to ensure that 
participants in the experiment (which might be colleagues of the experts) did not have 
any pre-knowledge of the experiment. The expert panel was intended to meet once in a 
meeting of approximately two hours. After a short introduction by the researcher 
(approximately five minutes), the experts were provided with a case-description of a 
construction company. The experts were given ten minutes to read the case-description. 
Thereafter, the experts were provided with the following tasks (the experts were told that 
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all tasks to be conducted, were related to the audit of the industry-specific financial 
statement account ‘Work in Progress’): 
1. Identification of business risk factors present in the case-description. From this 
task, the researcher composed a total list of identified business risk factors by all 
experts to be used in the next task.  
2. Indicating the relevance of identified business risk factors. The experts were 
asked to distribute 100 points of importance over the identified business risk 
factors. 
3. Identification of seemingly most effective entity-level controls. To complete this 
task the experts were (again) provided with the total list of identified business risk 
factors and were asked to identify those client’s entity-level controls that were 
deemed to most effectively mitigate the identified business risks. 
4. Indicating the deemed effectiveness of the identified entity-level controls. The 
experts were asked to distribute 100 points of effectiveness over the identified 
entity-wide controls. 
5. Assessment of the impact on audit risk (of the financial statement account ‘Work 
in Progress’) due to new occurred business risk factors. To complete this task, 
the experts were provided with a list of new events/business risk factors in 
addition to the case-description9 10 and were asked to assess the impact of each 
of these business risk factors on audit risk individually. 
6. Identification of seemingly most effective entity-level controls due to the new 
occurred business risk factors. To complete this task the experts were (again) 
provided with a list of the new occurred events/business risk factors and were 
asked to identify those client’s entity-level controls that were deemed to most 
effectively mitigate the business risks.  
7. Assessment of the impact on audit risk (of the financial statement account ‘Work 
in Progress’) due to (new) identified entity-level controls. To complete this task, 
the experts were provided with a list of the identified entity-level controls resulting 
from task 6 and were asked to assess the impact of each of the identified entity-
level controls on audit risk.  
 
                                                 
9
 The decision to introduce new business risk factors (in addition to the case-description) is motivated by 
potential knowledge-spillovers which could occur in the experiment. Having identified business risk 
factors, the subjects in the experiment have to assess the impact on audit risk due to the occurrence of 
business risks. This assessment could be confounded by information elements of the case-description. 
The introduction of new business risks will mitigate the risk of knowledge-spillover to some extent.  
10
 The content of this list of new events/business risk factors is based upon literature review (e.g., 
Vaassen, 2002; Kerst, 1997). 
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The coherence of the content of the expert panel’s tasks with the experimental tasks is 
visualized in Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2 Coherence of tasks Expert panel and Experiment 
 
 Expert panel Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The expert panel’s output of task one to four is to serve as benchmark in the calculation 
of the accuracy-variables in the experiment related to the identification tasks. The expert 
panel’s output of tasks five and seven has been used to make a selection of two client’s 
business risks and two entity-level controls to be included in the assessment task (in 
Figure 3.2 presented as Task 3 and 4 of the Experiment). The selection of two risks and 
two controls will be further described in section 3.3.5.  
 
Experts, after having completed the seven tasks, were asked to complete a debriefing 
questionnaire to ensure that both the case-description and the task content were clearly 
Task 1: Identification of most important client’s business 
risks 
Task 2: Indicating the relevance of client’s business risks 
Task 3: identification of client’s entity-level controls 
Task 4: Indicating the deemed effectiveness of client’s 
entity-level controls 
Task 5: impact of new client’s business risks on AR 
Task 6: identification of entity-level controls concerning 
new client’s business risks 
Task 7: impact of new entity-level controls on AR 
Task 1: Identification of most important (top five) client’s 
business risks (including indication of relevance) 
Task 2: Identification of most appropriate (top five) 
client’s entity-level controls (including indication of 
deemed effectiveness) 
Task 3: Assessing the impact of two new client’s business 
risks on audit risk 
Task 4: Assessing the impact of two new entity-level 
controls on audit risk 
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understood. From this debriefing questionnaire no specific remarks for further 
consideration were provided by the experts.  
 
The used materials during the expert panel’s meeting are presented in Appendix A of 
this empirical study.  
Task content of the experiment  
Participants having identified the five most important client business risks were 
subsequently asked to distribute 100 points over the five identified business risk in order 
to assess the level of importance (from the perspective of the client’s business 
operations) of each of the risks.  
 
Business risk  Relevance assessment 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 Sum = 100 
 
This sub-task was constructed in order to assist the development of an additional 
measure of judgment performance. This judgment performance shows the number of 
client’s business risks identified by a participant that match with client’s business risks 
identified by the expert panel.  
 
Consider the following possible outcome related to the first sub-task. Assume a 
participant had identified a number of three appropriate business risks (hence, missing 
two relevant business risks). In addition, assume that the participant applied most of the 
importance assessments to the three appropriate business risks and relatively less 
importance weight to the two less important business risks. In this situation, the 
participant would - related to the first sub-task - show a medium level of judgment 
performance. Consider on the other hand another possible outcome. A participant 
identifies four (out of five) appropriate business risks, but – let us assume – attached a 
high importance weight of 80 points to the ‘non-appropriate’ business risk. This latter 
case would result in a relatively lower level of judgment performance compared to the 
other participant with a medium level of judgment performance. Hence, the second sub-
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task provides us with an additional measure of judgment performance which sheds light 
on the level of importance the participant attributed to the identified business risks.  
 
Task content ‘Identification of client’s entity-level controls’ 
The task-structure of the task ‘Identification of client’s entity-level controls’ is similar to 
the previously described task content related to the task ‘Identification of client’s 
business risks’. Participants were requested to identify the five most appropriate entity-
level controls in mitigating the client’s business risks. The case-description did not 
provide a detailed list of internal control procedures. The participant, hence, needed to 
recall which of the entity-level control mechanisms had been effective – taking into 
consideration client-settings with similar risk-profiles and taking into consideration the 
theoretical knowledge framework developed during education and training – in mitigating 
business risks.  
 
In addition, the participants were asked to distribute 100 points of ‘perceived 
effectiveness’ over the five entity-level controls in mitigating the client’s business risks. 
These sub-tasks – in conformity with the sub-tasks related to the identification of client’s 
business risks - resulted in two measures of judgment performance. The first judgment 
performance measure is related to the conformity of the participants’ list of entity-level 
controls with the expert panel’s list of entity-level controls. The second judgment 
performance measure is related to the conformity of the participants’ relevance 
assessments regarding the identified client’s entity-level controls with the expert panel’s 
relevance weights.  
 
Task content ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risks and client’s entity-
level controls on audit risk’ 
The third and final audit task in the experiment relates to assessing the impact of client’s 
business risks and client’s entity-level controls on the level of audit risk of a certain 
financial statement account (see Section 3.3.4). This task encompassed a number of 
four pre-defined cues (two business risks and two entity-level controls):  
• The financial condition of the company strongly deteriorated (CBR1). 
• The company’s strategic focus changed from “low-cost homes” to “luxury villas” 
(CBR2). 
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• Strengthened project-control by progress reports on Work in Progress (ELC1). 
• More specialized personnel assigned to projects (ELC2). 
 
These four cues were presented to the participant in all possible combinations of 
presence (24 design) except for the possible combination of ‘zero cues present. Hence, 
each participant was provided with 15 individual cases, each of the cases representing a 
new client case-setting with varying cue combinations present. The participants were 
requested to assess for all cases the impact on audit risk. Audit risk has been defined in 
the experiment as the level of risk of material misstatement related to a certain financial 
statement account. Audit risk is a function of inherent risk and control risk (these two 
risks need to be assessed by the auditor individually or combined) as well as detection 
risk (this risk is a result of an acceptable level of audit risk and the assessment of 
inherent and control risk). In the research questionnaire the participant was not 
requested to individually assess (the impact on) inherent risk and control risk, but was 
instead requested to perform a combined risk impact assessment of inherent risk and 
control risk together. This closely connects to the ordinary audit practice as described in 
ISA 200 “Objective and General Principles Governing and Audit of Financial Statements” 
(Section 21, 2003).  
 
In section 3.4 the related dependent variables to this task will be discussed, including 
methodological aspects of modeling judgment performance. In the next section, the 
second element of the research sample – experiment participants – will be discussed. 
 
3.3.2  Participants 
Target group – organizational level 
The research questions of this empirical study are directed towards the auditors’ 
judgment performance with respect to the audit tasks as described in section 3.3.1. 
International Standards on Auditing related to these audit tasks (e.g., ISAs 200, 315, and 
330) describe the audit risk task from the perspective of an individual auditor conducting 
this task. However, ISA 315 (Section 14 and following, 2003) states that “the members 
of the engagement team should discuss the susceptibility of the entity’s financial 
statements to material misstatements”. From this standard, it is not exactly clear what 
level of the team members actually performs the identification of client’s business risk 
and controls as well as the impact assessment of these business risks and controls on 
audit risk. From ISA 315 (Sections 16 and 17) it follows that higher levels (including audit 
partners) are likely to be involved in the engagement team discussion because of their 
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roles, knowledge and experience. Libby and Tan (1997) argue that from the level of 
audit manager upward, the required knowledge focus shifts from technical knowledge to 
managerial knowledge. As auditors promote to a managerial level, inter-personal skills 
for example gain in importance. The conduct of the audit tasks selected in the 
experiments (see 4.3.1) imply that the auditor will have in real life settings discussions 
with client management in order to gain an understanding of the client’s business (Bell et 
al., 1997, p.13). Eilifsen et al. (2001) also expected that the transition of the traditional 
audit approach to the business risk audit approach would be accompanied with a shift in 
the composition of the audit team from less experienced to more experienced auditors. 
Identification of business risk and client’s response to those risks will regularly be 
performed by client’s management level (ISA 315, Section 33, 2003). Both from a client 
perspective (highest management is involved in risk management) and from an auditors’ 
skills perspective we conclude that the level of ‘audit manager’ will be involved in the 
tasks selected in the experiment. Hence, our experimental subjects come from this level.  
 
The ‘audit manager’ is also of interest from the ‘experience’-related behavioral 
accounting studies. Until approximately 1988 (e.g., Wright 1988) most of these studies 
concluded that general experience did not positively contribute to judgment 
performance. These studies, however, mainly examined general experience related 
junior and senior staff auditors. After 1988, higher levels have become more and more 
included in research studies (examples are Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Tan and Libby, 
1997). Bonner et al. (1990), for example, concluded that general experience positively 
influenced judgment performance. Therefore, it is of interest to examine what the impact 
of general experience for higher experience levels is on judgment performance in 
relatively new audit tasks. In order to investigate the impact of general experience on the 
auditors’ judgment performance a second subjects group was selected. This additional 
group consisted of post-graduate auditing students. Auditors’ judgment performance is a 
function of knowledge, experience and skills (Libby, 1995) which develop on a learning 
curve during an auditors’ career. Following this ‘expertise paradigm’ auditing students 
are referred to as “novices”, audit managers are referred to as “experienced” and the 
members of the expert panel as “experts”. 
 
Selection of subjects 
Distribution procedure 
In sum 120 questionnaires were sent to the Big4 audit firm representatives (each firm 
representative received 30 questionnaires). The firm representatives were requested to 
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compose a group of audit managers within their firm ensuring that approximately 15 of 
the questionnaires were completed by audit managers designated to the construction 
industry (see Section 3.3.3) and that another 15 questionnaires were completed by audit 
managers not designated to that industry. Most Big4 audit firms did not appear to have a 
separate department related to this industry but instead were ‘virtually’ organized with 
shared knowledge databases. In addition, cooperation of the Big4 audit firms with this 
empirical study was agreed under the condition that the results would be anonymously 
(without explicit reference to individual participants or individual firms) presented. As a 
result of these circumstances the participants were not randomly assigned to the 
experiments. All respondents were requested to complete the entire questionnaire. The 
questionnaire did not contain a between-subject manipulation. Audit firm representatives 
were also requested to monitor the timely response of the participants.  
 
Instruction-set 
In the instruction-set - to which the research questionnaire was attached – the 
participants were requested not to make use of any decision-aids and also not to 
discuss the questionnaire with colleagues. The focus of this empirical study is on 
individual auditor’s judgment performance (i.e., not on group judgment performance). 
The instruction-set additionally contained generally accepted definitions of key words 
used in the empirical study.  
 
The described distribution procedure resulted in 85 usable questionnaires which equals 
a response rate of 70.83% which satisfies the requirements for further analysis of the 
data-set as received from the questionnaires.  
 
Group of auditing students 
Data-collection with respect to the target group of auditing students took place during 
two (post-graduate) education sessions at the university resulting in 20 usable 
questionnaires. This group of auditing students has been selected as it is assumed that 
they would have some experience in the auditing field. From the debriefing 
questionnaire a mean of 2.85 years of general experience in the auditing field was 
reported. Auditing students received the same instruction-set as audit managers 
received. During the session, the teacher monitored that students did not discuss with 
each other and did not make use of any decision-aids.  
 
In Section 3.3.3, the third element of the research sample will be discussed, the 
selection of a specific industry.  
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3.3.3  Selection of industry 
In the design of the research sample, one specific industry has been selected. This 
design choice stems from the research question (refer to Chapter 2) ‘whether, and if so 
to what extent, the auditors’ judgment performance is influenced by the level of industry-
specific experience’.  
 
The construction industry has been selected for incorporation in the research design of 
the current empirical study. Among the reasons for selecting this specific industry are 
the following: 
• I was familiar with this industry while I previously had some construction audit 
engagements in my engagement portfolio when working as an independent 
auditor. This implied an advantage in developing a case description related to this 
industry. 
• The construction industry has not been examined previously in the context of the 
current empirical study. The current study hence fills a gap in existing research 
studies.  
• The construction industry is – compared to the more extensively studied industries 
like Financial Services and Healthcare (e.g., Solomon et al., 1999), financial 
services (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Solomon et al., 1999) – less regulated, and the 
industry-service lines of the Big4 audit firms in the Netherlands are less well 
developed11. It is therefore of interest to examine whether industry-experience in 
the construction industry would contribute to the auditor’s judgment performance.  
 
The next sub-section (3.3.4) is concerned with the selection of a specific financial 
statement account for the experiment.  
 
3.3.4  Selection of a specific financial statement account for the experiment 
The selection of a specific financial statement account is related with the experiment 
task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls on 
audit risk’. International Standards on Auditing (e.g. ISA 200, Section 18 and 19, IFAC, 
                                                 
11
 During individual interviews with expert panel members, panelists indicated, for example, that 
knowledge databases (including the development of industry-specific risk templates) were being 
developed at that point in time. In addition, they indicated that the industry line actually was a ‘virtual’ 
industry line since auditors designated to this industry were not physically located in one department 
on one or more locations, but for example, were located in the general audit practice department.  
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2003) require that the auditor considers the risk of material misstatement at various 
levels: the overall financial statement level, but also at the class of transactions, 
account/assertion balance, and disclosure level. This empirical study is concerned with 
audit risk assessment at the account level which is not unusual in research studies on 
audit risk assessments (e.g. Waller, 1993, states that auditors make use of the “most 
dominant assertion heuristic” when assessing audit risk at account level). We have 
selected the specific account Work in Progress (WIP) (instead of audit risks related to 
the financial statements as a whole or related to disclosures) which represents the heart 
of the business of the construction industry where the significant flows of transactions 
are recorded and which involves significant judgment of both the company’s 
management and the auditor. WIP consists of three components: costs plus profit 
surcharge (debit), invoiced installments (credit) and foreseeable losses (credit). WIP 
hence comprehends the major business processes through which the business-specific 
transactions flow.  
 
The following two sub-sections are concerned with the selection of specific client’s 
business risk factors and client’s entity-level controls in the audit task ‘assessing the 
impact of client’s business risks and entity-levels controls on audit risk’. 
 
 
3.3.5  Selection of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls in an 
assessment task 
The first two audit tasks selected in the experiment relate to the identification of client’s 
business risks and controls. With respect to the third audit task – assessing the impact 
of business risks and controls on audit risk – the selection of input cues to this decision 
needs separate consideration which is discussed hereafter.  
Number of cues 
In experimental settings comparable to this empirical study, the number of cues 
manipulated is regularly low (between four and six cues). At least two reasons are 
provided for this low number.  
 
First of all, researchers need to decide on the number of cues in relationship with the 
design of the study since participant fatigue and/or boredom potentially influence the 
statistical results if too many cues are incorporated in the experiment design. Principally, 
a decision is necessary as to use a full or a fractional factorial design. In a full factorial 
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design, all cues selected for the experiment are presented to the participant in all 
possible cue combinations. In a fractional factorial design, all cues selected for the 
experiment are presented to the participant in a sub-set of possible cue combinations. 
For example, a full factorial design with 6 cues (present/absent) result in 64 possible 
cases of cue combinations which would probably result in fatigue or boredom as all 
cases need to be assessed individually. A half fractional factorial design would in the 
given example result in 32 case combinations which are presented to a participant. 
Making use of a fractional factorial design requires careful consideration of the 
researcher to which of the possible cue combinations are excluded and which are 
included in the experiment. A fractional factorial design is hence, somewhat more 
complicated compared to the full factorial designs. In this thesis, a full factorial design 
has been selected for reasons of straightforwardness (i.e., this implies a less complex 
design and given the low number of cues included in the design will potentially 
overcome participants’ fatigue and boredom).  
Secondly, people in general appear to show bounded rationality in judgment and 
decision-making tasks (e.g. Cooksey, 1995; Solomon et al., 1995). This implies that for a 
single decision, people – whether they are experienced or not regarding the task at hand 
– consider only a limited number of cues which have impact on their decision.  
 
In this empirical study, both business risks and entity-level controls are part of the 
selected cues. Prior studies related to audit risk decisions or studies related to the 
business risk audit approach, did not take these both categories of cues into account. In 
this regard, this thesis contributes to existing audit research literature. The full factorial 
design consists of four cues, of which two are related to business risks and two are 
related to entity-level controls.  
Nature of cues 
The decision with respect to including specific business risks and entity-level controls in 
the experiment is made in relationship with the research questions.  
First, one of the research questions is concerned with the impact of industry-specific 
experience on the auditors’ judgment performance. As will be described in the sections 
3.4 and 3.5, it will be investigated whether (and if so, to what extent) industry-specific 
experience influences the auditors’ judgment performance with respect to the impact of 
an industry-specific cue on audit risk, as well as the auditors’ judgment performance with 
respect to the impact of a not-industry-specific cue on audit risk. In other words, do 
industry-specialized auditors make different judgments – compared to non-specialists – 
with respect to all cues or with respect to only industry-specific cues? As a result of this 
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consideration, for both client’s business risks and entity-level controls a general and an 
industry-specific cue have been selected.  
 
In order to select industry-specific cues for the factorial design, expert panel members 
were asked to indicate on a list of risk and control cues which of those risks and controls 
was industry-specific. For this list of risk and control cues, expert panel members were 
additionally requested to assess the individual impact of each of these cues on audit 
risk. In deciding on which risk and control cues to include in the experiment, the 
standard deviation of the panel members’ assessments has been considered. In 
addition, we have considered prior research studies related to financial statement risks.  
 
Table 3.1 presents the cues which have been selected for the experiment in a full 
factorial design.  
 
Table 3.1 Selection of cues in experiment (assessment) audit task 
 
Code Description Industry-specific Expert panel’s 
SD12 
CBR1 The financial condition of the company strongly 
deteriorated. 
X 2.22 
CBR2 The company’s strategic focus changed from 
“low-cost homes” to “luxury villas”. 
√ 2.58 
ELC1 Strengthened project-control by progress reports 
on Work in Progress. 
√ 2.99 
ELC2 More specialized personnel assigned to projects. X 1.91 
 
Where CBR = Client’s Business Risk 
And  ELC = Entity-Level Control 
  SD = Standard Deviation 
 
The selection of CBR1 (the financial condition of the company strongly deteriorated) was 
specifically based on prior research literature (e.g., Pratt and Stice, 1994). This business 
risk is found as one of the most important risks which probably can result in a material 
misstatement. For example, when the financial conditions of a company are bad, the 
company’s rating (if it is listed) or the relationship with the financial institutions will 
deteriorate, which in turn puts pressure on the company’s management to manage 
                                                 
12
 Expert panelists were asked to assess the impact of a list of individual client’s business risks and 
client’s entity-level controls on audit risk. The scale used to measure this impact ranges from -10 
(maximum negative impact on audit risk, i.e. decreased audit risk) to +10 (maximum positive impact on 
audit risk, i.e. increased audit risk). 
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earnings. CBR1, hence, applies to all financial statement accounts (and disclosures), 
whereas CBR2, ELC1, and ELC2 are related to single accounts (most importantly Work 
in Progress). CBR2 and ELC1 were selected because they were classified by the expert 
panelists as “industry-specific”. ELC2 was selected based on the relatively low standard 
deviation as calculated on the effectiveness assessments of the expert panelists. This 
implied that – compared to other entity-level controls – panelists showed a relatively high 
consensus on ELC2. So, it can reasonably be expected that this cue is relatively stable.  
 
3.3.6  Internal validity of research design 
In this section, aspects of internal validity of the research design will be described for the 
experiments. 
 
Identification tasks 
Regarding the identification audit tasks selected in the first experiment, the combination 
of an expert panel and an experiment will positively contribute to the internal validity of 
the research design since the judgment performance measures (accuracy, see also 
section 3.4) are based on external experts performing the same audit task on the same 
case-description. A potential threat to the internal validity of the design is the free 
response format that has been used in the questionnaire regarding the accurate 
interpretation of the wordings the participants and the wordings the expert panel have 
used. The participants’ answers provided in the response format will be used for the 
calculation of a judgment performance measure. The judgment performance measure 
(see Section 4.4 for a more detailed discussion) implies an equality relationship between 
the expert panel’s list of both business risks and controls and the participant’s list of 
business risks and controls. The participants were requested to describe in short 
wordings the top five of client’s business risks. It is hence possible that one participant 
used a catchword that covered a broader area compared to other participants. E.g., a 
participant identified the control ‘segregation of duties’ where other participants specified 
segregation of duties along departments/functions. For the purpose of mitigating this 
threat to a certain extent, I have prepared the ‘mapping’ of participant’s responses to the 
expert panel list as well as the underlying accuracy calculations. The entire mapping and 
calculation process was subsequently reviewed by and discussed with two other 
persons (an auditor of a Big4 audit firm and a member of the technical department of a 
Big4 audit firm and a researcher in auditing) resulting in a final accuracy scores. It was 
not possible to compute kappa’s measure of inter-rater reliability. Kappa’s measure 
 66 
presumes equal values of the initial and final accuracy calculations. The dataset did not 
contain for all of the accuracy-measures equal values. Instead, 2-tailed Pearson 
correlations were computed, which are shown in the next table.  
 
Table 3.2 Inter-rater Pearson correlations 
 Acc1ini Acc1final Acc2ini Acc2final Acc3ini Acc3final Acc4ini Acc4final 
Acc1ini 1 .922* 
(p=.000) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Acc1final  1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Acc2ini   1 .865* 
(p=.000) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Acc2final    1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Acc3ini     1 .732* 
(p=.000) 
n.a. n.a. 
Acc3final      1 n.a. n.a. 
Acc4ini       1 .866* 
(p=.000) 
Acc4final        1 
 
Table 3.2 shows that all inter-rater accuracy-measures to a high extent correlate 
significantly with each other.  
 
A second internal validity issue relates to the limitation of the maximum number of five 
business risks and five entity-level controls the participants were requested to identify. 
Limiting the response format to five items implies that participants may identify risks or 
controls that – although these risks and controls do not match with the expert panel’s list 
of risks and controls – are not simply wrong but only do not match with the most 
important risks and controls identified by the expert panel. This implies that judgment 
performance scores need to be cautiously interpreted. This issue is inherent to the 
design chosen.  
 
Assessment task (assessing the impact of client’s business risks and 
controls on audit risk) 
Subsequently, the following issues concerning the internal validity of the research design 
will be discussed.  
 Cue selection; 
 Consistency of participant’s response. 
  
   67 
Cue selection 
In section 3.3.5 the connection between the expert panel’s tasks and the experiment has 
been described. The selection of cues in the experiment is based on various criteria, 
amongst which the requisite that the expert panel exhibits substantial agreement on the 
importance of those cues (see also Tan and Libby, 1997)13. As no other fully suitable 
external criterion was available beforehand, this procedure contributed to a certain 
extent to the internal validity of the experiment mode of observation.  
 
Consistency of participant’s response 
Concerning the assessment tasks, a full factorial design is chosen. This implies that all 
selected cues are presented to the participants in all possible combinations (present: 
yes/no) resulting in 15 cases of cue combinations (excluding the combination of zero 
cues present). A threat to internal validity of this design is concerned with the potential 
impact of participants’ fatigue or boredom (‘demand effects’) due to the lengthiness of 
the questionnaire and the relatively similar cases to be assessed. In order to mitigate 
this potential threat to internal validity to a certain extent, the design of the questionnaire 
included four elements:  
• In addition to the 15 case combinations, participants were provided with four repeat 
cases. These cases replicated four cases included in the previously mentioned 
original fifteen cases of cue combinations. This procedure allowed for measuring 
stability14 of the participants’ responses (see also Colbert 1988; Cooksey, 1995);  
• With the purpose of avoiding memory-carryover effects, all individual cases of cue 
combinations were presented on a separate page. In addition, participants were 
requested to complete the questionnaire subsequently completing page by page, 
and not to turn back to previous cases and participants’ responses.  
• Three versions of the questionnaire were developed in which different sequences of 
case combinations were presented to participants in order to counter-balance the 
order-effect.  
                                                 
13
 “Since the expert panel’s responses were to serve as benchmarks it was crucial that items included in 
the final measure of tacit managerial knowledge exhibit substantial agreement among the partners” (Tan 
and Libby, 1997). 
14
 Other studies (e.g., Ashton, 1973) included an additional measure of stability, namely the stability over 
time. This procedure involved performing the same experiment with the same participants at a different 
point in time. As this procedure doubles the resource capacity the Big4 audit firms would have made 
available to this empirical study, the before mentioned procedure has not been put into practice. 
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• The debriefing questionnaire contained a question relating to the level of self-insight 
asking the participants to provide the subjective assessment of individual cue 
impact.  
 
The three sequences/versions were distributed over the group of audit managers as 
follows: 
• Group 1: auditors with sequence 1 (n=31); 
• Group 2: auditors with sequence 2 (n=30); and 
• Group 3: auditors with sequence 3 (n=24). 
 
Table 3.3 Sequence of cue presence 
 
Cue presence Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 
1234 1 15 1 
123 2 14 3 
124 3 13 5 
134 4 12 7 
234 5 11 9 
24 6 10 11 
23 7 9 13 
14 8 8 15 
13 9 7 14 
34 10 6 12 
12 11 5 10 
2 12 4 8 
3 13 3 6 
1 14 2 4 
4 15 1 2 
 
In this table, participants who completed “sequence 1” version of the questionnaire, first 
responded to the case setting in which all cues were present (“1234”), and subsequently 
responded to the case settings in which three cues were present (“123”, “124”, “134”, 
and “234”), and so on. Appendix B, tasks 5.1 to 5.15, is an example of sequence 1. 
Participants who completed “sequence 2” version of the questionnaire started with the 
case setting in only one cue was present (“4”, “1”, “3”, and “2”), and subsequently 
responded to case settings with two cues present, and so on. So, sequence 2 is the 
opposite sequence of sequence 1. Sequence 3 was a mixture of sequences 1 and 2.  
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Section 3.3 has described the elements of the research sample. The next section will 
discuss the dependent variables, measures of judgment performance.  
 
3.4 Dependent variables  
This section is concerned with the development of dependent variables, i.e. measures of 
the auditors’ judgment performance. Related to the first experiment tasks (identifying 
client’s business risks and identifying client’s entity-level controls) four accuracy 
measures have been developed. The formula underlying the calculation of these 
accuracy measures includes the expert panel’s response. For the purpose of 
understanding how the accuracy measures are derived from this expert panel, section 
3.4 first describes the content of the expert panel’s meeting as well as the relationship 
this panel meeting has with the research experiment tasks. Then, the accuracy 
measures will be described. The remainder of section 3.4 provides a description of the 
judgment performance measures related to the assessment task (assessing the impact 
of selected client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk). These 
performance measures are: consensus, self-insight, stability, and cue-usage.  
 
 
Accuracy (identification tasks) 
Figure 3.1 presented the dependent variables accuracy and consensus. Related to the 
identification tasks (identification of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level 
controls) accuracy has been selected as primary measure of judgment performance 
since an external criterion (expert panel meeting) is available. This section discusses 
how accuracy actually has been calculated.  
 
For both identification tasks two distinguished accuracy variables have been developed: 
• Factor accuracy, measuring the level of agreement between individual participants’ 
identified client’s business risks and controls and the expert panel’s list of identified 
client’s business risks and controls. 
• Weighting accuracy, measuring the level of agreement between individual 
participants’ importance (and appropriateness respectively) assessments relating to 
identified client’s business risks and controls and the expert panel’s importance 
(and appropriateness respectively) assessments.  
 
This distinction resulted in four accuracy variables which are presented in table 3.4: 
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Table 3.4 Description of accuracy variables as measures of judgment performance 
 
Measure Task Nature Description 
Accuracy1 Identification 
client’s 
business 
risks 
Factor accuracy The level of agreement between individual 
participants’ identified client’s business risks and the 
expert panel’s list of identified client’s business risks 
Accuracy2 Identification 
client’s 
business 
risks 
Weighting accuracy The level of agreement between individual 
participants’ assessed level of importance related to 
identified client’s business risks and the expert 
panel’s importance assessments. 
Accuracy3 Identification 
client’s 
entity-level 
controls 
Factor accuracy The level of agreement between individual 
participants’ identified client’s entity-level controls 
and the expert panel’s list of identified client’s entity-
level controls 
Accuracy4 Identification 
client’s 
entity-level 
controls 
Weighting accuracy The level of agreement between individual 
participants’ assessed level of appropriateness 
related to identified client’s entity-level controls and 
the expert panel’s appropriateness assessments. 
 
Accuracy1 
Accuracy1 measures the level of agreement between individual participants’ identified 
client’s business risks and the expert panel’s list of identified client’s business risks.  
 
The four individual expert panelists were asked to identify the five most important client’s 
business risks present in the hypothetical case-setting. This has resulted in a list of 
fifteen business risks (five identified client’s business risks obviously described one and 
the same risk), and were hence excluded from the total list of client’s business risks. 
Participants in the experiment were requested to identify the five most important client’s 
business risks present in the hypothetical case-setting.  
 
Accuracy1 is calculated as ‘the number of client’s business risks identified by a 
participant that match with the expert panel’s list of client’s business risks’.  
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Matching process 
Recall from section 3.3.1 that in the identification task both expert panelists and 
participants were requested to provide a list of the five most important client’s business 
risks and entity-level controls, i.e. they were requested to describe in their own words 
which client’s business risks were present in the hypothetical case-setting. This implies 
that the used wordings of experiment participants in many cases did not fully match with 
the wordings used by the expert panelists, giving rise to semantic discussions. In order 
to ensure that the matching process was reliably performed, a proposal of this matching 
process for each individual participant was prepared. Thereafter, this proposal process 
has been reviewed by two other persons. Final conclusions of these three persons on 
this matching process were drawn in two meetings.  
 
Accuracy2 
Accuracy2 measures the level of agreement between individual participants’ assessed 
level of importance related to identified client’s business risks and the expert panel’s 
importance assessments.  
 
The four individual expert panelists were asked to distribute 100 points of importance to 
the list of client’s business risks they had identified in the first task during the expert 
meeting. From this task, a mean importance level per important client’s business risk 
was computed. The participants in the experiment were asked to distribute 100 
importance points to their top five of most important client’s business risks.  
 
Accuracy2 has been computed per experiment participant as:  
 
[ ] 100÷∗ EPR MIPIP  
 
Where IPR = importance points of client’s business risk identified by experiment 
participant (only those identified business risks are taken into account that matched with 
the expert panel’s list of identified business risks) and  
 
MIPEP = mean importance points attributed to those matching risks by the expert panel 
100. 
Consider the following example. 
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Table 3.5 Example of risk identification 
 
Top five of business risks 
identified by a participant 
Participant 
importance 
assessment 
Match 
with 
panel? 
Panel business risk Mean expert 
panel 
importance 
assessment 
 1. Price competition 20 1 Due to focus on price, risk for 
long-term profitability 
10 
 2. Limited number of 
principals 
10 - Not applicable - 
 3. Business operations 
dependent of director 
30 1 Dominant position director 12.5 
 4. Financial position 20 - Not applicable - 
 5. Changing demand (market) 20 - Not applicable - 
 100 2   
 
For this example, accuracy1 and accuracy2 are:  
• Accuracy1: number of matching client business risks: score = 2 (see column 3) 
• Accuracy2: multiply respondent’s and expert panel’s weights for matching risks: 
  i.e. [(20*10) + (30 * 12.5)] /100 = 5.75 
 
This fictitious respondent of Table 3.5 identifies five client’s business risks of which only 
“price competition” and “business operations dependent of director” match with the list of 
risks identified by the expert panel. An accuracy1 score of “2” results. As the maximum 
possible score is 5, this respondent misses three important risks identified by the expert 
panel. In a similar way accuracy2 is calculated. For the two risks that match with the 
expert panel’s list of risks, the respondent’s weights (depicting the relevance of the 
individual risk) are multiplied with the respective expert panel’s weights. Accuracy2 
hence is in that regard related to accuracy1, but shows another aspect of judgment 
performance, namely the relative importance of the risks identified. 
 
 
Advantages/disadvantages of accuracy calculation 
Prior research studies computed accuracy using various different formulas. The 
accuracy calculation formula needs to be designed such that the results can be easily 
interpreted and that they fit with the research design.  
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Accuracy1 
Accuracy1 has been calculated as the number of client’s business risks identified by 
participants with the list of client’s business risks identified by an expert panel. With 
respect to this formula, the following remarks can be made: 
• The formula takes into account only the matching client’s business risks and does 
not take into account a penalty for non-matching risks. For example, Bonner’s 
(1990) study chose to provide participants a bonus for having selected cues that 
were appropriate given the case setting, but to provide participants a penalty for 
having selected cues that were inappropriate. In her case-setting, distinguishing 
between ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ was possible, which was not the case in the current 
empirical study. Both the expert panel and participants were asked to identify the 
top five of client’s business risk factors. This implies that participants may have 
identified risk factors that did not match with the expert panel’s list but potentially 
included factors that were not obviously wrong, but only less important compared 
to the expert panel’s list. Had a penalty been included in the accuracy formula, the 
participant would be too heavily penalized for having identified a risk that was not 
obviously wrong.  
• An important advantage is that the accuracy results can be easily interpreted: an 
increase of an accuracy-score implies improved judgment performance. 
Differences in judgment performance across auditors can be analyzed in terms of 
rate of deviation with the expert panel’s list which is good benchmark.  
 
 
Accuracy2 
Accuracy2 has been calculated as: the number of client’s business risks that match with 
the expert panel’s list times the importance weight applied to this risk by the expert 
panel. Accuracy2 2 aims to measure the judgment performance of auditors regarding 
the importance weights they applied to identified client’s business risks. With respect to 
this formula, the following remarks can be made: 
• In conformity with the accuracy1 calculation formula, no penalty has been taken 
into account for non-matching client’s business risks. 
• For accuracy calculations related to importance weights, an alternative way of 
measuring would be to compute the difference (instead of multiplying) the 
participant’s weights with the expert panel’s weights. Although this would be 
possible, it would result in a methodologically unsound measure since the weights 
calculated for the expert panel did not result from the same weighting process 
compared to the participant’s weighting process. The experts from the expert panel 
were first requested to identify the most important business risks, which resulted in 
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a list of 15 business risks. The experts were subsequently individually requested to 
apply importance weights to the 15 business risks, their individual weights 
summing up to 100. Afterwards, we have re-calculated these importance weights 
by averaging the importance weights of the four experts to the individual 15 
business risks. Since the experiment participants were limited to identifying the top 
five of client’s business risks and dividing 100 points over these 5 business risks, 
the participant’s weights for each of the risks identified were by definition higher 
compared to the average expert panel weights. Deduction of participants’ weights 
from the expert panel’s weights would result in a skewed distribution and would not 
result in an easily interpretable measure.  
 
Accuracy3 and Accuracy4 
Accuracy1 and accuracy2 were concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance 
regarding the identification of client’s business risks. Accuracy3 and accuracy4 are 
concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance regarding the identification of client’s 
entity-level controls. Although the task content differs (client’s business risks versus 
client’s entity-level controls), both tasks are actually the same. Hence, accuracy 3 
(measuring the level of agreement between individual participants’ identified client’s 
entity-level controls and the expert panel’s list of identified client’s entity-level controls) is 
calculated in the same way as accuracy1. The list of controls identified by the expert 
panel as a whole contains in total 21 entity-level controls. In the same way, accuracy4 
(measuring the level of agreement between individual participants’ assessed level of 
appropriateness related to identified client’s entity-level controls and the expert panel’s 
appropriateness assessments) is calculated in the same way as Accuracy2. The 
advantages and disadvantages described for the accuracy1 and accuracy2 formula 
equally apply to the accuracy3 and accuracy4 formula.  
 
For accuracy3 and accuracy4 the same matching process has been performed as has 
been conducted for the calculation of accuracy1 and accuracy2.  
 
The next section deals with the dependent variable of the auditors’ judgment 
performance in an assessment task (as opposed to the identification tasks that are 
previously discussed). 
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Consensus and other measures of judgment performance 
(assessment task) 
The dependent variables related to the experimental task ‘assessing the impact of 
various combinations of business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk’ (i.e., an 
assessment task), are described in the current section. For this task no external 
judgment performance criterion was available. From previous empirical studies on audit 
risk, it follows that various studies (e.g., Ashton 1973; Bonner, 1990; Meixner and 
Welker 1988; Stone and Dilla, 1994) have used an adapted version of the so-called 
Lens Model to compute the dependent judgment performance variables. This model, 
originally developed by Brunswik (e.g., Brunswik, 1952), distinguishes the following 
dependent variables: 
• Consensus amongst experiment participants; 
• Judgment stability of experiment participants; 
• Experiment participants’ cue-usage.  
• Experiment participants’ level of self-insight; 
 
These dependent variables are subsequently described in the subsequent sub-sections. 
But first we provide an overall description of the Lens model. 
 
Description of the ‘lens model’ 
The Lens model has been developed originally in the psychology discipline by Brunswik 
in 1952. Although the Lens model has been slightly adapted by various researchers 
since 1952, the basics of the model are still applicable and widely used. Since the 
introduction of the Lens model, it has been used in many academic disciplines. The 
model is often used in policy-capturing studies. Policy-capturing is a method that 
describes an individual’s evaluative judgment process with algebraic models (Cooksey, 
1995). An attractive aspect of the Lens model is that it incorporates both the external 
and unpredictable environment as well the (internal) process of judgment and decision 
making within individuals. Hence, the model sheds light on how judgment processes 
within individual persons take place making the judgment process measurable and 
comparable to that of other individuals. According to this view the real world is simplified 
into two aspects, namely the individual who makes decisions and the environment of the 
individual. The model is used in the current study to measure various aspects of 
consensus: (1) consensus within individual auditors
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over time; meant to measure the stability of judgments; i.e., the auditors’ judgment 
stability), and (2) consensus between (groups of) auditors. For the experiment, this 
means that only the assessment activities (assessment of the impact of client’s business 
risks and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk) (see section 3.3.5) are examined with 
use of the Lens model whereas the identification activities are measured making use of 
accuracy variables. Because there is no accuracy-like instrument available to measure 
consensus on cue assessments, the Lens model is a good alternative way of measuring 
judgment performance (Bonner, 1990).  
 
The model is called ‘Lens model’ because “it resembles light arrays emanating from a 
light source through a convex lens and converging to another point” (Ashton, 1973, p. 
55). Translated to the experiment, this means that the audit environment is sending its 
arrays/information cues which come together in the individual’s mindset. The model thus 
captures the policy of decision making within an individual’s brains (environment’s 
perceptions).  
The first application of the Lens model in the accounting/auditing discipline has been the 
thesis of R.H. Ashton (1973). Thereafter, many studies followed which also used the 
model. For example: Bonner (1990), Stone et al. (1994). The basic theorem Brunswik 
used, is called ‘probabilistic functionalism’ which has two primary emphases (Cooksey, 
1995, p.1): “(1) the chief task of psychology was to understand the functional 
relationship between the organism and its environment, and (2) the essence of this 
organism-environment relationship is necessarily based on probabilistic (uncertain) 
relations among environmental variables.” This uncertainty as well as uncertainty 
inherent to individual’s judgments and decisions is one of the basic reasons for 
incorporating an expert panel in the current research design. The outcomes of the expert 
panel meeting have been used to select specific cues for the assessment task in the 
experiment which has led to further improvement of the external validity of the research 
design.  
 
In its basic form the Lens model consists of the following formula (see Bonner, 1990, 
p.85): 
 
ra = G * R1 * R2 + C (1-R1) (1-R2) 
 
Where 
 
ra = correlation between subject 1 and 2’s judgments (here associations 
between audit risk judgments) 
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G = correlation between predictions based on models of subject 1 and 2’s 
judgments, or the ‘matching index’ 
Ri =  consistency of subject i in applying his or her judgment policy (from a linear 
regression of the subject’s judgments on the four cues) and 
C = correlation between the residuals from the subject 1 and 2’s models 
(configurality or some other form of non-linearity)  
 
The Lens model is based on the linearity assumption, namely the linear relation between 
cues and distal variables on the one hand and the linear relation between the cues and 
the individual judge’s assessment on the other hand. From several studies it is 
concluded that using non-linear models will not significantly increase the descriptive 
power of the model. That is, the linearity-assumption will not severely impact the 
outcomes of the model although some authors (e.g. Solomon & Brown, 1991) assume 
configural (i.e. non-linear) cue-usage by judges.  
 
Cue utilization 
 
The Lens model equation indicates the manner in which the individual auditor utilizes the 
cues in arriving at the final impact on audit risk assessment. Cue utilization is reflected in 
the following linear regression terms: 
 
Ýs = b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 
 
In this equation, Ýs is the optimal prediction of the auditors’ judgment of the impact of a 
cue or cue combinations on audit risk. X1, X2, X3 and X4 are the cues and b1 to b4 are the 
regression weights indicating the extent to which the auditor has used each cue in 
arriving at the assessment of the impact of the cues on audit risk.  
 
Consensus amongst (groups of) auditors 
As described in Figure 3.2 (experiment tasks 3 and 4) participants in the experiment 
were requested to assess the impact of two client’s business risks and two client’s 
entity-level controls on audit risk for the financial statement account Work in Progress. In 
sum, participants performed this assessment task for fifteen different combinations of 
these client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls. Judgment consensus is 
defined as the level of agreement amongst each pair of judges (experiment participants) 
over the fifteen different combinations. The following procedure has been conducted in 
order to compute the level of consensus (in conformity with Cooksey, 1995): 
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1. For each pair of auditors 2-tailed Pearson correlations were computed. This 
resulted in a total number of 3,570 correlation coefficients ([(85 participants * 85 
participants) -/- 85 participants] / 2). 
2. These resulting correlation coefficients were coded with a reference to the 
relating pair of auditors. 
3. This coding assisted in the run of group comparisons according to the 
independent variables of interest, which will be discussed in Section 4.5. Each 
pair of auditors, hence, was assigned to a group of interest, and in case a pair of 
auditors did not fit into a group, this pair was classified as ‘other’. 
4. Then, group means were computed in order to make comparisons of judgment 
consensus across various groups of auditors possible.  
5. With the purpose of assessing the significance of the group differences found, all 
correlation coefficients were re-calculated with so-called Fisher r to Z 
transformation, to adjust for non-normality. 
 
Table 3.6 provides visualization related to the previously mentioned first procedure.  
 
Table 3.6 Example of pair-wise correlations 
Cue combinations15  Participant 1 Participant 2 
1 3,00 6,00 
2 5,00 4,00 
3 5,00 8,00 
4 2,00 4,00 
5 2,00 2,00 
6 2,00 4,00 
7 2,00 2,00 
8 2,00 8,00 
9 2,00 4,00 
10 -4,00 -4,00 
11 6,00 8,00 
12 2,00 4,00 
13 -4,00 -4,00 
14 4,00 8,00 
15 -4,00 0,00 
 
                                                 
15
 See Table 3.3 for an example of possible cue combinations (first column). 
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In the example of Table 3.6, the mutual consensus variable – as measured by the two-
tailed Pearson correlation – is .877 (p <.1). The accompanying Fisher r to Z transformed 
value is 1.363.  
 
Judgment stability of participants 
As visualized in Figure 3.2 experiment participants were first requested to assess the 
impact of client’s business risks and entity-levels controls on audit risk for fifteen cue 
combinations. In addition, the experiment participants were provided with four repeat 
cases, which equaled four out of the fifteen previous cases in order to measure the 
auditors’ stability of judgments (consensus within individual auditors). For each 
participant judgment stability has been computed as the paired Pearson correlations of 
the four repeat cases with the four original cases. The judgment stability measure was 
used in order to assess the impact of the risk of ‘demand effects’ (participants’ fatigue 
and boredom due to lengthiness of the questionnaire). 
 
 
Cue usage of participants 
Cue usage is the objective weight experiment participants attributed to each of the four 
cues used in the experiment in assessing their impact on audit risk, namely two client’s 
business risks and two client’s entity-level controls. For each participant, a linear 
regression form was computed. The (objective) cue weights were the raw regression 
weights of these linear regressions.  
 
Self-insight of participants 
The level of self-insight of the experiment participants refers to the self-insight related to 
their (“objective”) cue usage. Self-insight was computed per participant as the correlation 
between the “objective” cue weights and their “subjective” cue weights. This computation 
is regularly applied in lens model research. The subjective cue weights for the four cues 
were separately asked in the debriefing questionnaire. Specifically, participants were 
asked to attribute 100 cue weight points to each of the four cues. In order to make the 
objective (i.e., raw regression) weights comparable to the subjective cue weights, the 
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objective cue weights were recalculated to add up to 100. Congruent with our statement 
regarding to judgment stability, the participants’ level of self-insight was used with the 
purpose of increasing the internal validity of the research design.  
 
A specific aspect of the self-insight computation in the current empirical study is that the 
business risk cues are assumed to have a positive impact on audit risk (i.e., audit risk 
increasing) where entity-level control cues are assumed to have a negative impact on 
audit risk (i.e., audit risk reduction). In other empirical studies making use of the lens 
model, the cues included in the research design only have a positive impact on the 
dependent variable. I am not aware of any empirical studies which included both risks 
and controls in the cue selection. The fact that in the current empirical study cues with a 
positive or a negative impact on audit risk have been included does not appear to be 
problematic in the calculation of self-insight. Regarding the computation of the objective 
cue weights, these cue weights have been re-calculated to an absolute (i.e., positive) 
value. This is possible given the fact that the scales used for the impact on audit risk 
assessment range from -10 to +10 where the centre of the scale is 0. This implies that 
respondents assess each case (combination of various cues present) relative to the 
same scale centre. Whether a cue has a positive or a negative impact on audit risk does 
not make a difference.  
With respect to the computation of subjective cue weights, participants were – as 
described – requested to distribute 100 points of importance to each of the four cues. 
These four cues included both business risks and entity-level controls. First, none of the 
participants indicated in the debriefing questionnaire that they experienced difficulty in 
attributing a positive importance weight to entity-level control cues. Second, each 
participant related the (subjective) importance of the four cues towards the same scale 
centre. A participant attributing more points of importance to entity-level control cues 
compared to business risk cues, implicitly assessed a risk-reducing (i.e., negative) 
impact of the four combined cues on audit risk.  
 
 
 
3.5 Independent variables 
In chapter 2 hypotheses have been developed describing the potential impact of 
independent variables on the auditors’ judgment performance. For both identification 
and assessment tasks, the same independent variables are included in these 
hypotheses except for the variable ‘level of risk-aversion’ which is only included in the 
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statistical analyses with respect to the assessment task. Subsequently the measurement 
of the following independent variables will be discussed: 
• The level of experience; 
• The level of feedback when conducting audit risk assessments; 
• The level of risk-aversion. 
 
3.5.1  The auditors’ level of experience  
In section 3.5.1, three different types of the auditors’ experience will be discussed: 
• The auditors’ level of general experience in the auditing field; 
• The auditors’ level of industry-specific experience; 
• The auditors’ level of task-specific experience.  
 
The auditors’ level of general experience in the auditing field 
The auditors’ level of general experience in the auditing field has been measured in 
terms of the number of years the participant has been engaged in a specific audit firm (in 
conformity with, for example, Bonner 1990). Wright (1988, p. 309) reasoned that the 
mixed results of prior research studies on the impact of general experience in auditing 
on the auditors’ judgment performance might be attributable to the relatively limited 
range of experience levels included in prior studies. Studies typically focused on 
experience levels between one and three years of experience. The current empirical 
study extends the range of experience levels by both including audit managers and 
auditing students in the research design. 
 
The auditors’ level of industry-specific experience 
In section 3.3.3, it was described that in the research design of this empirical study the 
construction industry has been selected. Measuring the auditor’s level of industry-
specific experience is, thus, related to the auditors’ experience in the construction 
industry. Prior studies have used ‘designation as industry specialist’ as variable 
measuring industry-specific experience (e.g., Wright and Wright 1997; Solomon et al. 
1999) or ‘number of industry-specific audits performed’ (e.g., Taylor 2000; Wright and 
Wright 1997) or ‘hours of staff training directed towards a specific industry’ and ‘years of 
non-public accounting experience in a specific industry (e.g., Wright and Wright 1997). 
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Wright and Wright (1997) stated that “since there is no variable recognized which is an 
optimal measure of industry, alternative measures provide the opportunity to examine 
the effect of different dimensions of the notion of industry experience”.  
 
In this empirical study three dimensions of industry-specific experience have been 
examined: 
• Estimated annual number of hours spent on (construction) industry-specific training 
(cf. Taylor, 2000; Wright and Wright 1997); 
• Estimated annual number of days spent on knowledge acquisition related to the 
(construction) industry; 
• Estimated cumulative number of hours spent over three years on (construction) 
industry-specific audit engagements. This dimension has been used as alternative 
measure to ‘number of industry-specific audits performed’ (Taylor, 2000; Wright and 
Wright, 1997). The measure ‘number of audits performed’ is insufficiently specific in 
terms of clients versus engagements (e.g., if an auditor is involved in the audit of 
two subsidiaries of a construction company, does that count for one or two audits?) 
and it is also insufficiently specific in terms of the amount of time that an auditor is 
involved in the audit of industry-specific companies. For that reason a period of 3 
years has been used in this thesis. Estimating a number of audit hours is as such 
subjective and has thus been shortened to a period of 3 years, which falls within a 
reasonable period of time with which an auditor can estimate the number of hours.  
 
Based upon analysis of the debriefing questionnaires, the first and second industry-
experience measure turned out to be no accurate measure of industry-experience. 
Participants reported that the Big4 audit firms do not provide much industry-specific 
training to specialists in the construction industry. In addition, auditors do not distinguish 
as industry-specialist in spending time on knowledge acquisition in the construction-
industry. As a result, only the third measure will be used in the empirical analysis of the 
potential impact of industry-specific experience on the auditors’ judgment performance.  
 
The auditors’ level of task-specific experience 
Bonner (1990) made a distinction concerning her experiment on control risk and 
analytical risk assessments between inexperienced and experienced auditors. In this 
regard, an experienced auditor was defined as “one who has training and extensive 
experience in both control risk assessments and analytical risk assessments; such 
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experience is held by managers (auditors with about five to seven years of experience). 
An inexperienced auditor is one who has extensive training and some experience in 
control risk assessments and minimal to no training and experience in analytical risk 
assessment. Staff auditors with two years of experience with two years of experience 
meet this criterion”. 
 
This thesis has made the same (high-level) distinction between inexperienced (i.e., 
auditing students) and experienced auditors (audit managers). Bonner’s measurement 
of task-specific experience, however, is based on assumptions which can differ across 
audit firms. As the current empirical study comprised more than one audit firm, the 
independent variable ‘task-specific experience’ has been measured as a continuous 
variable (i.e., not only a discontinuous distinction has been made between experienced 
and inexperienced auditors, but participants have been specifically asked to indicate the 
level of task-specific experience). Participants were asked to provide both the number of 
times and the number of estimated hours spent on each of the following tasks: 
• The identification of client’s business risks; 
• The identification of client’s entity-level controls; 
• Assessing the impact of client’s business risks on audit risk; 
• Assessing the impact of client’s entity-level controls on audit risk. 
 
Hence, this way of measurement sheds more light on the actual level of task-specific 
experience on the selected audit tasks. The task-specific experience variables (based 
on their experience in the recent audit year) are presented in Table 3.7.  
 
Table 3.7 Description of task-specific experience variables 
 
Variable Description Measurement in terms of  
IDBR1 Identification of client’s business risks Number of times task 
performed 
IDBR2 Identification of client’s business risks Cumulative number of hours 
IDBM1 Identification of client’s entity-level controls Number of times task 
performed 
IDBM2 Identification of client’s entity-level controls Cumulative number of hours 
WBR1 Assessing the impact of client’s business risks on audit risk Number of times task 
performed 
WBR2 Assessing the impact of client’s business risks on audit risk Cumulative number of hours 
WBM1 Assessing the impact of client’s entity-level controls on 
audit risk 
Number of times task 
performed 
WBM2 Assessing the impact of client’s entity-level controls on 
audit risk 
Cumulative number of hours 
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3.5.2  The level of feedback in conducting audit risk assessments 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesized that the (perceived) level of feedback (when 
conducting audit risk assessments) would have a positive impact on the auditors’ 
judgment performance.  
 
Participants in the experiment were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale how often 
they received feedback from their supervisors having performed audit risk assessments. 
The scale-ends ranged from ‘never’ to ‘always’ (when conducting these tasks).  
 
The variable ‘perceived level of feedback’ is part of training-on-the-job experience and, 
thus, might attribute the auditors’ judgment performance in addition to the auditors’ task-
specific experience. Prior research (e.g. Waller and Felix 1984; Tuttle and Stocks 1988) 
on the impact of (outcome) feedback on the auditors’ judgment performance is typically 
designed with feedback as a manipulated variable. This type of experiments, however, 
do not consider to what extent participants receive feedback in actual settings. In recent 
years, regulatory bodies and international auditing standards (e.g. POB 2000; ISA 200, 
section 18, 2003) have accentuated the need for adequate supervision on and 
performance evaluation of the auditors’ audit documentation. The level of feedback has 
been measured in the current empirical study by a measured variable instead of a 
manipulated variable, hence reflecting the perceived level of feedback in current audit 
practice. 
 
3.5.3  The level of risk-aversion 
This section is concerned with the last independent variable used in this empirical study. 
The level of risk-aversion is not specifically related to the conduct of audit risk 
assessments, but is designed as a trait of people in general.  
 
The participants were provided with a question regarding a gambling game (derived 
from Harrison, 1986). Participants could assume that they were to receive with 100% 
certainty an amount of € 10,000. Then, participants were asked which percentage of 
certainty they would need to accept receiving an uncertain amount of € 25,000. This % 
is used as a measure of risk-aversion. A higher % of required certainty corresponds with 
a higher level of risk-aversion. A break-even points exists at the level of 40% (i.e., 40% * 
€ 25,000 = 100% * € 10,000).  
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In this empirical study, taking into consideration the level of risk-aversion, the aim was to 
find a single measure of risk-aversion. Harrison’s (1986) study, however, examined a 
variety of possible situations (including variations on the amounts that could be won). As 
a result, the measure of risk-aversion used in the current empirical study is a simplified 
one. The amounts selected in the gambling game were chosen to reflect a real life 
setting and to include for most participants the trigger to choose for the uncertain 
situation.  
 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has discussed the research design for the empirical study regarding the 
auditors’ judgment performance. It was described that an experiment is conducted for 
the “identification tasks” (i.e., the identification of client’s business risks and entity-level 
controls) as well as a quasi-experiment for the “assessment task” (i.e., assessment of 
the impact of selected client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk). In 
addition, it was described that an expert panel was constructed in order to develop an 
external evaluation criterion regarding judgment performance with respect to the 
“identification tasks” and to increase the external validity of the cues selected in the 
quasi-experiment.  
 
The next Chapter will describe the empirical results regarding the auditors’ judgment 
performance in the “identification tasks”. Chapter 5 provides the empirical results 
regarding the auditors’ judgment performance in the “assessment task”. 
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4 Results of the experiment: judgment performance with respect to 
identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls 
4.1 Introduction16  
This chapter presents the experimental results related to the auditors’ judgment 
performance regarding the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risk and client’s 
entity-level controls’. Particularly, I examine whether the auditors’ judgment performance 
is influenced by three types of experience (experience in the auditing field, industry-
specific experience and task-specific experience) and two other independent variables 
which potentially influence the auditor’s judgment performance in the experiment:  
1 Level of feedback received from supervisors in conducting audit risk analysis; 
2 Level of risk-aversion. 
 
Judgment performance related to the task selected in the experiment has been 
measured by ‘accuracy-scores’. The accuracy-scores measure the conformity of client’s 
business risk factors and client’s entity-level controls identified by auditors with the 
respective risk factors and controls identified by a panel of experts. The previous chapter 
elaborated more on the methodological aspects of the expert panel (including 
composition of the expert panel, due process of the expert panel’s session, as well as 
the calculation of accuracy-scores). Recall from the previous chapter that for both the 
identification of client’s business risks and the identification of client’s entity-level 
controls, two distinct accuracy-scores have been calculated: 
• A factor accuracy-score which measures to what extent the risk factors and 
controls identified by auditors match with the factors identified by the expert panel; 
and  
• A weighting accuracy-score which measures to what extent the importance weights 
the auditors attached to the risk factors and controls match with the importance 
weights as developed by the expert panel. 
 
                                                 
16
 Due to confidentiality reasons, it was agreed with the participating firms not to report on the impact of 
the quality individual of auditors’ judgments. In addition, the results presented in this empirical study will 
not refer to the names of the participating audit firms.  
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As such the accuracy-scores measure the judgment performance of individual auditors. 
The next chapter describes the empirical results regarding the assessment task. In the 
assessment task, judgment performance is measured by consensus, which implies the 
level of agreement among a group of auditors17. Whether and if so, to what extent, the 
accuracy-measure is related to the consensus-measure will be discussed at the end of 
the next chapter. 
 
This chapter reads as follows. Section 4.2 starts with a preliminary exploration of the 
data obtained in the experiment. In section 4.3 the hypotheses related to the 
identification task, as developed in Chapter 2, will be repeated shortly. The sections 
4.4.1 to 4.4.5 present the quantitative analyses of the results of the experiment, 
subsequently followed in sections 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 with the qualitative analyses of the 
experimental results. The chapter concludes with a summary in section 5.5. 
 
4.2 Dataset 
This paragraph provides a general overview of the composition of the dataset. The 
dataset contains responses of both audit managers (“experienced auditors”) and 
auditing students (“novices to the task”). In the previous chapter it is argued that the task 
selected in the experiment is, due to task complexity and novelty of the task, performed 
by audit managers. Auditing students have been selected to serve as a benchmark to 
the group of audit managers. The preliminary analysis of the dataset is concerned with 
items addressed in the debriefing questionnaire, which primarily relate to the personal 
characteristics of the respondents in terms of experience and task-specific work 
environment. Subsequently, the following topics will be dealt with in this section 2: 
• Overall descriptive statistics; 
• Participants; 
• Experience in the auditing field; 
• Industry-specific experience; 
• Task-specific experience.  
 
                                                 
17
 In this empirical study, two groups of auditors are distinguished (refer to section 3.3.2): a group of audit 
managers and a group of post-graduate auditing students. 
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4.2.1 Overall descriptive statistics 
This section presents an overview of the descriptive statistics of the two target groups of 
this empirical study.  
Descriptive statistics dependent variables 
Tables 4.1 present the descriptive statistics regarding the dependent variables. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics dependent variables identification tasks 
 
Variable n Actual 
minimum 
Theoretical 
minimum 
Actual 
maximum 
Theoretical 
maximum 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Audit managers 
Accuracy1 85 1.00 .00 5.00 5.00 2.46 1.03 
Accuracy2 85 .50 .00 8.13 12.5018 3.82 1.84 
Accuracy3 85 1.00 .00 5.00 5.00 3.68 1.03 
Accuracy4 85 1.00 .00 13.88 22.50 8.18 2.71 
        
Auditing students 
Accuracy1 20 0.00 .00 3.00 5.00 2.05 .83 
Accuracy2 20 0.00 .00 7.00 12.50 3.35 1.93 
Accuracy3 20 1.00 .00 5.00 5.00 3.95 1.05 
Accuracy4 20 2.50 .00 13.25 22.50 9.12 2.80 
        
 
Table 4.1 suggests that audit managers show higher judgment performance on the 
mean accuracy-scores (i.e., 2.46 and 3.82 respectively) compared to auditing students 
(i.e., 2.05 and 3.35 respectively) related to the identification of client’s business risks. To 
the contrary, Table 4.1 suggests that audit managers show lower judgment performance 
on the mean accuracy-scores (i.e., 3.68 and 8.18 respectively) compared to auditing 
                                                 
18
 The theoretical maximum is achieved when a respondent allocates the maximum number of 100 points 
to a client’s business risk factor that was ranked highest by the expert panel. The highest-ranking 
risk factor identified by the expert panel was ‘Business operations are strongly dependent of the 
director’ (mean expert panel 12.50). The same applies to accuracy4 where the highest ranked entity-
level control was ‘strong project control by periodical management information reports’ (mean expert 
panel 22.50). 
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students (i.e., 3.95 and 9.12 respectively) related to the identification of client’s entity-
level controls. The Mann-Whitney test shows no significant (p<.10) differences between 
audit managers and auditing students on all accuracy-scores, see Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Statistics Mann-Whitney test for assessing significance of accuracy 
differences between audit managers and auditing students 
 
 
Accuracy1 Accuracy2 Accuracy3 Accuracy4 
Mann-Whitney U 672 729 702.5 666.0 
Z -1.520 -.988 -1.261 -1.502 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.129 .323 .207 .133 
 
 
The participants were forced to limit their identifications to only the five most important 
client’s business risks and entity-level controls. We need to take this into account when 
interpreting the overall means of accuracy1 (measuring the number of client’s business 
risks) and accuracy3 (measuring the number of client’s entity-level controls). On the one 
hand, it can be argued that participants did identify risks and controls that were not 
obviously wrong; these risks and controls or at least some of these ‘lacking’ risks and 
controls were simply not in the top five of the expert panel’s list, which does not say 
these risks and controls were not important at all. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that these accuracy-scores leave room for further improvement (obviously, the 
participants’ list of risks and controls did not fully match with the expert panel’s list of 
most important risks and controls). In previous studies (e.g., Bedard and Maroney, 2000) 
it has been suggested that judgment performance in identification tasks can be improved 
by performing these tasks in group sessions (brainstorm will be helpful to idea 
generation in general and to risk factor identification in particular). Some participants 
reported in the debriefing questionnaire they would have liked to make use of the 
knowledge and experience colleagues, others would like to have used decision-aids like 
industry-specific templates (see also Bedard and Graham, 2002).  
 
With respect to the mean accuracy-scores related to the importance attached to the 
client’s business risks (accuracy2) and entity-level controls (accuracy4) also room is left 
for improved judgment performance. Comparing both these accuracy-scores reveals 
that on average accuracy4 is much higher than accuracy2 for both audit managers and 
auditing students. The most important cause underlying this finding is that both the 
expert panel and the participants viewed one single control as being the most important 
one, hence, distributing more of the 100 points to this single control. This control 
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involves tightened project control by periodic project control reports. This type of 
management information is important as it is used as a tool of management by which 
management can monitor individual projects (cost control) and act on these reports as a 
well as that management gets an overall view on the project portfolio. Most of the 
respondents identified this single control. As accuracy2 and accuracy4 are a 
multiplication of the participant’s weights (on matching factors) with the expert panel’s 
weights, this single control is solely responsible for the higher scores on accuracy4. 
 
Descriptive statistics independent variables 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the descriptive statistics regarding the independent variables 
for audit managers and auditing students respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics independent variables audit managers 
 
Demographic question Categories (if 
applicable) 
n Minimum Maximum  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Big 4 Audit Firm 1 20     
 2 25     
 3 25     
 4 15     
Direct work-experience in 
Construction-industry 
Yes 419     
 No 81     
Construction-industry 
specific training 
Yes 13     
 No 72     
Number of days spent on 
gathering industry-
specific knowledge20  
Yes 58     
                                                 
19
 Given the fact that a very low number of participants indicated that they had prior direct work 
experience in the construction industry (outside the auditing field), this variable has not been included in 
the empirical analysis.  
20
 58 participants indicated that they spent some time during the year on gathering industry-specific 
knowledge. Given the extreme variance in indicated number of days spent on this knowledge-acquisition 
process, it has been assumed that various participants had difficulty in applying a number of days to this 
question. Probably, other participants may have experienced difficulty in interpretation of the question. 
Would this for example also include reading the newspaper, formalized industry-specific training, and 
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Demographic question Categories (if 
applicable) 
n Minimum Maximum  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 No 27     
 Overall  0 150 6.32 18.16 
Client-size of industry-
specific engagements  
Mainly large 
clients 
19     
 Mainly 
small/medium-
sized 
28     
 No clients 38     
Desirability of tool-usage 
when completing 
questionnaire 
Yes 34     
 No 51     
General experience in 
auditing (years) 
 85 5 42 13.02 6.64 
Industry-specific 
experience (hours) 
 85 0 3,000 536.94 687.50 
Task-experience 
(IDBR1)21 
 83 0 50 9.88 7.26 
Task-experience 
(IDBR2)22 
 83 0 192 39.55 34.50 
Task-experience 
(IDBM1)23 
 84 0 50 9.79 7.22 
Task-experience 
(IDBM2)24 
 84 0 500 56.56 70.13 
Feedback  84 0 10 5.27 2.71 
Autonomy25  84 3 10 8.03 1.13 
Risk-aversion  82 0 100 65.07 24.46 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
discussing industry-specific issues with colleagues, etc.? Given the potential for controversy, this variable 
has not been included in the empirical analysis.  
21
 IDBR1 is measured as the number of times respondents conducted the task ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ last year. 
22
 IDBR2 is measured as the number of hours respondents spent on the task ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ last year. 
23
 IDBM1 is measured as the number of times respondents conducted the task ‘identification of client’s 
entity-level controls’ last year.  
24
 IDBM2 is measured as the number of hours respondents spent on the task ‘identification of client’s 
entity-level controls’ last year. 
25
 This variable initially was supposed to be the opposite of the variable ‘Feedback’. This variable has not 
been included in the empirical analysis given the multi-interpretability of the variable.  
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Table 4.3 shows that all Big4 audit firms are represented well in the data-set. The 
cooperation of the Big4 audit firms – specifically the assistance of the technical 
departments in ensuring a high response rate - with this empirical study has contributed 
to the participation of each firm in this empirical study.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that audit managers’ general experience in the auditing field ranges 
from five to 42 years. In The Netherlands, audit firms – in addition to the requirement of 
having completed the Auditing education - use a minimum level of general experience of 
five years as a minimum requirement to promote senior staff to audit manager.  
 
Table 4.3 also shows that audit managers have relatively little experience in the 
construction industry outside the auditing field (e.g., in functions like work foreman, 
calculation departments etcetera). The measure of industry-specific experience in terms 
of audit hours assigned to industry-specific audit engagement appears to be the most 
representative measure of industry-specific experience compared to the other measures 
used in this empirical study. Auditor’s experience in industry-specific audit engagements 
is related to both large (19 auditors) and medium-sized/small audit engagements (28 
auditors). 
 
With regard to the mean levels of task-specific experience, Table 4.3 suggests that on 
average Audit managers perform the identification tasks (both the identification of 
client’s business risks and the identification of entity-level controls) approximately ten 
times a year. As a rule of thumb this number comes near to the average number of audit 
engagements an audit manager is assigned to. Audit managers spend on an annual 
basis more time on the identification of client’s entity-level controls (56 hours) compared 
to the time spent on the identification of client’s business risks (40 hours). Both 
estimations of time spent on the tasks seem to be relatively low. This might be explained 
by the fact that the role of the audit manager in performing these tasks has slightly 
changed from ‘executing’ to ‘supervising’.  
 
Table 4.3 further suggests that audit managers perceive to receive on average 
sometimes feedback (mean level of feedback 5.27) when conducting audit risk 
assessments.  
 
Finally, Table 4.3 indicates that audit managers are relatively risk-averse (level of risk-
aversion of 65 where a level of 40 would indicate a risk-neutral level). 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics independent variables auditing students 
 
Demographic question Categories (if 
applicable) 
n Minimum Maximum  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Big 4 Audit Firm 1 3     
 2 5     
 3 3     
 4 4     
 Other 5     
Direct work-experience in 
Construction-industry 
Yes 0     
 No 20     
Construction-industry 
specific training 
Yes 0     
 No 20     
Number of days industry-
specific spent on 
gathering industry-
specific knowledge  
Yes 5     
 No 15     
 Overall 20 0 5.00 .75 1.62 
Client-size of industry-
specific engagements  
Mainly big clients 1     
 Mainly 
small/medium-
sized 
3     
 No clients 16     
Desirability of tool-usage 
when completing 
questionnaire 
Yes 7     
 No 8     
General experience in 
auditing (years) 
 20 1.5 5.0 2.85 1.18 
Industry-specific 
experience (hours) 
 20 0 400.0 56.5 119.44 
Task-experience (IDBR1)  20 0 20.0 7.2 6.57 
Task-experience (IDBR2)  20 0 600.0 101.05 158.92 
Task-experience (IDBM1)  19 0 30.0 9.16 8.17 
Task-experience (IDBM2)  19 0 600,0 169.47 196.59 
Feedback  20 2.0 10.0 6.8 2.50 
Autonomy  20 3.0 9.0 6.15 1.95 
Risk-aversion  19 20.0 95.0 72.63 20.10 
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Some introductory remarks follow from Table 4.4: 
• Auditing students are – compared to audit managers – relatively inexperienced in 
terms of general experience (on average 2.85 years of experience, which 
corresponds to their attendance of a second-year post-graduate training course) 
and industry-specific experience (on average 56.5 hours were spent over the past 
three years on industry-specific audit engagements, which is explained by another 
element of Table 4.4: only four auditing students had some experience with 
industry-specific audit engagements).  
• The level of the auditing students’ task-specific experience is higher then could 
have been expected. Although auditing students perform the tasks less often 
compared to audit managers, auditing students spent on average far more time on 
these tasks. Explanation for the average time spent on the tasks for example might 
be: (1) auditing students actually execute the tasks, where audit managers 
supervise the execution of the tasks, (2) as a result of their relative lack of general 
experience, auditing students execute the tasks more inefficiently compared to audit 
managers (i.e., they need more time to complete the task). 
• It is also clear from Table 4.4 that auditing students perceive to receive more 
feedback when conducting audit risk assessments compared to audit managers. 
Finally, auditing students seem to be slightly more risk-averse compared to audit 
managers.  
 
4.2.2 Participants 
The experiment has been limited to the Big4 audit firms in The Netherlands26. For the 
group of audit managers, 120 case materials and questionnaires have been sent to firm 
representatives. These firm representatives were requested to distribute these materials 
to an equal group of audit managers with substantial experience in the construction 
industry, and a group of audit managers having no experience in the construction 
industry. In total, 85 audit managers participated in the experiment (with a minimum of 
16 participants and a maximum of 26 participants per firm). As in total 120 
questionnaires have been distributed, this equals a 70.8% response rate. A group of 20 
post-graduate auditing students was provided with the experiment materials during a 
course at the ‘Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam’ and includes both auditing students 
employed at Big4 audit firms (75%) as well as non-Big4 audit firms (25%).  
                                                 
26
 When the experiment was conducted (2003), the Big4 audit firms in The Netherlands were: Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
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4.2.3 Experience in the auditing field 
Audit managers had on average 13.02 years of experience in auditing with a minimum of 
5 and a maximum of 42 years of experience (standard deviation of 6.64). The detection 
of outliers was performed, using a threshold of 3 times the standard deviation (Stevens, 
1996). This resulted in the identification of two outliers (respondent 73 with 42 years of 
experience and respondent 67 with 35 years of experience). The reported mean of 
13.02 years of experience reflects regular career patterns in Big4 audit firms. In these 
audit firms, auditors are promoted to audit manager, regularly having a minimum of 5 
years of experience and having successfully completed the auditing education. 
Differences in experience in the auditing field were not significant across the 
participating audit firms. 
Auditing students reported a mean of 2.85 years of experience in the auditing field, 
ranging from 1.5 to 5 years. The Independent Samples t-test shows that the level of 
experience in the auditing field significantly differed between the two groups (t = 6.795; 
df = 103; mean difference = 10.168; p = .0; equal variances assumed).  
 
4.2.4 Industry-specific experience  
In order to get a relatively high number of respondents with high-levels of industry-
specific experience, firm representatives (recognized as “industry leaders by the audit 
firm”) have been asked to distribute 15 questionnaires to audit managers with 
considerable industry-specific experience in the construction industry.  
 
Out of 85 audit managers, 19 audit managers serve large audit clients in the 
construction industry, 28 audit managers serve medium-sized clients in the construction 
industry and 38 audit managers did not serve audit clients in the construction industry.  
The level of industry-specific experience (as measured by the sum of estimated number 
of hours spent on industry-specific audit clients in the past three years) varied between 0 
and 3,000 hours with a mean of 536.9 hours (standard deviation of 687.5). Other 
studies, e.g., have measured industry-specific experience by: designation as specialist 
by the firm (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Solomon et al., 1999), or number of industry-specific 
engagements, number of industry-specific clients, number of training hours directed 
toward a specific industry, and years of non-public accounting industry-specific 
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experience (e.g., Wright and Wright, 1997). Recently, Neal and Riley (2004) advocated 
a market share or portfolio share approach related to auditor specialization. One outlier 
(with hours more than 3 times the standard deviation) has been detected (respondent 25 
with 3,000 hours).  
A total of 14 out of 20 students reported no construction industry-specific experience at 
all. The other 6 respondents had an average industry-experience of 56.5 hours over the 
past three years (differences between the two groups are significant, t=3.103, p = .002). 
 
In chapter 2 it has been discussed that audit firms in the late nineties were organized 
around industries. The decision of audit firms to distinguish several industries within the 
audit firm is based upon factors such as (improvement of) audit efficiency and audit 
effectiveness. In addition, marketing arguments support segmentation of the audit 
practice. E.g., clustering industry-specific knowledge within the audit firm will be helpful 
to individual audit managers in discussions with industry-specific clients about industry 
issues like trends in the industry, industry-specific risks, etc. The reported mean of 
industry-specific experience in terms of hours spent on industry-specific audit clients 
reported over the past three years (536.9) indicates that the construction industry within 
audit firms is distinct from other industries, e.g. the industries Financial Services, 
Healthcare and Government (local/country-level) industries27. The level of industry-
specific experience – as described above by the number of audit managers with 
industry-specific experience (47 auditors compared to 38 auditors with no industry-
specific experience) and the mean level of industry-specific experience (536.9) - is 
expected to be a good indicator of the auditors’ expertise in the construction industry. 
Table 4.5 shows the mean levels of industry-specific experience (as measured in terms 
of hours spent on industry-specific engagements over the past three years) of the 
participants per audit firm.  
                                                 
27
 E.g., Solomon et al. (1999) reported that “over the past five years, the financial (health) specialists had 
spent, on average, 74% (63%) of their time working on audits. Taylor (2000) reports for banking 
specialists over a period of two years a similar percentage (74%). Wright and Wright (1993) report a mean 
of 3.5 retailing engagements for their participants on an annual basis. Although these measures of 
industry experience are different (and the study of Solomon et al. (1999) does not describe how many 
hours are involved with financial/health clients), both studies show clearly that health and financial 
specialists devote more time to their industry of specialization compared to the retail specialists.  
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Table 4.5 Mean levels of industry-specific experience of participants per audit firm 
 
Firm Mean industry-
specific experience 
1 371.5 
2 455.4 
3 574.8 
4 821.9 
  
Total 536.9 
 
Based upon the Scheffé test for multiple post-hoc comparisons the mean levels of 
industry-specific firms did not significantly differ across firms. However, when firm 4 was 
compared with the other three firms combined, a significant difference was reported 
based on the Mann-Whitney test (p = .01). 
 
The audit managers’ level of experience in the auditing field does not significantly 
correlate (after adjustment for three outliers) with the level of industry-specific 
experience (2-tailed Pearson correlation of .008, p = .947, n = 82). The auditing 
students’ level of experience does also not significantly correlate with the level of 
industry-specific experience (2-tailed Pearson correlation of -.041; p= .863; n =20).  
4.2.5 Task-specific experience 
With respect to task familiarity, we have asked participants to provide details on their 
experience with identification of client business risks and entity-level controls as well as 
with the assessment of the impact of client business risks and entity-level controls on 
audit risk. All task familiarity variables are measured in terms of the ‘number of times 
task performed in the last year’ and ‘number of hours spent on the task in the last year’. 
Table 4.6 reports the audit managers’ descriptive statistics for each of the distinguished 
task-familiarity variables. In Table 4.6, two outliers have been excluded (respondent 73, 
e.g., reporting 50 times the identification of client’s business risk task; and respondent 
81 with 500 hours spent on the identification of entity-level controls). 
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Table 4.6 Audit managers’ task-specific experience  
 
Task Description n Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
dev. 
Number of times 
performed 
81 0 30 9.39 5.80 
Number of hours spent 81 0 192 38.68 34.24 
Identification of 
client business 
risks (CBR) 
Average time spent on 
task 
80 1 33.33 5.09 5.57 
Number of times 
performed 
82 0 27 9.29 5.76 
Number of hours spent 82 0 256 50.93 50.75 
Identification of 
client’s entity-
level controls 
(EWC) Average time spent on 
task 
80 .58 36 6.48 6.02 
Number of times 
performed 
82 0 30 9.70 6.08 
Number of hours spent 82 0 200 38.00 35.79 
Assessment of 
impact of CBR 
on audit risk 
Average time spent on 
task 
80 .67 20 4.43 3.44 
Number of times 
performed 
81 0 30 9.70 6.25 
Number of hours spent 81 0 200 42.37 37.04 
Assessment of 
impact of EWC 
on audit risk 
Average time spent on 
task 
79 .42 20 5.19 4.09 
 
The n as reported in Table 4.6 does not equal 83 (85 respondents minus two outliers) 
because of missing values. On the whole, 3 respondents indicated having performed the 
task in the past year more than 20 times. Out of 81 audit managers, 35 reported having 
performed the identification of client’s business risk task less than 10 times last year, 
where 46 audit managers reported having performed this task more than 10 times. The 
means (e.g., the means of the number of times the four tasks have been performed is 
higher than nine) of all task-familiarity variables as reported indicate that most of the 
participating audit managers are sufficiently familiar with the tasks selected in the 
experiment. As a rule of thumb, the client portfolio of an individual audit manager 
regularly comprises 10 to 20 different clients (depending on client size). Taking this rule 
of thumb into consideration it is suggested that audit managers perform the tasks 
presented in Table 4.6 for the majority of their clients.  
 
Table 4.7 reports the mean levels of task-specific experience of participants per 
individual audit firm.  
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Table 4.7 Mean levels of task-specific experience of participants per audit firm28 
 
 IDBR1 IDBR2 IDBM1 IDBM2 
Firm 1 9.6 29.3 9.7 27.3 
Firm 2 9.2 35.0 10.0 59.9 
Firm 3 7.8 44.9 8.1 63.1 
Firm 4 14.2 52.2 11.9 78.8 
     
Total 9.9 39.6 9.8 56.6 
 
Based on the Scheffé test for multiple post-hoc comparisons, a significant difference 
between firm 3 and firm 4 has been reported regarding the task ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ as measured by IDBR1 (p = .06). Table 4.7 suggests that firm 4 is mostly 
distinguished from the other firms. Based on the Mann-Whitney test it was reported that 
firm 4 significantly differed from the other firms both for IDBR1 and IDBR2 (p = .04 and p 
= .07 respectively), but not for IDBM1 and IDBM2. No clear-cut explanation is available 
related to this finding.  
 
Additionally, the task familiarity variables have been correlated with experience in the 
auditing field and industry-specific experience. The 1-tailed Pearson correlations are 
presented in Table 4.8 (p<.1). 
                                                 
28
 See legend to Table 4.8 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 4.8: 1-tailed Pearson correlations task-specific with experience in the auditing field 
and industry-specific experience (audit managers) (significance p < .1) 
 
 Idbr1 Idbr2 Wbr1 Wbr2 Idbm1 Idbm2 Wbm1 Wbm2 
Expyears  .011 
(.461) 
.025 
(.414) 
.060 
(.297) 
-.073 
(.259) 
-.166 
(.069)* 
-.294 
(.004)* 
-.032 
(.388) 
-.237 
(.017)* 
Hours  -.241 
(.016)* 
.143 
(.103) 
-.186 
(.049)* 
-.023 
(.418) 
-.224 
(.022)* 
-.067 
(.276) 
-.300 
(.003)* 
-.064 
(.287) 
Idbr1  .301 
(.003)* 
.914 
(.000)* 
.401 
(.000)* 
.686 
(.000)* 
.157 
(.083)* 
.866 
(.000)* 
.342 
(.001)* 
Idbr2   .276 
(.007)* 
.612 
(.000)* 
.128 
(.129) 
.438 
(.000)* 
.229 
(.021)* 
.531 
(.000)* 
Wbr1    .475 
(.000)* 
.698 
(.000)* 
.212 
(.028)* 
.886 
(.000)* 
.353 
(.001)* 
Wbr2     .335 
(.001)* 
.730 
(.000)* 
.414 
(.000)* 
.864 
(.000)* 
Idbm1      .340 
(.001)* 
.759 
(.000)* 
.363 
(.000)* 
Idbm2       .281 
(.006)* 
.841 
(.000)* 
Wbm1        .409 
(.000)* 
Wbm2         
 
Legend to Table 4.8 (significance between brackets; p < .1 is significant): 
• Expyears: years of experience in the auditing field; 
• Hours: industry-specific experience; hours spent over past three years on audit clients in 
construction industry; 
• Idbr1: Number of times the task ‘identification of client’s business risk’ performed in last year; 
• Idbr2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘identification of client’s business risk’ in last year; 
• Wbr1: Number of times the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risk on audit risk’ 
performed in last year  
• Wbr2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risk on audit 
risk’ in last year; 
• Idbm1: Number of times the task ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ performed in last 
year; 
• Idbm2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ in last year; 
• Wbm1: Number of times the task ‘assessing the impact of the client’s entity-level controls on audit 
risk’ performed in last year; 
• Wbm2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘assessing the impact of the client’s entity-level controls 
on audit risk’ in last year. 
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From Table 4.8 the following conclusions can be drawn: 
• A significant negative correlation (-.229; -and -.302, respectively29) has been 
reported between experience in the auditing field and task-specific experience 
related to the identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls (as 
measured by the number of hours spent on these tasks). This implies that as the 
audit managers’ experience in the auditing field increases this is accompanied with 
a decreasing involvement in the two tasks. From a practical perspective this can 
probably be explained by the changing content of the task over time. E.g., in the 
period just after being promoted to audit manager, the audit manager performs the 
task him/herself. After some years, new promoted audit managers become 
involved in the task and the more experienced audit managers’ role changes from 
‘performing the task’ to ‘reviewing and supervising the task performed by other 
audit managers’. Another explanation can be that more experienced audit 
managers perform the tasks in less time (more efficiently) compared to the less 
experienced audit managers. The debriefing questionnaire contained a question 
related to the ‘task environment’ in terms of the level of feedback a manager 
receives when performing the task. Pearson correlation between years of 
experience in the auditing field and the feedback measure also point in the 
direction of changed content of the task over time. The 2-tailed Pearson correlation 
between Experience in the auditing field and Feedback is negative: -.346 (p = .001; 
n = 8230). This implies that more experienced audit managers receive less 
feedback compared to less experienced audit managers. Although the explanation 
for the negative relationship between Experience in the auditing field and task-
specific experience provided sounds reasonable, this does not imply a value 
judgment in terms of right or wrong. In the regulatory audit environment (see for 
example PCAOB, ISQC1, 2003), a tendency of increasing the importance of 
feedback by supervisors (including partner involvement) is observable. From Table 
4.8 we cannot conclude that the increased importance of feedback and supervision 
has already been implemented by audit firms. Whether this finding also has an 
impact on the quality of the auditors’ judgments is examined in section 4.4. 
• The second line of Table 4.8 suggests that industry-specific experience negatively 
correlates with two other task-familiarity variables: task familiarity related to the 
identification (as measured by the number of times the tasks have been performed) 
of client’s business risks and entity-level controls. Table 4.8 also shows that the 
significant correlations only relate to task-familiarity as measured in terms of 
‘number of times the task is performed’; the other task-familiarity measures 
                                                 
29
 For auditing students, these correlations are not significant. 
30
 For auditing students this correlation is not significant.  
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(measured in terms of ‘hours spent on the task’) are not significantly correlated with 
industry-specific experience. This implies that increased industry-specific 
experience need not necessarily imply that the task is performed more efficiently. 
In fact, the opposite is true. Namely, significant positive correlations were found 
between industry-specific experience and the average time spent on the tasks as 
can be seen in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 Pearson correlations between general experience and industry-specific 
experience and average time spent on the task 
 
 
Average time 
spent on 
identification of 
client’s business 
risk  
Average time 
spent on 
assessing impact 
of client’s business 
risk on audit risk 
 
Average time 
spent on 
identification of 
client’s entity-level 
controls 
 
Average time 
spent on 
assessing impact 
of client’s entity-
level controls on 
audit risk  
General 
experience 
-.160 (p=.162; n=78) -.217* (p=.058; 
n=77) 
-.255* (p=.024; 
n=79) 
-.255* (p=.024; 
n=78) 
Industry-specific 
experience 
.387* (p=.000; n=78) .241* (p=.035; n=77) .152 (p=.182; n=79) .276* (p=.015; n=78) 
 
• Finally, Table 4.8 indicates that all task-familiarity variables are positively correlated 
(most of them are significant) with each other. This could provide an indication that 
the four tasks selected for the experiment (two of them, related to the identification 
of client’s business risks and entity-level controls, are described in this chapter, and 
the other two tasks (assessing the impact of client’s business risks and entity-level 
controls on audit risk) are described in the next chapter) are performed together by 
the same functional level. In addition, these correlations suggest that the various 
task familiarity variables measure the same construct.  
 
Table 4.10 presents the descriptive task-familiarity statistics for auditing students.  
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Table 4.10 Task-specific experience of auditing students 
 
Task Description N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
dev. 
Number of times 
performed 
20 031 20 7.2 6.57 
Number of hours spent 20 0 600 101.05 158.92 
Identification of 
client business 
risks (CBR) 
Average time spent on 
task 
17 3.33 40 10.90 10.11 
Number of times 
performed 
19 0 30 9.16 8.17 
Number of hours spent 19 0 600 169.47 196.59 
Identification of 
client’s entity-
level controls 
(EWC) Average time spent on 
task 
17 5 40 17.96 12.15 
Number of times 
performed 
19 0 20 7.68 6.51 
Number of hours spent 19 0 600 93.37 162.49 
Assessment of 
impact of CBR on 
audit risk 
Average time spent on 
task 
17 1 40 9.51 10.70 
Number of times 
performed 
20 0 30 8.35 8.42 
Number of hours spent 20 0 600 139.40 201.59 
Assessment of 
impact of EWC 
on audit risk 
Average time spent on 
task 
16 2.5 40 13.85 11.06 
 
From Table 4.10 it follows that on average the auditing students’ group reports a 
relatively high task familiarity (e.g., the means of the number of times the four tasks have 
been performed are higher than seven). Based upon the relative novelty of the business 
risk audit approach and given the relative high complexity of the task (e.g. 
Abdolmohammadi, 1999), it was (prior to the conduction of the experiment) expected 
that the tasks selected in this thesis would solely be performed by audit managers. The 
Independent Samples t-test shows that all task familiarity-related variables measured in 
‘hours spent on the task’ report significant differences between audit managers and 
auditing students. With respect to the task familiarity-related variables measured in 
‘number of times task performed’ no significant differences are reported.  
 
                                                 
31
 Three auditing students reported they did not perform this task in the past year. Two auditing students 
reported they did not perform the identification of controls task last year.  
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In section 4.2 the main descriptive statistics of the dataset have been described. In the 
next paragraph, the research hypotheses (developed in Chapter 2) will be repeated in 
summarized form.  
4.3 Research hypotheses regarding the identification task 
In Chapter 2 the research hypotheses including the theoretical rationale underlying 
these hypotheses have been developed. The hypotheses describe the expected 
relationships between the auditors’ judgment performance related to the identification of 
client’s business risks and entity-level controls and the independent variables. The 
independent variables are concerned with the auditors’ experience as well the auditors’ 
perceived level of feedback when conducting the risk assessment task. Table 4.11 
summarizes these hypotheses.  
 
Table 4.11 Research hypotheses ‘Judgment Performance related to the identification of 
client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls 
 
Judgment Performance related to identification of client’s business risks and client’s 
entity-level controls  
1. Judgment Performance related to general experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’ and 
‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ correlates positively with general experience.  
 
2. Judgment Performance related to industry experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’, and 
‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and ‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business 
risks and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with industry experience.  
 
3. Judgment Performance related to task-specific experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’, 
‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and ‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business 
risks and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with task-specific experience.  
 
4. Judgment Performance related to perceived level of feedback 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’, and 
‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and ‘assessment of the impact of identified client’s business 
risks and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk’ correlates positively with feedback received from 
supervisors when conducting audit risk assessments. 
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4.4 Auditors’ judgment performance related to the tasks ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Section 4.4 discusses the results of the experiment regarding the judgment performance 
of auditors in the identification of client’s business risks as well as in the identification of 
client’s entity-level controls. Each of the sub-sections (4.4.2 to 4.4.6) of section 4.4 will 
describe the results of the tests of the hypotheses as described in the previous 
paragraph. Sub-sections 5.4.7 and 5.4.8 describe qualitative analyses regarding 
judgment performance regarding the identification tasks. 
4.4.2 Overall model of judgment performance and independent variables 
Before starting with detailed testing of the research hypotheses by means of correlation 
matrices, linear regression models have been developed to examine whether and to 
what extent the independent variables contributed to each of four accuracy variables. 
Each of the four models had the following form: 
 
Accuracy = α + β1 (general experience) + β2 (industry-specific experience) + β3 (task-
specific experience) + β4 (feedback) + ε 
 106 
 
Accuracy1 
Table 4.12 Linear regression model statistics accuracy1 (=number of matching client’s 
business risks) 
 
Model summary 
 
R R 
square 
Adjusted R square Std.error of the 
estimate 
 
 
.324 .105 .056 1.012  
ANOVA 
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 8.791 4 2.198 2.148 .083* 
Residual 74.709 73 1.023   
Total 83.500 77    
Coefficients 
Model Un-standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
 
B Std. error Beta 
t Sig. 
 
 
VIF 
Constant 2,992 .407  7.344 .000*  
General experience -.014 .022 -.069 -.624 .535 1.01 
Industry experience .000 .000 .195 1.692 .095* 1.08 
Task experience 
(idbr2) 
-.005 .003 -.153 -1.359 .178 1.04 
Task experience 
(idbm1) 
-.032 .022 -.167 -1.441 .154 1.09 
Feedback32       
 
Table 4.12 suggests that industry-specific experience significantly contributes to the 
auditor’s judgment performance as measured by accuracy1. However, adjusted R 
square (.056) is rather low which implies that industry-specific experience to a relatively 
small extent explains differences in the auditor’s judgment performance. In addition to 
Table 4.12, it was tested whether significant interaction effects were present. Based on 
these tests, no interaction effects were observed.    
                                                 
32
 When feedback is included in the linear regression model, the model is not significant. For that reason, 
feedback is excluded from the model. 
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Accuracy2 
The linear regression model showed that none of the independent variables significantly 
contributed to judgment performance.  
Accuracy3 
Table 4.13 Linear regression model statistics accuracy3 
Model summary 
 
R R 
square 
Adjusted R square Std.error of the 
estimate 
 
 
.427 .182 .101 .96  
ANOVA 
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 14.470 7 2.067 2.230 .042
* 
Residual 64.876 70 .927   
Total 79.346 77    
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
 
B Std.error Beta 
t Sig. 
 
 
VIF 
Constant 3.482 .501  6.949 .000*  
General experience .028 .024 .144 1.175 .244 1.28 
Industry experience .000 .000 .259 .194 .032* 1.19 
Task experience 
(idbr1) 
.032 .031 .170 1.032 .306 2.32 
Task experience 
(idbr2) 
-.003 .004 -.094 -.691 .492 1.59 
Task experience 
(idbm1) 
-.029 .031 .151 -.936 .353 2.24 
Task experience 
(idbm2) 
-.003 .003 -.167 -1.221 .226 1.61 
Feedback -.012 .047 .031 -.252 .802 1.26 
 
 
Table 4.13 suggests that only industry-specific experience significantly contributes to the 
auditor’s judgment performance as measured by accuracy3. For this regression model, 
adjusted R square (.101) is relatively low.  
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Accuracy 4 
The linear regression model showed that none of the independent variables significantly 
contributed to judgment performance.  
 
4.4.3 Judgment performance and the impact of experience in the auditing field  
This section describes the tests of hypothesis 1:  
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ correlates positively with 
general experience.  
 
Table 4.14 presents the 1-tailed correlations between experience in the auditing field 
and the auditors’ judgment performance. In the Table, two outliers (respondents with 35 
and 42 years of experience, respectively) have been excluded. 
 
Table 4.14 Pearson correlations (1-tailed) of experience in the auditing field and audit 
managers’ judgment performance  
 
Judgment Performance 
measure 
Task n Correlation 
(significance) 
Accuracy1 (number) Identification of client’s business risk 83 -.028 (.401) 
Accuracy2 (importance weights) Identification of client’s business risk 83 -.093 (.201) 
Accuracy3 (number) Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
83 .164 (.070)* 
Accuracy4 (importance weights) Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
83 .013 (.454) 
 
From Table 4.14 it follows that only accuracy3 (measuring the number of entity-level 
controls identified by audit managers which match with the controls identified by the 
expert panel) positively and significantly correlates with experience in the auditing field. 
Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported regarding accuracy3, but not for accuracy1, accuracy2 
and accuracy4.  
 
Table 4.14 seems to be in contrast with Table 4.1. Table 4.14 reports for audit managers 
a positive impact of general experience on judgment performance (accuracy3) where 
Table 4.1 reports that auditing students show higher mean judgment performance 
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related to the identification of entity-level controls. It seems hence, that the learning 
curve of auditors shows two peaks, one at the start of the career in auditing, and one 
when getting experienced in auditing. How can this be explained?  
The relatively high mean judgment performance of auditing students can be explained 
(at least partially) by the fact that their mind-set is less framed by client-specific 
experiences, and is largely based on knowledge derived from textbooks in auditing and 
accounting information systems. For experienced auditors on the other hand, it may be 
possible that they experience early in their career a learning curve, in which practical 
experiences with actual clients need to be embedded in theoretical frameworks. When 
becoming more experienced, the auditor potentially gets more and more away from 
client-specific circumstances they were exposed to early in their careers and more and 
more get an overall picture of internal control systems in general paying off in higher 
judgment performance. It must be kept in mind however, that earlier research (e.g., 
Wright 1988) has produced mixed results on the effect of experience on judgment 
performance in general. General experience does not related to all tasks pay off and for 
the more complex tasks the auditor needs to get task-specific experience in order to 
show higher judgment performance on these tasks. Regarding the identification of 
controls task, the task itself is classified as relatively unstructured, but at the same time 
the auditor relies on prior knowledge of the client when identifying internal controls 
making the task – when repetitively performed – less complex.  
 
4.4.4 Judgment performance and the impact of industry-specific experience 
This section describes the tests of hypothesis 2:  
 
The auditor’s judgment performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’, and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’, and ‘assessment of the 
impact of identified client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls on audit risk’ 
correlates positively with industry experience.  
 
Table 4.15 presents the 1-tailed correlations between industry-specific experience and 
the auditors’ judgment performance. In Table 4.15, one outlier (respondents with 3,000 
hours of industry-specific experience) has been excluded. 
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Table 4.15 Pearson correlations (1-tailed) of industry-specific experience and audit 
managers’ judgment performance  
 
Judgment Performance 
measure 
Task n Correlation 
(significance) 
Accuracy1 (number) Identification of client’s business risk 84 .158 (.075)* 
Accuracy2 (importance weights) Identification of client’s business risk 84 .067 (.272) 
Accuracy3 (number) Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
84 .195 (.038)* 
Accuracy4 (importance weights) Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
84 .128 (.122) 
 
With respect to accuracy1 and accuracy3 (measuring the conformity of the client’s 
business risk factors and entity-level controls identified with those identified by the 
expert panel) hypothesis 2 is supported. Both accuracy1 and accuracy3 show a positive 
and significant correlation with industry-specific experience. With respect to accuracy2 
and 4 (measuring the conformity of the weights attached by auditors to client’s business 
risks and entity-level controls with those attached by the expert panel) the correlations 
are statistically not significant. The results suggest that industry-experience to a certain 
extent is helpful in identifying the relevant cues (risks and controls) but is not necessarily 
helpful in assessing the importance of these cues. In section 4.2 significant differences 
between the mean levels of industry-specific experience of firm 4 compared to the other 
three firms were reported. However, no significant differences related to all of the four 
accuracy scores between audit firms were reported based on the Mann-Whitney tests.  
 
A detailed data exploration indicated that the auditor’s judgment performance showed a 
non-linear pattern when examined in congruence with industry-specific experience. For 
that reason, the population was broken down into sub-groups of more or less the same 
size in order to further investigate this pattern. 
 
Table 4.16 presents the 1-tailed Pearson correlations between judgment performance 
and industry-specific experience: 
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Table 4.16 Pearson correlations between judgment performance and industry-specific 
experience  
 
 Industry-specific experience (hours over past three years) 
 0 > 0 - < 250 >= 250 - < 
500 
>= 500 - < 1.000 >= 1.000 
 
n=28 n=13 n=11 n=14 n=16 
Accuracy1 n.a. .651 (.006)* .290 (.193) .353 (.108) -.218 (.200) 
Accuracy2 n.a. .686 (.003)* .136 (.345) .312 (.139) -.330 (.098)* 
Accuracy3 n.a. .170 (.281) .429 (.094)* -.182 (.266) -.119 (.324) 
Accuracy4 n.a. .129 (.330) -.161 (.319) -.412 (.072)* -.331 (.097)* 
 
Table 4.15 presented for the population of audit managers positive and significant 
correlations between judgment performance and industry-specific experience with 
respect to accuracy 1 and 3. Table 4.16, however, shows for accuracy 1 that the sub-
group of audit managers with industry-specific experience between zero and 250 hours 
highly contributes to the overall positive correlations and the sub-group of audit 
managers with more than or equal to 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience 
negatively contributes to this overall correlation. Additionally I have divided in two other 
sub-groups, namely: (1) < 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience (including 
respondents with zero hours of industry-specific experience, n=67), and (2) >= 1,000 
hours of industry-specific experience (n=17). Table 4.17 presents the 1-tailed Pearson 
correlations between industry-specific experience and judgment performance for both 
these sub-groups.  
 
Table 4.17 Pearson correlations between judgment performance and industry-specific 
experience 
 
  Industry-specific experience 
  < 1,000 
hours 
>= 1,000 
hours 
Accuracy 1 (number) Identification of client’s business risk 
.215 (.040)* -.218 (.200) 
Accuracy 2 
(importance weights) 
Identification of client’s business risk 
.212 (.043)* -.330 (.098)* 
Accuracy 3 (number) Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
.027 (.414) -.119 (.324) 
Accuracy 4 
(importance weights) 
Identification of client’s entity-level 
controls 
-.052 (.339) -.331 (.097)* 
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Table 4.17 suggests that for accuracy 1 and 2 (both related to the identification of 
client’s business risk) a positive and significant correlation exists between industry-
specific experience and judgment performance for audit managers with less than 1,000 
hours years of experience. For audit managers with more than or equal to 1,000 hours 
of industry-specific experience, a negative correlation has been reported (for accuracy 2 
significant, p < .1). For the sub-group of audit managers with less than 1,000 hours of 
industry-specific experience, no significant correlations have been reported between 
industry-specific experience and judgment performance regarding the identification of 
entity-level controls. These findings together suggest that industry-specific experience 
contributes to judgment performance in the task ‘identification of client’s business risk’ 
within the period between zero and 1,000 hours and, after this period an increase of 
industry-specific experience is accompanied with decreased performance levels. This 
suggestion implies that after a certain level of industry-specific experience, the auditors’ 
judgment performance even tends to decrease. This implies that the auditor’s judgment 
performance does not follow a linear pattern. In order to investigate this suggestion, first 
a linear regression model has been developed with the following form: 
 
Judgment Performance (accuracy) = α (constant) + β (hours). 
 
From the statistical results it followed that this model was not statistically significant. In 
order to test for non-linear patterns, another – non-linear – model was developed with 
the following form: 
 
Judgment Performance (accuracy) = α (constant) + β (hours) + β (hours)2 
 
This model predicts for audit managers the level of judgment performance linked to the 
level of industry-specific experience. Figure 4.1 presents the optimum of predicted 
judgment performance.  
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Figure 4.1 Optimum judgment performance (accuracy1) related to industry-specific 
experience 
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The model’s statistics are presented in Table 4.18. 
 
Table 4.18 Linear regression model statistics (judgment performance Accuracy1 versus 
industry-specific experience) 
 
Model summary 
 R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .235(a) .055 .032 1.01319 
      
ANOVA 
 Sum Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 4.928 2 2.464 
Residual 84.178 82 1.027 
2.400 .097* 
Total 89.106     
      
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients   
 B Std. Error Beta  t Sig. 
Constant 2.224 .157  14.155 .000* 
Hours .001 .000 .647 2.146 .035* 
Hours squared -3.786E-07 .000 -.557 -1.849 .068* 
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Figure 5.1 and Table 4.18 show that up to an industry-experience level of slightly above 
1,000 hours judgment performance (as measured by accuracy1) increases with an 
increase in industry-specific experience (steep learning curve) and from 1,000 hours or 
more judgment performance decreases. The regression model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p < .1) as well as the coefficients. In interpreting the practical impact to audit 
firms of the regression model’s statistics, we need to consider that the variance in 
judgment variance can be explained for 5.5% by industry-specific experience. Other 
variables – hence – also can influence judgment performance. Taking into consideration 
the significance of the model, the relatively low R-square and the small margin of 
predictive values (approximately between 2.25 and 2.75), these results might provide an 
indication for audit firms to build industry-specific experience to a certain extent 
regarding the task ‘identification of client’s business risks’. Auditors’ judgment 
performance might have benefit of a separate construction industry within the audit firm, 
although it might be relevant considering: (1) the need for providing opportunities to 
audit managers to combine industry-specific experience with audit experience in 
general, and / or (2) the need for rotation of audit managers over industry-specific audit 
clients. Regarding this second consideration, previous research studies suggested that 
the auditors’ judgment performance can be negatively affected by increases of 
engagement-specific experience. E.g., Wright et al. (2004) concluded that experts 
weight client-specific information more heavily than industry information for most sub-
goal judgments33. This does, however, not suggest that the group of audit managers 
with less than 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience performs better compared to 
the group of audit managers with more than 1,000 hours. Table 4.19 sheds light on the 
mean performance levels of the here distinguished two sub-groups. 
 
Table 4.19 Mean judgment performance levels of audit managers for two sub-groups of 
different levels of industry-specific experience  
 Means Levene’s Test for 
equality of variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
 <1,000 
hours 
>=1,000 
hours 
F Sig t Df Sign. (2-
tailed) 
Accuracy1 2.40 2.71 1.242 .268 -1.079 82 .284 
Accuracy2 3.79 3.96 .136 .713 -.329 82 .743 
Accuracy3 3.55 4.12 .002 .968 -2.078 82 .041* 
Accuracy4 7.92 9.28 .032 .859 -1.875 82 .064* 
                                                 
33
 In addition, Bedard and Graham (2002) suggest that “some elements of risk knowledge included in their 
representations are transferable across clients (e.g., general principles of control mechanisms and effects 
of industry conditions), but many are client-specific. Thus, auditors with more years of experience, or even 
greater industry experience, are not necessarily better positioned to possess risk knowledge”. 
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Table 4.19 presents for all judgment performance measures higher means for the group 
of audit managers with more than or equal to 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience 
compared to the group of audit managers with less than 1,000 hours of industry-specific 
experience. However, only the mean differences related to accuracy3 and accuracy4 
significantly differ between both groups of audit managers. Integrating the findings of 
Tables 4.17 and 4.19, I conclude that with respect to the task ‘identification of client’s 
business risks’ audit managers’ judgment performance is positively affected by industry-
specific experience within the first 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience and 
negatively affected for audit managers with more than 1,000 hours of industry-specific 
experience. This impact of industry-specific experience does not result in significant 
performance differences between the two groups of audit managers. Additionally, with 
respect to the task ‘identification of entity-level controls’ audit managers with more than 
1,000 hours of industry-specific show a decreasing impact of industry-specific 
experience on judgment performance. For the group as a whole, however, the group 
audit managers with more than 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience performs 
significantly better on this task compared to the group audit managers with less than 
1,000 hours of industry-specific experience. When considering the findings of the impact 
of industry-specific experience on the auditors’ judgment performance for both the 
identification of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls, this suggests that 
audit firms need to consider the assignment of industry-specialized auditors to the 
specific tasks. Regarding the ‘identification of client’s business risk’ task, audit firms 
need to consider the potential for more task rotation amongst audit managers 
experienced in the construction industry in order to benefit from learning patterns and to 
remain skeptical towards the task resulting in more task efficiency and task 
effectiveness. Regarding the identification of client’s entity-level controls task, there is 
less need for assigning industry-specialists to this task.  
4.4.5 Judgment performance and the impact of task-specific experience 
This section describes the tests of hypothesis 1: “Audit managers’ Judgment 
Performance regarding the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’ and 
‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ correlates positively with task-specific 
Experience”. Task-specific experience has been measured by asking participants to 
provide their best estimate of the number of times they performed last year the tasks 
‘identification of client’s business risks’ and ‘identification of entity-level controls’ 
(resulting in the variables IDBR1 and IDBM1, respectively) as well es their best estimate 
of the summed hours spent on these tasks (resulting in the variables IDBR2 and IDBM2 
respectively).  
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Table 4.20 presents the 2-tailed correlations between task-specific experience and the 
audit managers’ judgment performance. In the table, two outliers (respondents reporting 
having performed the task ‘identification of client’s business risk 50 times a year, or 
reporting 500 hours spent on the identification of client’s entity-level controls) have been 
excluded. 
 
Table 4.20 Pearson correlations between judgment performance and task-specific 
experience of audit managers 
 
 2-tailed Pearson Correlation (significance) 
Judgment 
Performance 
measure 
IDBR1 
No of times task 
identification 
client’s business 
risk performed 
n=82 
IDBR2 
No of hours spent 
on task 
identification 
client’s business 
risk 
n=82 
IDBM1 
No of times task 
identification of 
client’s entity-
level controls 
performed 
n=83 
IDBM2 
No of hours spent 
on task 
identification 
client’s entity-
level controls 
n=83 
Accuracy1 -.178 (.109) -.163 (.144) -.252* (.022) -.151 (.172) 
Accuracy2 -.050 (.657) -.119 (.289) -.126 (.257) -.073 (.512) 
Accuracy3 .071 (.525) -.066 (.555) -.152 (.171) -.256* (.020) 
Accuracy4 .065 (.563) -.033 (.976) -.027 (.811) -.086 (.441) 
 
Table 4.20 shows for accuracy1 (related to the task ‘identification of client’s business 
risks) a negative (not significant) correlation with task-specific experience. Further, Table 
4.20 shows a significant negative correlation between accuracy1 (accuracy3) and task-
specific experience as measured by IDBM1 (IDBM2). As a result hypothesis 3 is 
rejected. This finding is inconsistent with Bonner (1990). Bonner reported that task-
specific knowledge related to cue selection (i.e., selection is a sort of proxy for the 
identification tasks) results in increased judgment performance in an analytical risk 
assessment task, but does not result in increased judgment performance in a control risk 
assessment task. Future research should be directed towards exploration of the reasons 
behind the lacking positive association between judgment performance and task-specific 
experience. Specifically related to the identification of client’s business risks it is 
imaginable that each company faces its own engagement-specific business risks. 
Auditors performing more often the identification task or spending more hours on the 
task can develop a biased mind-set. This potential bias could probably result in relatively 
lower judgment performance and auditors with more client-specific experience become 
to a lesser extent sensitive for alternative cues. It is recommended that this avenue for 
future research also takes into account whether, and if so, to what extent decision-aids 
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(e.g., industry-specific templates with respect to business models including business 
risks) result in increased judgment performance. Recently, Kotchetova (2002) 
investigated whether the analysis of client strategy content or strategy process was 
associated with more accurate (inherent and control) risk assessments. The empirical 
results supported this hypothesis, although the variability of the risk assessments did not 
decrease, probably due to a relatively large number of cues. One might indeed assume 
that a large number of cues require a clear focus on the most important cues. The more 
experienced auditors experience more difficulty in the selection process. Additionally, 
the questionnaire used in the experiment requested participants not to make use of any 
reference material or decision aid. The empirical results could have shown to be 
different from the results presented here, if the participants had made use of e.g. 
industry-specific templates34.  
 
Table 4.21 presents the 1-tailed correlations between task-specific experience and the 
auditing students’ judgment performance. In the Table, one outlier (respondent reporting 
having spent 600 hours on the task ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’) has 
been excluded. 
 
Table 4.21 Pearson correlations between judgment performance and task-specific 
experience of auditing students 
 
Judgment 
Performance 
measure 
n 1-tailed Pearson Correlation (significance) 
  IDBR1 
No of times task 
identification 
client’s business 
risk performed 
IDBR2 
No of hours spent 
on task 
identification 
client’s business 
risk 
IDBM1 
No of times task 
identification of 
client’s entity-level 
controls 
performed 
IDBM2 
No of hours spent 
on task 
identification 
client’s entity-
level controls 
Accuracy1 19 .057 (.408) .029 (.453) .176 (.242) .351 (.077)* 
Accuracy2 19 -.109 (328) -.011 (.482) .012 (.481) .156 (.268) 
Accuracy3 19 .234 (.168) .201 (.204) .340 (.084)* .291 (.120) 
Accuracy4 19 .012 (.481) .132 (.295) .099 (.348) .190 (.225) 
 
Table 4.21 shows predominantly positive correlations between judgment performance 
and task-specific experience for the group of auditing students. This contrasts with the 
                                                 
34
 Of the 85 audit managers, 34 (i.e., 40%) indicated that they would have used a decision aid if one 
should have been available. Some respondents mentioned ‘sparring with colleagues’, other respondents 
mentioned the aid of templates. 
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predominantly negative correlations reported for audit managers (Table 4.20). The 
significant correlation (correlation of .351; significance 7.7%) between judgment 
performance related to accuracy 1 (the identification of client’s business risks) and 
IDBM2 (this task-specific experience variable relates to the identification of client’s 
entity-level controls) is remarkable. This might be explained by the fact that auditing 
students already gained some experience in the auditing practice. This type of 
experience potentially implies that auditing students learn from their experience with 
other audit clients, i.e. auditing students’ knowledge base is relatively easily transferable 
to other audit clients. For audit managers, the learning curve regarding the identification 
of entity-level controls is assumed to be less steep. Task-specific experience as 
measured by the number of hours spent on the task ‘identification of client’s entity-level 
controls’ significantly and positively correlates with task-specific experience variables 
IDBR2 (number of hours spent on identification of client’s business risks; 1-tailed 
Pearson correlation .523; significance 1.3%) and IDBM1 (number of times the task 
‘identification of entity-level controls’ has been performed; 1-tailed Pearson correlation 
.727; significance 0%). The positive correlation between judgment performance as 
measured by accuracy1 and task-specific experience as measured by IDBM2 suggests 
that auditing students spending more time on identification of entity-level controls identify 
more accurately client’s business risks. The two tasks, although distinguished from each 
other, are closely connected. Indeed, in the identification of entity-level controls the 
auditor will be looking for those controls which are most effective in mitigating client’s 
business risks. This suggests that if auditors spend more hours on the identification of 
entity-level controls, this will also benefit the accuracy of identification of client’s 
business risk (transferable knowledge across tasks).  
Regarding judgment performance as measured by accuracy3 a significant and positive 
correlation has been reported in Table 4.21 with task-specific experience as measured 
by IDBM1 (the number of times the auditor performs the task ‘identification of entity-level 
controls’). For this correlation, hypothesis 3 (judgment performance is positively 
correlated with task-specific experience) has been supported. As audit managers 
performed the task ‘identification of entity-level controls’ an equal number of times (i.e., 
9) compared to auditing students, the positive correlation between judgment 
performance and task-specific experience for auditing students suggests that auditing 
students experience relatively higher learning effects compared to audit managers 
(transferable knowledge across clients).  
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4.4.6 Judgment performance and the impact of the ‘perceived level of feedback 
when conducting risk assessments tasks’ 
This section describes the tests of hypothesis 2 (refer to paragraph 4.3). Hypothesis 4 is 
stated as follows:  
 
Judgment Performance with respect to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’ 
and ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls’ correlates positively with feedback 
received from supervisors when conducting audit risk assessments.  
 
This hypothesized positive correlation is based on the assumption that providing 
auditors with feedback will result in increased learning effects. Supervision, by means of 
feedback, is meant to monitor the learning process of an auditor and adjust the auditors’ 
judgment process when judgment errors are identified.  
 
Participants in the experiment have been requested to indicate how often they receive 
feedback from their superiors when conducting a risk assessment task. The 11-point 
response scale ranged from zero (sometimes) to ten (often). The 11-point response 
scale ranged from zero (little/not much) to ten (much).  
 
Table 4.22 presents descriptive statistics related to the variables ‘feedback’. 
 
Table 4.22 Descriptive statistics related to ‘feedback’  
 
 
 Means 
 Feedback 
Audit managers (n=84) 5.274 
Auditing students (n=20) 6.800 
 
Independent samples test 
Levene’s test for equality of 
variances 
t-test for equality of 
means 
  
F sign t df sign 
Feedba
ck 
Equal variances assumed .594 .443 -2.295 102 .024* 
 Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.410 30.527 .022* 
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From Table 4.22 it can be noted that audit managers significantly perceive to receive 
less feedback from their supervisors when conducting risk assessments compared to 
auditing students. From a practical perspective, the (significant) mean difference 
between audit managers and auditing students related to feedback is not surprising. 
Auditing students/auditing staff receive in audit practice more direct supervision 
compared to audit managers. From a regulatory perspective, the PCAOB has recently 
issued new guidance regarding documentation requirements. These documentation 
requirements are also related to ensuring a high (and visible) level of audit quality (e.g. 
PCAOB Auditing Standard No.2, sections 119 and 125, 2004). Another example is 
PCAOB Auditing Standard No.3 (2004) that deals with the quality of audit 
documentation. AS 3 states on page 3: “In addition to providing the basis for the 
conclusions in the auditors’ report, audit documentation facilitates the planning, 
performance, and supervision of the engagement and provides the basis for the review 
of the quality of the work by providing the reviewer with written documentation of the 
evidence supporting the auditors’ significant conclusions”. As our experiment has been 
conducted prior to the issuance of AS 3, it can be concluded that prior to 2004 the 
quality of audit documentation, and hence the adequacy of supervision, left room for 
improvement. Page A1-4 additionally states that: “audit documentation must contain 
sufficient information to enable an experienced auditor, having no previous connection 
with the engagement: (a) to understand the timing, nature, extent and results of the 
procedures performed, evidence obtained, and conclusions reached and (b) to 
determine who performed the work and the date such work was completed as well as 
the person who reviewed the work and the date of such review”. Each document in the 
audit file, hence, needs to be undersigned by two persons: one signature of the person 
who performed the work, and one signature of the person who reviewed the work. As 
many engagements are performed under time pressure, particularly nearly the 
completion of the audit, and audit managers become more involved with the completion 
of the audit, it is hence expected that audit managers perceive lower levels of review by 
their audit partner compared to auditing students. Interestingly, AS 3 connects the 
quality of documentation (including the quality of supervision/review) directly with audit 
quality. Higher levels of judgment performance, thus, can be expected when more 
review of the work performed takes place.  
 
Further analysis of the perceived level of feedback was directed towards potential 
differences across firms since feedback can be an element of a company’s culture 
and/or company policy. Table 4.23 shows the mean perceived levels of feedback for 
audit managers across audit firms.  
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Table 4.23 Audit firm means of perceived feedback  
 
 Feedback n 
Firm 1 3.84 19 
Firm 2 4.96 26 
Firm 3 6.04 23 
Firm 4 6.38 16 
 
Sum  84 
 
The perceived level of feedback, based upon the Scheffé multiple post hoc comparison, 
differs significantly between firm 1 and firm 3 (p = .064) and between firm 1 and firm 4 (p 
= .047). As previously discussed new auditing standards (see also ISA 200, sections 18 
and 22, 2003) require significant attention of audit firms regarding implementation of 
adequate supervision and review procedures. Based upon Table 4.23, it is suggested 
that particularly audit firm 1 is required to align internal feedback procedures with the 
new international auditing standards.  
 
Table 4.24 presents the 1-tailed correlations between the perceived levels of feedback 
and the audit managers’ judgment performance. This Table excludes outliers as 
described in previous sections.  
 
Table 4.24 Pearson correlations between the perceived levels of feedback and judgment 
performance 
 
 Group  Judgment performance n Feedback 
Audit managers Accuracy 1 84 -.032 (.387) 
 Accuracy 2 84 -.036 (.371) 
 Accuracy 3 84 -.055 (.308) 
 Accuracy 4 84 .099 (.186) 
 
Auditing 
students 
Accuracy 1 20 -.199 (.201) 
 Accuracy 2 20 .109 (.323) 
 Accuracy 3 20 -.044 (.427) 
 Accuracy 4 20 .106 (.328) 
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From Table 4.24 follows that hypothesis 4 is not supported. As a result, we cannot 
conclude that higher perceived levels of feedback contribute to increased judgment 
performance. From the dataset no unambiguous explanations for the results reported 
are at hand. However, from existing research literature it is known that variables, other 
than ‘feedback’ contribute to increased judgment performance. E.g., the identification 
tasks examined in this thesis are performed by auditors individually. Bedard and 
Maroney (2002) argue that, specifically for idea generation tasks, judgment performance 
might be improved by group decision-making when compared to individual decision-
making. Additionally, audit firm’s audit manuals often provide required or emphasized 
use of decision aids. The decision aids as another explaining factor influence judgment 
performance. E.g., a positive contribution of the required use of a specific template to 
judgment performance might be expected if the template to be used is based on 
(standardized) business practices (e.g., Kotchetova, 2002). A standardized checklist, for 
example, will be helpful in mitigating blind spots in individual auditors’ judgment and 
decision-making in that the individual auditor is obliged to check the presence of a pre-
defined list of risk factors. 
Regarding the impact of the level of feedback on judgment performance we suggest that 
future research needs to define the variable ‘feedback’ in more clear terms. As 
described above, AS 3 (PCAOB, 2004) requires a high quality audit documentation 
including visible and dated sign-off of audit documentation by reviewers. However, AS 3 
at the same time prescribes that review notes need to be cleared from the audit files 
prior to the report release date (PCAOB, 2004, p.5). Although this requirement will result 
probably in more transparent audit files, review notes (including feedback of supervisors 
to those performed the task under review) will additional function as juridical evidence 
that a task has been reviewed by a supervisor. Feedback hence, needs to be 
distinguished into oral feedback, and (informal, not part of the audit files, and formal) 
written review notes. This distinction will clarify more about the content of feedback 
provided to those performing audit tasks. 
 
The sections 4.4.2 to 4.4.6 described the quantitative analyses and tests of the 
hypotheses related to the identification of client’s business risks and entity-level controls. 
The next sub-section (4.4.7) provides qualitative analyses of the nature of the client’s 
business risks identified by auditors. The subsequently following sub-section (5.4.8) 
provides qualitative analyses of the nature of the client’s entity-level controls identified 
by auditors. 
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These topics are of particular interest given the relative novelty of the business risk audit 
approach and the absence of a worldwide or nation-wide accepted framework for the 
identification of client business risks.  
 
4.4.7 Exploration of the type of client business risks identified by auditors 
Typically, client business risks are divided into two subcategories, strategic risks and 
operational risks (e.g. Knechel, 2001)35. This distinction has been derived from existing 
text-books on auditing (e.g., Knechel, 2001). Strategic risks comprise a combination of 
risks resulting from (external) industry forces and the strategy implemented by a 
company (e.g. Knechel, 2001, p.137). Operational risks are business risks related to the 
realization of a company’s objectives, which can be linked to (internal) activities within 
the organization (e.g. Knechel, 2001, p.137, 195). Bell et al. (1997, p.1) argue that 
“knowledge about the nature of the client’s business activities and related business 
risks, its organizational structure and internal environment, and its relationships and 
interactions with its external environment, provides a basis for the auditors’ evaluation of 
whether financial-statement assertions are valid. In today’s complex and dynamic 
economic world, obtaining this knowledge is a formidable undertaking. It entails 
identifying, collecting, and processing a wealth of information about the client’s business 
and industry that may be relevant for the audit. And, more importantly, it entails 
integrating this information to form a “whole-system” representation of how the client 
organization fits within the broader economic environment, and how effectively its key 
business processes, working in combination, maintain or strengthen that fit”. Hence, 
both strategic and operational business risks are of major importance in the business 
risk audit approach.  
 
From the questionnaires, a list of risk factors identified by auditors has been developed. 
This list of risk factors is shown in Appendix C. The entire list was reviewed by three 
individual persons, each of them individually classifying each risk as either a strategic 
business risk or an operational business risk. After three discussion sessions with these 
persons, 100% consensus was reached on the final classification of the business risks. 
Subsequently, the final classification was entered in SPSS as two separate variables.  
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 Others categorize business risks into operational, financial and compliance risks (e.g. Bell et al., 1997, 
p.35). Other classifications are – thus – possible as well.  
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The analysis of the classification of client business risks consists of two parts. Firstly, we 
analyzed this classification for the entire list of client business risks identified by 
respondents. This analysis will gain insight into the focus of the nature of risk factors 
(whether these risk factors attribute to judgment performance or not) in the identification 
process. Secondly, we analyzed whether the impact of the classification on judgment 
performance of audit managers and auditing students.  
 
Analysis of risk identification process 
 
Table 4.25 summarizes a comparison of the number of operational and strategic 
business risks identified by audit managers and auditing students.  
 
Table 4.25 Summary number of operational and strategic business risks identified 
 
 Operational risks Strategic risks 
 Number  % Mean number per 
respondent 
Number  % Mean number per 
respondent 
Audit managers 237 57.66 2.79 174 42.34 2.05 
Auditing 
students 
44 45.36 2.20 53 54.64 2.65 
 
From Table 4.25 follows that audit managers identified relatively more operational risks 
compared to the number of strategic risks. For auditing students opposite results are 
reported, auditing students identifying relatively more strategic risks than operational 
risks. These differences are significant, according to the Mann-Whitney test (for 
operational risks: p-value = .019; for strategic risks: p-value = .029).  
An analysis of the nature of the dataset of risk factors revealed differences in 
identification of strategic risks related to: 
• “Absence of formalized strategy” (identified by 75% of auditing students and 25% 
of audit managers);  
• “Changes in the demand for the projects/services” (identified by 25% of auditing 
students and 14% of audit managers);  
• “Magnitude of work at hand” (identified by 24 audit managers; 0 auditing students) 
and “financial position” (21 audit managers; 1 auditing student). 
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An analysis of the nature of the dataset of risk factors revealed differences in 
identification of operational risks related to: 
• “Risk of calculation errors” (identified by 28% of the audit managers and 20% of the 
auditing students); 
• “Risk of absent reconciliation between finance administration and management 
information related to projects” (identified by 20 audit managers and by 3 auditing 
students). 
 
These differences between audit managers and auditing students in the nature of risks 
identified underline that auditing students have been relatively more focused on strategic 
risks and audit managers have been relatively more focused on operational risks. In the 
next section, it is examined whether and if so, to what extent this different focus also 
explains differences in judgment performance between audit managers and auditing 
students. 
 
Analysis of risk classification versus judgment performance 
 
The previous section was concerned with the identification process as such, i.e., the 
identification process including both risk factors matching and not matching with the 
expert panel. The current section deals with the quality of the identification process, i.e., 
it is focused on the identification process related to only risk factors which matched with 
the expert panel. Indeed, the accuracy-scores calculation included only those risk 
factors that matched with the expert panel. In order to analyze the judgment 
performance of auditors related to strategic and operational business risks, the original 
accuracy1-score was decomposed in risk factor components, e.g. an accuracy1-score of 
5 was decomposed into 5 accuracy1-scores each with the value of 1. The same 
decomposition has been performed for accuracy2. The number of risks (identified by 
respondents) matching with the expert panel’s identified risks (i.e. accuracy1) is 
presented below: 
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Table 4.26 Summary number of strategic and operational business risks matching with 
the expert panel (accuracy1) 
 
 Operational risks Strategic risks 
 Num
ber  
% Mean number per 
respondent 
Numbe
r  
% Mean number per 
respondent 
Audit managers 148 70.81 1.74 61 29.19 0.72 
Auditing 
students 
26 63.41 1.30 15 36.59 0.75 
 
These differences are, according to the Mann-Whitney test, only significant for 
operational risks (p = .098) (p-value for strategic risks = .677). A comparison of the 
identification process as such (Table 4.25) and the quality of the auditors’ identification 
process (Table 4.26) result in the following conclusions: 
• For audit managers it was found that they identified more operational risks 
compared to strategic risks (a number of 237 operational risks versus 174 strategic 
risks, see Table 4.25). In addition, it was found that operational risks attributed 
more to judgment performance compared to the attribution of strategic risks to 
judgment performance (a number of 148 operational risks versus 61 strategic risks 
attributed to judgment performance). Compared to auditing students, audit 
managers identified more relevant risk factors as a whole. Audit managers’ 
judgment performance was primarily influenced by operational risk factors. These 
results suggest that audit managers have most learning opportunities with respect 
to the identification of important strategic risks36.  
• For auditing students it was found that they identified more strategic risks 
compared to operational risks (a number of 53 strategic risks versus 44 operational 
risks). However, the identified operational risks attributed more to their judgment 
performance compared to the strategic risks (a number of 26 operational risks 
versus 15 strategic risks). These results suggest that auditing students have most 
learning opportunities in selecting the appropriate (i.e. those risks matching with 
the expert panel) most important strategic risks37.  
 
                                                 
36
 
ISA 315 (e.g., ISA 315: Appendix 1, IFAC, 2003) provides examples of the relevance of client’s 
business risks due to the client’s strategy and objective setting process in relationship with the accounting 
requirements and - thus - the financial statements.
 
37 ISA 315 (e.g., ISA 315: Appendix 1, IFAC, 2003) provides examples of the relevance of client’s 
business risks due to the client’s business operations. 
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The results give rise to interesting questions regarding the audit profession. Particularly, 
it is of interest how these results translate to actual client settings. One of the most 
important issues is whether the auditor adequately identifies the most important risk 
factors present in the audit environment. ISA 315 (IFAC, section 31, 2003) explicitly 
states that the auditor does not have the responsibility to identify or assess all business 
risks. However, the auditor is required to identify significant risks (i.e., risks that requires 
special audit consideration) affecting the financial statements (ISA 315, IFAC, section 
108 and following, 2003). From previous literature (e.g., Kotchetova, 2002) it has been 
suggested that decision aids might be helpful in addressing this issue. A related 
question is concerned with the focus of the identification of business risks. From a 
psychological perspective it is known that human beings share the characteristic of 
‘bounded rationality’ (e.g. Choy and King, 2003; Conlisk, 1996; Cooksey, 1995). That is 
to say that they are limited in processing lots of cues into judgment and decision-making. 
Prior studies (e.g. Shanteau, 2002) have shown that both experts and novices make use 
of only a few cues. This thesis also suggests a need for more focus on a limited number 
of relevant risk factors. Indeed, audit managers as well as auditing students have 
obviously missed risk factors which the expert panel deemed most important, and 
additionally have identified risk factors which the expert panel did not identify. This does 
not mean that the identified risk factors not matching with the expert panel’s list of risk 
factors, were not important at all, but probably respondents put relatively too much 
weight on (according to the expert panel) less relevant risk factors. Given the recently 
issued international auditing standards (ISAs 200, 315, 330, and 550 as well as PCAOB-
standards AS1, AS2, AS3, and AS4) and other available international guidance (e.g., 
updated COSO-ERM framework) it is expected that specific audit firms will continue with 
adjusting and focusing audit approaches to those issues that requires significant 
consideration during the financial statement audit. Specifically for audit firms who also 
provide attest services regarding internal control as a result of the issuance of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) section 404, auditors’ judgment process may benefit from 
improved risk analyses prepared by the audit clients. Given the accounting scandals 
published in previous years, audit firms have raised ‘Audit Quality’ to one of the most 
important strategic themes, which implies that currently audit firms invest significant 
amounts of money in the audit firm’s quality and judgment processes of individual 
auditors. In addition, it is expected that the recently issued audit documentation 
standards (ISA 500, 2003; PCAOB, AS3, 2004) combined with more institutionalization 
of group judgment processes (e.g.: team planning events, post-interim events, wrap-up 
events) and establishment of independent reviewers will result in increased judgment 
performance and audit quality.  
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Related to accuracy2 (which includes judgment performance regarding the importance 
weights the respondents attached to each of the identified risk factors) the results are 
given in Table 4.27: 
 
Table 4.27 Summary number of strategic and operational business risks matching with 
the expert panel (accuracy2) 
 
 Operational risks Strategic risks 
 Importance 
points  
% Mean importance 
points per 
respondent 
Importance 
points  
% Mean importance 
points per 
respondent 
Audit 
managers 
232.64 71.66% 2.74 92 28.34% 1.08 
Auditing 
students 
50.31 71.81% 2.52 19.75 28.19% 0.99 
 
These results are comparable with the results presented in Table 4.26 and, hence, are 
not further amplified.  
 
Description of the nature of identified client business risks 
This section is concerned with the nature of identified client business risks. In the 
previous section, some differences between audit managers and auditing students in the 
outcomes of the identification task have already been reported. The description of these 
differences, however, was primarily concerned with the distinction between strategic and 
operational client business risks. In order to find a norm with which the judgment 
performance of auditors could be compared, the accuracy-scores were used (i.e., the 
panel of expert auditors was used as benchmark). The remaining analyses of the nature 
of identified client business risks in the current section starts with a description of the 
client business risks deemed most important by audit managers and auditing students. 
This provides additional insight, compared to the analysis of operational and strategic 
risks, into the nature of risks identified. Subsequently, a comparison will be made with 
published business risks for the construction industry in The Netherlands. This 
comparison contributes to our insight into potential differences between auditors’ risk 
perceptions and audit client’s risk perceptions. Due to differences in methodology 
between this industry-specific publication and this thesis, the analysis will be high-level 
and qualitative by nature. 
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Business risk factors deemed most important 
The identification task of audit managers and auditing students resulted in a list of 35 
distinguished risk factors (see Appendix A). Ranking the list of risk factors by the number 
of times an audit manager identified a business risk, results in the following top five of 
business risks: 
1 The risk of formalization of adjustments to original contract-specifications (variation 
status list) (n = 25); 
2 Risks due to the number of projects in the order book (work at hand) (n = 24); 
3 The risk of project losses (n = 24); 
4 The risk of calculation errors in the tender phase (n = 24); 
5 Risks due to the relatively low number of principals (n = 23). 
 
The top-five of auditing students is composed as follows: 
1 Risks due to the absence of a formalized strategy (n = 15); 
2 The risk of formalization of adjustments to original contract-specifications (variation 
status list) (n = 9); 
3 Compliance risks with respect to rules and regulations (e.g., environmental rules, 
safety rules etc.) (n=9); 
4 Risks resulting from fixed fee contracts; this has a consequence that price-
increases cannot be charged to the principal (n = 7); 
5 Risks due to the relatively low number of principals (n = 6). 
 
A comparison of both lists of the top five business risks resulted in the following findings: 
• Regarding the top five of client’s business risks identified by audit managers, it is 
notable that more or less the same number of auditors (between 23 and 25 
auditors) identified these risks. For the group of auditing students, n ranges from 6 
to 15. This difference is probably a consequence of the relatively small population 
of auditing students (n = 20). 
• Audit managers and auditing students seem to share only two out of the sum of 
eight risk factors. This finding is less striking than it seems to be. If the presented 
list of risk factors had been enlarged to the top eight of risk factors, the lists of audit 
managers and auditing students would become comparable. However, one 
business risk factor (i.e., risks due to the number of projects in the order book) is 
not identified by any student. This might be explained by the fact that the wordings 
of business risks were not pre-defined in the questionnaire, but were left free to the 
respondent. As can be seen in the presented list of auditing students’ risk factors, 
six auditing students identified the risks due to the relatively low number of 
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principals. It could be argued that this risk is related to the risk regarding the order 
book. We conclude that the list of mostly identified business risks of audit 
managers and auditing students does not differ very much. 
 
Reviewing of the lists provided above raises the question whether these really are 
business risks a corporate director of a construction-company is really worrying about. 
We will elaborate more about this question in the next section.  
 
A comparison of risks identified by auditors and published risk factors  
In this section, risk factors identified by auditors will be compared by risk factors which 
are generally applicable to construction companies. Risk factors generally applicable to 
construction companies have been derived from a recent publication in The Netherlands 
of the Stichting Bouwresearch (further: the foundation). The foundation assists the 
construction and real estate-industry in the prevention and solution of bottlenecks with 
respect to the application of new insights and developments aimed at the improvement 
of quality, productivity, working circumstances and opportunities for employment in this 
industry. The foundation published guidance with respect to risk management for small 
and medium-sized construction firms some time before (2000) the questionnaire 
underlying this thesis was distributed. Risk-management is defined in this context as: 
“recognition and controlling of risks and uncertainties during the realization of projects in 
order to increase the chance of successfulness of the project”. This publication 
categorizes the most important risks along the phases of a project: (1) risks in the 
tender- and negotiation phase, (2) risks in the project-preparation phase, (3) risks during 
the execution of a project, and (4) risks in the project-completion phase. The essence of 
each of these phases as well as a comparison of the risks published by the foundation 
and the risks identified by audit managers is presented in Table 4.28: 
 }}}  
Table 4.28 Risk comparison: generally applicable risks as published versus risks identified by auditors in experiment 
Project-phase Generally applicable risks as published 
(summarized) 
Risks identified by auditors in experiment (summarized) n 
Calculation errors 24 
Fixed fee contracts 17 
Risk of project-losses 24 
Assessment of costs too low 
Risks due to price-competition 15 
Calculation errors 24 
Fixed fee contracts 17 
Vagueness of project specifications and descriptions 
Risk of project-losses 24 
Tender- and 
negotiation 
Project-duration estimated too short Calculation errors 24 
Calculation errors 24 
Fixed fee contracts 17 
Risk of project-losses 24 
Starting too soon (e.g. insufficient project information received 
from principal; insufficient project information to and from sub-
contractors and suppliers; planning insufficient). 
Internal communication (not one-to-one match) 3 
Construction method insufficiently considered Not identified  
Project 
preparation 
Project-location too small (e.g. crowded city) Not identified  
Risk of project-losses 24 
Internal communication (not one-to-one-match) 3 
Quality of personnel 7 
Speed of execution behind planning 
Exit of key personnel 8 
Quality of sub-contractors and suppliers (e.g. compliance to 
contract) 
Contacts with suppliers and sub-contractors 4 
Risk of theft, vandalism etc. Risk of project-losses 24 
Risks due to weather Risk of project-losses 24 
Late invoicing of installments to principal Late invoicing of installments to principal 15 
Absence of personnel due to illness Risk of project-losses 24 
Project execution 
 Compliance to rules and regulations regarding working environment  21 
Fixed fee contracts 17 
Risk of project-losses 24 
Internal communication (not one-to-one match) 3 
Discussions about deviations of original contract (variation status list) 25 
Discussions about deviations of original contract (variation status 
list) 
Completeness of invoicing variation status list 21 
Project completion 
Risk of timeliness payments by principal  Debtor risks 14 
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Qualitative analysis of this comparison gives rise to the following remarks. 
 
Firstly, risks reported by the foundation are merely project-related. E.g., external threats 
or risks resulting from the strategy formulated by the construction company are not 
described. Although the theme ‘business risks resulting from the strategy chosen by the 
construction company’ was not part of the foundation’s research question, it is important 
to note that strategy and objective-setting can result in significant business risks (see 
also ISA 315, Appendix 1, 2003). Risks identified by audit managers on the other hand 
are not specifically focused on those business risks that result from specific construction 
projects but cover a broader area. For example, audit managers identified the following 
risks which have not been identified by the foundation: risks due to insufficient 
innovation, risks due to the competitive position (e.g. potential of new entrants to the 
marketplace), dominant position of the general manager, internal information-related 
risks (incomplete management information), a limited number of principals and risks due 
to the composition and completeness of the order book and risks related to the financial 
position of the company. Given the relatively high number of audit managers identifying 
these risks, it can be concluded that risk identification by audit managers in general 
comprises a spectrum of risks which is broader than just the project-related risks. 
 
Secondly, a relatively high number of audit managers identified risks in the 
tender/negotiation-phase. This could probably be an indication that the business risk 
audit approach results in early identification of business risks in order to get a broader 
understanding of the client’s business. This probably implies the recognition by audit 
managers that early recognition of business risks is important to understanding the 
causes underlying the establishment of project results (work-in-progress). Based upon 
risk identification prior to or from the start of the project, the auditor might be better able 
to formulate knowledge-laden expectations (Bell et al., 1997; Knechel, 2001) on material 
financial statement accounts. For example, auditors identified the risk of ‘calculation 
errors’ in the tender and negotiation phase of a project. When auditors have analyzed 
the impact of this risk, auditors formulate hypotheses regarding the error sensitivity of 
the entire calculation process. Should the risk only have impact on one specific project, 
the auditor will focus attention on this specific project and will subsequently assess the 
risk of a material loss for that specific project due to calculation errors and communicate 
with the audit client whether and to what extent this risk is mitigated by internal controls. 
At year-end, the auditor will also perform analytical procedures regarding the account 
balance of work-in-progress with specific attention to a potential loss provision for the 
project that required specific consideration (i.e., when conducting analytical procedures, 
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the auditor develops knowledge-laden expectations as to the development of specific 
account balances).  
 
Thirdly, it is clear from Table 4.28 (see highlighted cells) that audit managers did not 
identify two risks which have been identified by the Foundation of Construction research 
(namely: 1. Construction-method insufficiently considered and 2. Project-location too 
small (e.g., crowded city)). Does this finding suggest that business risks in this project 
phase bear less relevance to the financial statement audit? This could probably be the 
case. E.g. risks due to insufficient consideration of construction method are highly 
technical by nature. Obviously, auditors do not possess skills to evaluate such 
considerations and to evaluate the financial impact of alternative constructions. This 
does, by the way, not necessarily imply that risks in the project-preparation-phase can 
be fully neglected in the financial statement audit. Sooner or later, this kind of risks (if 
they exist) will become visible in the valuation of Work-in-Progress (overrun in budgeted 
costs and probably resulting in a provision for losses). On the other hand, research 
literature (e.g. Eilifsen et al., 2001) suggests that the business risk audit approach 
involves the assignment of more specialists to the audit team. For the case-setting in the 
experiment, auditors did not identify the before mentioned risk and are probably 
unaware of the need for adding specialists to the team.  
 
Finally, and in addition to the previous remarks, risks identified by audit managers are 
clearly linked to the client’s accounting system. Table 4.28 includes only the risk factors 
identified by auditors if they matched with the risk factors identified by the foundation. 
However, auditors identified also factors additional to the factors described in Table 
4.28. Auditors identifying client’s business risks direct their attention, more than is shown 
in the foundation’s report, to those risks which are also of relevance to the financial 
statements. Examples of “accounting” risks include the following: shifts in recording 
costs to other projects, the accounting organization and the system of internal controls 
as a whole, debtor risks (related to debtor valuation), late invoicing of installments 
(resulting in a relatively high value of Work-in-Progress), analysis of hours worked 
(timesheet administration), and the linkage between the finance administration and 
management information (information risks).  
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4.4.8 Exploration into the nature of entity-level controls identified by auditors 
This section is concerned with the nature of identified client entity-level controls. In the 
previous section, some differences between audit managers and auditing students in the 
outcomes of the identification task were already reported.  
 
Entity-level controls deemed most important 
In total, the identification task of audit managers and auditing students resulted in a list 
of 27 entity-level controls (see Appendix B). Ranking the list of risk factors by the 
number of times an audit manager identified a client’s entity-level control, results in the 
following top five of client’s entity-level control: 
1 Project progress management’s report / project-controlling (n = 62); 
2 Comparison of ex ante project-calculations with ex-post calculations/project 
evaluations (n = 40); 
3 Budget procedures (general costs, ‘AK’) (n = 37); 
4 Segregation of duties (n = 35); 
5 Compliance to rules and regulations, code of conduct (n = 29). 
 
The top-five of auditing students is composed as follows: 
1 Project progress management’s report / project-controlling (n = 14); 
2 Comparison of ex ante project-calculations with ex-post calculations/project 
evaluations (n = 12); 
3 Budget procedures (general costs, ‘AK’) (n = 9); 
4 Project-administration in place and reconciled to the finance administration (n = 9); 
5 Compliance to rules and regulations, code of conduct (n = 7). 
 
A comparison of both lists of the top five of entity-level controls resulted in the following 
findings: 
• Audit managers and auditing students seemingly view the top-five of entity-level 
control equally important. This suggests that differences in judgment performance 
regarding the identification of entity-level controls are more attributable to other 
controls (below the top-five). One obvious difference is related to the control 
‘deviations of original contract procedures’) (n audit managers = 23; n auditing 
students = 2). This type of control obviously relates to the client’s business risks 
‘Risk of absence of monitoring the completeness of the variation status list’ and 
‘Risk of discussions regarding variation status list due to insufficient formalization of 
project variations’. One of the reasons explaining the finding that students did not 
identify the control ‘deviations of original contract..’ could be that they identified 
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compensating controls. E.g. the identification of the control ‘Project-administration 
in place and reconciled to the finance administration’ could mitigate the previously 
described client’s business risks by separately coding variations in the project 
administration (e.g. coding of separate project labels in order to monitor the timely 
invoicing of project variations). Another example would be the existence of reliable 
management information. In case the project progress report provides an early 
warning of unexpected losses or higher than budgeted costs, making visible that 
some corrective action (like formalization of procedures related to project 
variations) would be required. 
• Both audit managers and auditing students recognized the control ‘compliance to 
rules and regulations/code of conduct’ nearly equally important. Probably, this 
control has gained in recent years more and more importance. Amongst other 
things, codes of conduct became more important due to the scandals related to 
financial reporting. As a result, there has been a call for more emphasis on the 
themes ‘corporate integrity’ and ‘tone at the top’ (e.g. SOX-404, 2002, Code 
Tabaksblatt, 2003). Non-compliance with rules and regulations might result in 
negative publicity and even in fines. Hence, the responsibility of the board of 
directors for reliable financial reporting has received much attention in laws, rules 
and regulations. From an agency perspective, the principal (e.g. investors) might 
put a premium on the expected rate of return for companies who received negative 
publicity. For registered companies, this might be a very important business risk, 
which is directly related to the financial statements (reliability of financial reporting). 
Or, more properly formulated, the existence of a code of conduct is, from an 
agency perspective, a pre-requisite for being ‘in control’. In addition, at the time of 
the experiment, ‘compliance’ was a hot issue as a result of the parliamentary 
investigation regarding fraud in the construction industry. Although this 
investigation was not specifically addressed in the case description used in the 
experiment and the questionnaire did not provide hints in this direction, it might 
indeed be the case that participants have used their general knowledge in the 
identification of compliance controls. 
• It should also be noted that a relatively low number of audit managers (i.e. 1) and 
auditing students (i.e. 3) identified controls related to the formalization of corporate 
strategy. Recently, ERM (2004) has been published putting more emphasis on the 
process of setting strategic objectives which, according to ERM (2004), involves a 
more direct relationship with the corporate control ‘risk analysis’ (this COSO-
component has been identified by 1 audit manager and has not been identified by 
any of the auditing students). This finding might be explained by the size of the 
company described in the case-setting, i.e. a medium-sized company. For 
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relatively small companies, this control might be viewed as too bureaucratic. 
However, at the same time audit managers as well as auditing students identified 
the absence of a formalized strategy as an important client’s business risk (21 audit 
managers; 15 auditing students).  
 
4.5 Summary of empirical results related to the auditors’ identification of client’s 
business risks and entity-level controls 
Chapter 4 describes the empirical results regarding the auditors’ judgment performance 
regarding the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks’ and ‘identification of the 
client’s entity-level controls’.  
Limited support has been found for the hypothesis expecting a positive impact of general 
experience in the auditing field on judgment performance. This hypothesis was only 
supported for the auditors’ judgment performance regarding the identification of entity-
level controls as measured by accuracy3 (measuring those entity-level controls identified 
by auditors which matched with the expert panel). These results are – except for the 
finding relating to the impact of general experience on accuracy3 – in conformity with 
prior research studies (e.g., Bonner 1990; Wright, 1988).  
Support was also found for the hypothesis expecting a positive impact of industry-
specific experience on judgment performance. This hypothesis was confirmed for both 
the identification of client’s business risks as well as the identification of client’s entity-
level controls. These results are in conformity with results regarding industry-expertise 
reported by Solomon et al. (1999), Taylor (2000), and Wright and Wright (1997). 
Regarding accuracy1 (judgment performance with respect to identifying the appropriate 
business risks) it was reported that judgment performance tends to increase with an 
increase in industry-specific experience up till a level of 1,000 hours cumulatively spent 
over three years to industry-specific audit engagements. From that level of 1,000 hours 
and more industry-specific experience, judgment performance tends to decrease. The 
auditors’ judgment performance related to the relevance assessments of each the 
identified client’s business risks and entity-level controls was not significantly associated 
with industry-specific experience. Finally, we found no significant correlation between 
the level of experience in the auditing field and industry-specific experience.  
I did not find support for the hypothesis expecting a positive relationship between the 
audit managers’ judgment performance and task-specific experience. Even a significant 
negative association between these two variables has been reported. With respect to 
auditing students a significant positive correlation was found between the auditors’ 
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judgment performance related to the identification of entity-level controls and the number 
of times they performed this task last year. These results are in contrast existing 
literature (e.g. Bonner, 1990). 
We did not find support for the hypothesis expecting a positive relationship between the 
perceived level of feedback received from supervisors when conducting risk 
assessments and judgment performance.  
Finally, this chapter presents qualitative analyses regarding both the identification of 
client’s business risks and entity-level controls. Audit managers, compared to auditing 
students, identified relatively more operational business risks than strategic business 
risks. For both audit managers and auditing students, these operational business risks 
also contributed more to judgment performance than the strategic risks. Overall, most of 
the business risks identified by auditors corresponded with the risk framework developed 
by the Foundation of Construction Research. However, auditors, in addition to the risks 
identified by the framework, identified more business risks which were by nature 
“accounting-related”, which can be explained by the linkage with the financial statement 
audit.  
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5 Results of the experiment: judgment performance with respect to 
assessing the impact of client’s business risks and entity-wide 
controls on audit risk 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the results from two identification tasks (i.e., the identification of 
client’s business risks and client’s entity-wide controls) have been reported. Chapter 5 
presents the experimental results regarding the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s 
business risks and entity-wide controls on audit risk’. Two client’s business risks and two 
entity-wide controls have been selected in the full factorial experiment design. The audit 
risk assessment relates in the experiment to financial-statement-account ‘Work-in-
Progress’. Particularly, we examine the potential influence of experience, perceived level 
of feedback when conducting risk assessments and the auditor’s level of risk-aversion 
on judgment performance.  
 
It is important to examine the auditors’ judgment performance, as auditors (like other 
decision-makers) do not always make high-quality judgments, many times reflecting 
systematic errors (Bonner, 1999).  
 
In the previous chapter, judgment performance has been measured by accuracy. For 
those (identification) tasks an external performance criterion was at hand, namely the 
expert panel’s judgments. Regarding assessment tasks such an external performance 
criterion has not been available. Instead, we have measured judgment performance by 
consensus, making use of Brunswik’s Lens Model (Brunswik, 1952). The lens model is, 
despite its criticisms, still widely used in research in the auditing discipline (e.g., Ashton 
1973, 1974; Bonner 1990; Meixner and Welker, 1998; Trotman, 1998; Majid et al., 2001) 
as well as many other academic disciplines (e.g. Mear and Firth 1987; Bonner et al., 
2003, financial analysts and investors’ forecasts; Licata et al., 2001, marketing; Dhami et 
al., 2004, psychology). Consensus is often used in research studies if no accuracy 
criterion exists. Other judgment performance variables examined in this chapter are: the 
stability of auditors’ judgments, auditors’ cue usage as well as the auditors’ self-insight.  
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In Chapter 3 we have provided a description of the Lens Model. The assessment task 
was modeled in a full-factorial design, using four cues. Each participating auditor was 
asked to weigh the impact of each of the four combinations, as well as their different 
combinations of occurrence, on audit risk. This resulted in 15 cases (the case in which 
none of the cues was present, was eliminated). The current chapter presents an 
overview and analysis of the Lens model’s results. The underlying hypotheses to be 
tested are described in Table 5.1: 
 
Table 5.1 Research hypotheses ‘Judgment Performance related to assessing the impact 
of client’s business risks and client’s entity-wide controls on audit risk’ 
 
Judgment Performance related to assessing the impact of client’s business risks and 
client’s entity-wide controls on audit risk 
1. Judgment Performance related to general experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance is negatively influenced by general experience.  
 
2. Judgment Performance related to industry experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance is positively influenced by industry experience.  
 
3. Judgment Performance related to task-specific experience 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance is positively influenced by task-specific experience.  
 
4. Judgment Performance related to perceived level of feedback 
 
The auditor’s judgment performance is positively influenced by the perceived level of 
feedback received from supervisors when conducting audit risk assessments. 
 
 
The results are subsequently presented using four aspects of the auditors’ judgment 
performance: stability (5.2), consensus (5.3), cue-usage (5.4) and self-insight (5.5). At 
the end of this chapter, a summary of conclusions will be given.  
 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics concerning the dependent variables relating 
to the assessment of client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics dependent variables assessment task 
 
Variable n Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Audit managers 
Self-insight 83 -.74 1.00 .69 .41 
Stability 85 -.01 1.00 .93 .15 
Consensus 85 n.a. n.a. .72 n.a. 
      
Auditing students 
Self-insight 20 -.45 .99 .71 .34 
Stability 20 .85 1.00 .96 .05 
Consensus 20 n.a. n.a. .64 n.a. 
 
Table 5.2 suggests that the level of consensus amongst audit managers’ is higher 
compared to the level of consensus amongst auditing students (.72 versus .64). This 
difference is statistically significant (for more details, see section 5.3.1). The differences 
between audit managers and auditing students relating to the mean levels of self-insight 
and stability are less striking. 
 
5.2 Auditors’ stability of judgments with respect to assessing the impact of 
client business risks and entity-wide controls 
For the population of audit managers an overall mean stability of .93 has been reported 
(standard deviation: .15). Stability has been computed as the paired Pearson 
correlations of the four repeat cases with the four original cases (refer to section 3.4). 
This implies that the auditors’ judgments related to the assessment task are 
considerably stable. For the population of auditing students, an overall level of stability of 
.96 has been reported (standard deviation of .05).  
 
The remainder of this section deals with: 
• The correlation between stability and accuracy (as judgment performance measure 
used in the previous chapter); 
• Tests of hypotheses related to judgment performance as measured by stability. 
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5.2.1 Correlation between stability and accuracy 
Stability negatively correlates with accuracy1 (identification of client’s business risks 
measuring the number of business risks identified by the participant matching with the 
expert panel): -.217 (significance .023). This finding suggests that audit managers 
perform differently on identification tasks and assessment tasks (in conformity with 
Bedard and Graham, 2002) and stresses the need for improvement of auditors’ 
judgment quality in the planning phase of the financial statement audit. For auditing 
students, a correlation has been reported of -.293 (significance, .105).  
5.2.2 Tests of hypotheses related to judgment performance as measured by 
stability 
Correlation between stability and experience 
No significant correlations were found between stability on the one hand and general 
experience and industry-specific experience on the other hand.  
 
Table 5.3 presents the 1-tailed Pearson correlations between the distinguished task-
specific experience variables and stability.  
 
Table 5.3 Pearson correlations between task-specific experience and Judgment Stability 
(p<.1 significant) 
 
 IDBR1 IDBR2 WBR1 WBR2 IDBM1 IDBM2 WBM1 WBM2 
Managers n = 83 n = 83 n = 84 n = 84 n = 84 n = 84 n = 83 n = 83 
Stability .167 
(.065)* 
.172 
(.060)* 
.164 
(.069)* 
.232 
(.017)* 
.120 
(.137) 
.190 
(.042)* 
.204 
(.032)* 
.249 
(.012)* 
Students n = 20 n = 20 n = 19 n = 19 n = 19 n = 19 n = 20 n = 20 
Stability -.045 
(.425) 
.184 
(.218) 
.036 
(.442) 
.200 
(.206) 
.153 
(.266) 
.314 
(.095)* 
.085 
(.361) 
.286 
(.111) 
 
Legend to Table 5.3:  
• Idbr1: Number of times the task ‘identification of client’s business risk’ performed in last year; 
• Idbr2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘identification of client’s business risk’ in last year; 
• Wbr1: Number of times the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risk on audit risk’ 
performed in last year  
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• Wbr2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risk on audit 
risk’ in last year; 
• Idbm1: Number of times the task ‘identification of client’s entity-wide controls’ performed in last 
year; 
• Idbm2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘identification of client’s entity-wide controls’ in last year; 
• Wbm1: Number of times the task ‘assessing the impact of the client’s entity-wide controls on audit 
risk’ performed in last year; 
• Wbm2: Number of hours spent on the task ‘assessing the impact of the client’s entity-wide controls 
on audit risk’ in last year. 
 
From Table 5.3 it follows that stability positively correlates with nearly all of the task-
specific experience except for IDBM1. This finding contrasts Table 4.20 in the previous 
chapter showing a significantly negative correlation between accuracy1 (judgment 
performance related to the identification of client’s business risks) and task-specific 
experience. The correlations presented in Table 5.3 suggest that judgment consistency 
improves when auditor’s task-specific experience (measured in hours) increases. This is 
in conformity with Bonner (1990). Repeat engagement experience might also be helpful 
in reaching higher stability levels.  
We conclude that hypothesis 1 and 2 is not supported (for judgment performance 
measured by stability) and hypothesis 3 is supported.  
 
Correlation between stability and the perceived level of feedback when 
conducting risk assessments 
For audit managers, a significant positive (1-tailed) correlation between Stability and the 
perceived level of feedback has been reported of .251 (significance .011, n=84). For 
auditing students, this correlation was not significant (correlation of .095, significance of 
.346, n=20). Hence, we conclude that hypothesis 4 is supported for audit managers, but 
not for auditing students. This suggests that feedback is a helpful mechanism to 
increasing judgment stability.  
 
5.3 Auditors’ judgment consensus with respect to assessing the impact of 
client business risks and entity-wide controls on audit risk 
Consensus between auditors is used as a surrogate for auditors’ judgment accuracy 
which has been used in the previous chapter as a measure for judgment performance in 
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an identification task. Consensus or ‘agreement’ is defined as “the degree of correlation 
between a judge’s responses to cue profiles or configurations in a task and the 
responses made by another judge to those same profiles” (Cooksey, 1995, p. 367). 
Consensus is measured, making use of Brunswik’s lens model, as the pair-wise 
correlations of (impact on) risk assessment for each pair of auditors. All participants 
have completed 15 case combinations, resulting in 15 assessments of the impact of 
each (or in combination) of the four cues on audit risk. For each pair of auditors, the 
pairwise Pearson correlation has been computed, resulting in 3,570 
consensus/correlation coefficients.  
In this paragraph we first perform data-analyses for the dataset as a whole (5.3.1), 
subsequently followed by description of the tests of hypotheses related to consensus 
(section 5.3.2).  
 
5.3.1 Overall analysis of consensus 
Consensus has been measured as the correlations of the judgments of each pair of 
auditors (excluding auditing students) on the 15 case combinations. For the group of 
audit managers this resulted in 3,570 correlation coefficients38. For the dataset of audit 
managers an overall consensus of .72 is reported (standard deviation .174). Others 
reported comparable consensus averages (e.g. Ashton, 1973: .70; Bonner, 1990: .63-
.65; Meixner and Welker, 1988: .73) for assessment tasks in audit risk decisions39, 40. 
Zimmer’s study (Zimmer, 1980) involved loan officers making annual predictions of 
failure of corporations based on a series of ratios. Zimmer reported a mean consensus 
level of .72, which is consistent with comparable studies related to loan officers (e.g., 
                                                 
38
 Which are computed as follows: ((85 participants * 85 participants) -/- (85 respondents)) / 2. 
39
 Shanteau (2002) examined various knowledge domains and concluded that auditors show, compared 
to other domains, relatively high performance-levels and categorized auditors’ judgment/decision-making 
in general as ‘aided decisions’. Other types of decisions (with lower performance-levels) are ‘competent’, 
‘restricted’, and ‘random’. Shanteau reports for auditors average consensus values of .76; only weather 
forecasters show higher performance-levels with an average consensus level of .95. Experts with lowest 
performance include polygraphists (average consensus of .33) and stock-brokers (average consensus of 
.32).  
40
 Embly and Finley (1997) reported framing biases in judgments related to internal control systems. 
Auditors, making their judgments in terms of “risks” (e.g. control risk), tend to under-rely on internal control 
systems. Auditors making their judgments in terms of “control strengths” tend to over-rely on internal 
control systems. 
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Libby 1975). Given the relative novelty of the business risk audit approach relatively 
lower consensus levels could have been expected in the present study.  
 
For the population of auditing students an average consensus-level of .64 was found. 
Ashton and Kramer (1980) reported a similar result (consensus of .66 for students). With 
the t-statistic, this average consensus level significantly differed from the consensus 
level of audit managers (Levene’s test for equality of variances: F=16,235 and 
significance .000; t-test for equality of means: t=-6.113; df= 221.015 and significance 
.000). Zimmer (1980) also used (financial accounting) students in order to investigate 
the “students as surrogate” issue, and reports accurate self-insight into the accuracy of 
each prediction, and showed a high degree of judgment consensus (mean levels have 
not been reported). Based upon auditing research (e.g. Bonner et al., 1997) it can be 
argued that the auditors’ judgment performance is both influenced by knowledge and 
experience. From this perspective, the significant difference in judgment performance 
between audit managers and auditing students is not surprising. However, one might on 
the other hand argue that auditing students possess a mind-set that is to a minor extent 
framed by experience in the auditing field compared to the mindset of audit managers. 
The findings, however, suggest that experience, given the specific case-setting, has led 
to a higher quality of judgment performance. This suggestion is in conformity with 
Ashton and Kramer (1980), although these authors correctly added that the differences 
reported are relatively low. Ashton and Kramer (1980) reviewed many studies relating to 
differences between students and more experienced subjects. Most of them conclude 
that decision-making seems to be very similar for students and more experienced 
subjects across a variety of tasks. From a psychological perspective, this may be 
explained by the fact that experts are prone to the same judgment biases compared to 
novices to the task (see section 2.3). 
 
The four cues, used in the experiment, were:  
1 Financial condition of the company strongly deteriorated (client business risk, CBR 
1); 
2 The company’s strategy changed from “low-cost home-construction” to “luxury 
villas” (CBR 2); 
3 Strengthened project-control by progress reports on Work in Progress (entity-wide 
control, EWC 1); and 
4 More specialized personnel assigned to projects (EWC 2). 
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We used ‘standard deviation’ for the variable ‘impact on audit risk assessment’ to 
analyze the impact of each of the four cues individually as well as the impact of the cue 
combinations. The result is presented in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1: 
 
Table 5.4 Standard deviations versus cases  Fig. 5.1 Standard deviations vs 
case number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1 follows that the cases with only one cue present 
contribute most to the reported consensus results. Cases 12 to 15 show the standard 
deviations related to the impact assessments when only 1 cue is present in the case. 
These standard deviations range from 1.78 to 2.38. Compared to the standard 
deviations related to cases with more cues present (cases 1 to 10), ranging from 2.27 to 
3.45, the standard deviation in cases with only 1 cue present is lower. Auditors, like 
everyone, experience bounded rationality (e.g. Choy and King, 2003). An increase in the 
number of cues will most probably result in higher standard deviations, i.e. lower 
consensus levels (e.g., Cooksey, 1995).  
 
From a probabilistic perspective (i.e., looking at the group of auditors as a whole, as 
opposed to an ideo-graphic perspective), we conclude that on average, auditors show a 
relatively high level of judgment performance for the assessment task performed by the 
participants of the experiment. On a more detailed level, the cases with only one cue 
present contributed mostly to this conclusion.  
Case # Stand Dev.
1 3,38          
2 3,20          
3 2,78          
4 3,45          
5 3,15          
6 2,67          
7 3,09          
8 2,79          
9 3,16          
10 2,38          
11 2,27          
12 2,38          
13 2,24          
14 2,26          
15 1,78          Number of 1 cue
Number of 4 cues
Number of 3 cues
Number of 2 cues
Stand Dev.
-
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Stand Dev.
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5.3.2 Tests of hypotheses related to judgment performance as measured by 
consensus 
This section contains the following sub-sections: 
• The impact of experience on judgment performance; 
• The impact of the perceived level of feedback on judgment performance; 
• The impact of the auditor’s level of risk-aversion on judgment performance; and 
• The impact of case-sequence on judgment performance.  
 
For each of the following sub-sections consensus has been computed as the Pearson-
correlation of each pair of auditors. As described in section 5.3.1, this resulted in 3,570 
correlations. As consensus is by nature not a measure to evaluate individual auditors’ 
judgment performance but an inter-auditor measure, for each of the independent 
variables sub-groups have been distinguished. The mean consensus levels of the sub-
groups will be compared to each other. To assess the significance of differences in 
judgment performance, the correlation coefficients have been recomputed with the 
‘Fisher r to Z transformation’. Transformation of the Pearson correlations is necessary 
since these correlations are not normally distributed (Ashton, 1973; Cooksey, 1995). All 
independent variables have been distinguished in more than two sub-groups. The 
classification of a group of audit managers into sub-groups has been based (equal) 
sample size considerations. Assessment of the significance of differences in judgment 
performance across sub-groups will accordingly be performed with Scheffé’s multiple 
post-hoc comparisons. 
 
The impact of the independent variables (including the impact of case sequence) on 
consensus is shown in the following Table.  
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Table 5.5 Overview impact independent variables on consensus 
 
Panel A: impact of general experience (# of years experience in auditing) on consensus 
 
Group 1 2 3 
Experience < 10 >= 10 - < 15 >= 15 
 
Consensus .75 .70 .70 
 
 
Panel B: impact of industry experience (# of hours spent on industry-specific audit 
engagements over the past three years) on consensus  
 
 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 
Experience  0 >0 - <250 >=250-<500 >=500-<1,000 >=1,000 
 
Consensus .74 .61 .78 .73 .59 
 
 
Panel C: impact of task-specific experience (# of times task ‘assessment impact of CBR 
on audit risk performed last year) on consensus 
 
 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Experience  < 5 >=5 - < 10 >=10 - <15 >=15 
 
Consensus  .71 .71 .72 .77 
 
 
Panel D: impact of task-specific experience (# of times task ‘assessment impact of ELC 
on audit risk performed last year) on consensus 
 
 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Experience < 5 >=5 - < 10 >=10 - <15 >=15 
 
Consensus  .69 .73 .71 .77 
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Table 5.5 (continued) Overview impact independent variables on consensus 
 
Panel E: impact of perceived level of feedback (# of times the participant perceives 
feedback on audit risk assessments from a supervisor) on consensus 
 
 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Feedback < 2,5 >= 2,5 - < 5 >=5 - <7,5 >=7,5 
 
Consensus  .66 .68 .76 .72 
 
 
Panel F: impact of level of risk-aversion (% of certainty required to choose highest win in 
gamble game) on consensus 
 
 
Group 1 2 3 
Risk-aversion <= 50% > 50% - <=75% > 75% 
 
Consensus  .72 .78 .64 
 
 
Panel G: impact of case sequence on consensus 
 
 
Group 1 2 3 
Case sequence 1 2 3 
 
Consensus  .70 .73 .72 
 
 
     
 
In the following sub-sections the statistical results of each of the panels of Table 5.5 will 
be clarified.  
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A. The impact of experience in the auditing field on the level of consensus 
 
The entire group of audit managers has been split into three different sub-groups with 
different intervals of experience in the auditing field: the first group reports less than 10 
years of experience (n=27), the second group reports more than or equal to 10 and less 
than 15 years of experience (n=33), and the third group reports more than 15 years of 
experience (n=23). The third group included two outliers with 35 and 42 years of 
experience respectively. These outliers have been excluded in the analysis of judgment 
performance as measured by consensus, resulting in 3,403 correlation coefficients 
instead of 3,570 as mentioned in section 5.3.1.  
 
The Scheffé-test for multiple post-hoc comparisons has been used to investigate the 
statistical significance of the differences of the group means. According to the Scheffé-
test all differences between groups, except for the difference between groups 2 and 3, 
are statistically significant. According to hypothesis 1 a negative direction for the impact 
of experience on judgment performance was expected. The statistical results provide 
support for this hypothesis, although the differences between group 1 versus group 2 
and 3 are relatively small (.75 versus .70).  
 
Existing research literature has provided mixed results related to the impact of 
experience in the auditing field on the auditors’ judgment performance (e.g. Libby and 
Luft, 1993; Bonner 1990). Potential explanations for the evidence presented in Table 5.5 
are differences in task-specific experience and engagement-specific experience across 
auditors. Additionally, Meixner and Welker (1988) reported no positive impact of 
experience on judgment consensus, but consensus did increase with an increase of the 
length of time that staff auditors had been associated with the same audit manager. As 
the debriefing questionnaire did not specifically refer to the length of time working under 
the same supervisor, it is not clear whether the results presented in Table 5.5 have been 
influenced by this variable.  
 
B. The impact of industry-specific experience on the level of consensus 
 
The entire group of audit managers has been split into five sub-groups with different 
intervals of industry-specific experience (as measured in hours spent on industry-
specific clients over the past three years), which resulted in sub-groups of more or less 
equal size:  
• Group 1: auditors with zero hours of industry-specific experience (n=28); 
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• Group 2: auditors with more than zero but less than 250 hours of industry-specific 
experience (n=14); 
• Group 3: auditors with more than or equal to 250 hours and less than 500 hours of 
industry-specific experience (n=11); 
• Group 4: auditors with more than or equal to 500 hours and less than 1,000 hours 
of industry-specific experience (n=14); 
• Group 5: auditors with more than or equal to 1,000 hours (n=17), excluding outlier 
respondent with 3,000 hours of industry-specific experience.  
 
Excluding the previously mentioned outlier, a number of 3,486 correlation coefficients 
resulted.  
 
The Scheffé method for multiple post-hoc comparisons has been used to assess the 
statistical significance of differences in mean consensus levels across the groups. This 
resulted in the following statistically significant (p < .1) differences in consensus across 
groups: 
• Group 1 significantly differs from groups 2 and 5; 
• Group 2 significantly differs from groups 1 and 3; 
• Group 3 significantly differs from group 2; 
• Group 4 does not significantly differ from all other groups; 
• Group 5 significantly differs from the groups 1, 2, and 3.  
 
The relatively high level of consensus for the sub-group of auditors with zero hours of 
industry-specific experience (n=28) is remarkable. This contrasts with hypothesis 2 in 
which a positive impact of (industry-specific) experience on judgment performance was 
expected. One possible explanation for this finding is that this sub-group is not ‘hindered’ 
by client-specific knowledge. Related to the sub-group of audit managers with less than 
250 hours of industry-specific experience, this can give rise to the supposition that some 
industry-specific experience does not provide a good benchmark or overview of the 
construction-industry as a whole in which the given case-setting would fit. In other 
words, the sub-group of audit managers with less than 250 hours of industry-specific 
experience is probably distracted from taking the right audit risk decision. E.g., assume 
that each audit manager in this sub-group has experience with only one audit client in 
the construction industry. Some of them probably face bias in under-assessing audit risk 
(e.g. their only construction-client performs very well and has a well designed and 
operating control structure), others probably face bias in over-assessing audit risk. E.g., 
their only construction-client performs very badly and does not have any proper 
procedures in place or their client was confronted with such a business risk that 
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continuance of the company was seriously questionable. Both examples, and 
particularly these audit managers in combination, result in a relatively lower level of 
consensus within the sub-group.  
 
The third and fourth sub-group (the sub-group with industry-specific experience between 
250 and 500 hours, respectively, the sub-group with industry-specific experience 
between 500 and 1,000 hours) also show relatively high judgment performance. These 
sub-groups are in contrast with the last sub-group (more than 1,000 hours of industry-
specific experience) which shows a relatively low level of consensus. Recall from section 
4.4.3 that for audit managers with more than 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience 
a negative correlation was found with accuracy 2 and accuracy 4 (both accuracy-
measures measure the importance of each of the five client’s business risks and five 
entity-wide controls identified by the auditor). Taken together, both the results of the 
identification tasks (the identification of client’s business risks and entity-wide controls) 
and the assessment task suggest that judgment performance declines from a certain 
level of industry-specific experience. In section 4.4.3 it was suggested that this finding is 
caused by engagement-specific experience. This might be the case. Audit firms more 
and more organize the firm along industry-specific service lines. From previous research 
literature (e.g. Taylor, 2000; Solomon et al., 1999) there is evidence that for some 
industries (like Financial services, Healthcare) an increase in industry-specific 
experience is accompanied with higher judgment performance, probably due to the 
highly-regulated nature of the industry.  
 
We conclude for the group of audit managers that hypothesis 2 is partly supported 
(difference between group 2 and 3), and partly not supported (groups 1, 4 and 5).  
 
 
 
 
C. The impact of task-specific experience (related to task ‘assessing the impact of 
client’s business risks on audit risk) on the level of consensus 
 
The entire group of audit managers has been split into four different sub-groups with 
different intervals of task-specific experience. As the assessment task in the experiment 
both involves assessing the impact of client’s business risks as well as assessing the 
impact of client’s entity-wide controls on audit risk, we have distinguished two types of 
task-specific experience as well (both measuring the number of times the task has been 
performed last year).  
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The Scheffé test for multiple post-hoc comparisons shows that for audit managers, 
group 4 differs significantly with all other groups. We conclude that for audit managers 
the hypothesis 3 (expecting a positive association between task-specific experience and 
judgment performance) is supported.  
 
D. The impact of task-specific experience (related to task ‘assessing the impact of 
client’s business risks on audit risk) on the level of consensus 
 
The Scheffé test for multiple post-hoc comparisons shows that for audit managers group 
1 differs significantly from the groups 2 and 4. Additionally, group 3 differs significantly 
from group 4. We conclude that hypothesis 3 is supported.  
 
The results from Table 5.5 contrast with the results presented in Table 4.20 where 
negative correlations between task-specific experience and accuracy 1 and 3 have been 
reported. The results presented in Table 5.5 are in conformity with the results of Bonner 
(1990) suggesting that task-specific knowledge contributes to increased auditors’ 
judgment performance (see also Trotman, 1998). 
E. The impact of the perceived level of feedback on judgment performance 
Hypothesis 4 expects a positive association between the auditor’s judgment 
performance and the perceived level of feedback when conducting risk assessments. 
The perceived level of feedback has been measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 
zero (sometimes) to ten (often). The entire group of audit managers has been divided 
into the following four sub-groups:  
• Group 1: auditors perceiving a level of feedback of ‘2.5’ or lower when conducting 
risk assessments (n=20); 
• Group 2: auditors perceiving a level of feedback higher than or equal to ‘2.5’ and 
lower than ‘5’ when conducting risk assessments (n=13);  
• Group 3: auditors perceiving a level of feedback higher than or equal to ‘5’ and 
lower than ‘7.5’ when conducting risk assessments (n=28);  
• Group 4: auditors perceiving a level of feedback higher than ‘7.5’ (n=23).  
 
 
The Scheffé-test for multiple post-hoc comparisons reveals that group 1 significantly 
differs with groups 3 and 4 and group 2 significantly differs with group 3. Hence, Table 
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5.5 shows an increased judgment performance for the groups of auditors with perceived 
levels of feedback ranging from 0 to 7.5. For these groups hypothesis 4 has been 
supported. This contrasts with the negative direction of the correlation between the 
perceived level of feedback and judgment performance (measured by accuracy) as 
reported in Table 4.24. Although Table 4.24 does not show significant correlations the 
perceived level of feedback seems to have a negative impact on accuracy and a positive 
impact on consensus. However, the results are in conformity with prior research on the 
impact of feedback on judgment performance (Tuttle and Stocks, 1998; Ashton,  1990, 
1992; Arkes et al., 1986).  
 
F. The impact of the auditors’ risk-attitude on judgment performance 
Related to the impact of the level of risk-aversion no directional hypothesis has been 
developed. In order to be able to examine the impact of the level of risk-aversion on 
judgment performance, the entire group of audit managers has been split into the 
following sub-groups of more equal size: 
• Group 1: audit managers with less than or equal to ‘50%’ level of risk-attitude 
(n=25); 
• Group 2: audit managers with more than ‘50%’ and less than or equal to ‘75%’ 
level of risk-attitude (n=28); and 
• Group 3: audit managers with more than ‘75%’ level of risk-attitude (n=29). 
 
The Scheffé-test for multiple post-hoc comparisons results in a significant difference 
between group 2 and group 3. Table 5.11 reveals that the group, with mean level of risk-
aversion higher than or equal to 50% and smaller than 75% show the highest level of 
consensus compared to the groups of auditors with lower or higher risk-aversion levels. 
The result is in conformity with the suggestion that more risk-averse auditors show in 
their judgment and decision-making process to deviate from optimal judgment 
performance. Group 2 is positioned more near to the optimum (risk-neutral situation of 
40%) compared to group 3. It is hence suggested, that the level of consensus (which 
may serve as a scale of increasing judgment performance to optimal levels) is negatively 
influenced by the level of risk-aversion. In the current audit environment, audit firms are 
increasingly aware of running reputation risks since bookkeeping scandals (Enron, 
Worldcom, etc.) were reported. Delivery of high levels of audit quality is of high 
importance to audit firms in decreasing reputation risks. It can be argued that audit firms 
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in this regard may have benefit of high levels of judgment consensus. Auditors showing 
increasing levels of risk-aversion may be a threat to this benefit.  
 
G. The impact of case sequence on judgment performance 
Section 5.3.1 described the four cues which have been presented in different 
combinations to the participants in the experiments. As a 24 full factorial design has 
been used in the experiment, respondents have been provided with fifteen different cue 
combinations (the combination ‘no cues present’ has been eliminated from the 
experiment design as this cue combination is not meaningful to the respondent). 
Respondents have been asked to assess the combined impact of each of the four cues 
on audit risk. Each respondent received one of the three versions of different cue 
sequence combinations. The first sequence of case combinations starts with all four 
cues and the next cases incorporate three cues or less. The second sequence of case 
combinations is inverse to sequence 1, starting with only one cue present, and followed 
in the next cases with more than one cue. The third sequence of case combinations is a 
combination of sequences of 1 and 2. The case sequences are presented in Table 3.3. 
The rationale underlying to the use of different sequences of case combinations is – in 
conformity with Ashton (1973, 1974) – found in the length of the questionnaire and, 
hence, the possible influence of fatigue or boredom.  
 
The three sequences/versions were distributed over the group of audit managers as 
follows: 
• Group 1: auditors with sequence 1 (n=31); 
• Group 2: auditors with sequence 2 (n=30); and 
• Group 3: auditors with sequence 3 (n=24). 
 
Although the average consensus levels do not show a high (absolute) difference, the 
Scheffé-test for multiple post-hoc comparisons reveals that groups 1 and 2 significantly 
differ from each other. Potential explanations for this difference might be the presence of 
factors like fatigue or boredom (due to the repetitiveness of case combinations). 
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5.4 Auditors’ cue usage with respect to assessing the impact of client business 
risks and entity-wide controls on audit risk 
In this section, potential factors influencing the auditors’ judgment performance as 
measured by “cue usage” will be examined. Cue usage is concerned with the weights 
auditors put on each of the four cues when assessing the impact of these cues on audit 
risk: 
• “Financial position dramatically deteriorated” (general client’s business risk); 
• “Strategic change from normal homes to luxury villa’s” (industry-specific client’s 
business risk); 
• “Increased project control by project progress reports” (industry-specific entity-wide 
control); 
• “More specialized personnel designated to projects” (general entity-wide control). 
 
5.4.1 Overall analysis of cue usage: audit managers versus auditing students 
The cue weights, auditors applied to the four cues in assessing their impact on audit 
risk, are the (beta) weights resulting from linear regression. Linear regression has been 
performed for each auditor, resulting in individual regression weights. For audit 
managers and auditing students Table 5.6 reports the means of beta weights put on 
each of the four cues: 
 
Table 5.6 Overview of the auditors’ cue usage (beta weights)  
 
 Weight Cue 1 Weight Cue 2 Weight Cue 3 Weight Cue 4 
Cue description  “Financial 
position 
dramatically 
deteriorated” 
“Strategic change 
from normal 
homes to luxury 
villa’s” 
“Increased project 
control by project 
progress reports” 
“More specialized 
personnel 
designated to 
projects” 
Cue nature General  
business risk 
Industry-specific 
business risk 
Industry-specific 
entity-wide control 
General  
entity-wide control 
Audit managers .40 .41 -.39 -.12 
Auditing 
students 
.42 .29 -.44 -.15 
     
Overall .40 .39 -.40 -.13 
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The highest difference between cue weights of audit managers compared auditing 
students relates to cue 2 “Strategic change from normal homes to luxury villas”. The 
following linear regression model was developed in order to assess the significance of 
differences between audit managers and auditing students.  
 
Impact on audit risk = α + β1Cue1 + β2Cue2 + β3Cue3 + β4Cue4 + β5Accstud + ε 
 
This linear regression model shows the following results: 
 
Table 5.7 Regression model results audit managers versus auditing students 
 
Model summary 
 R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std.error of 
the estimate 
 
 .72 .518 .517 2.84952  
ANOVA 
Model Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 13700.448 5 2740.09 337.46 .000* 
Residual 12731.83 1568 8.12   
Total 26432.28 1573    
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized coefficients Standardized 
coefficients 
 B Std.error Beta 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
Constant .140 .239  .586 .558 
Cue1 3.287 .145 .40 22.621 .000* 
Cue2 3.192 .145 .39 21.974 .000* 
Cue3 -3.247 .145 -.40 -22.347 .000* 
Cue4 -1.025 .145 -.13 -7.057 .000* 
Accstud .805 .183 .077 4.402 .000* 
 
From the linear regression model, it follows that the variable ‘accstud’ (differentiating 
between audit managers and auditing students) significantly contributes to differences in 
cue usage. This suggests that general experience in auditing may result in differences in 
cue usage, dependent of the nature of a cue. Ashton and Kramer (1980) report for 
example that auditors more heavily rely on segregation-of-duties cues compared to 
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other internal controls. Auditors may have experienced different client settings in which 
specific client’s business risks may differ. Related to cue2, for example, auditors – as 
opposed to students – are assumed to be more involved in client strategy or risk insight 
sessions on Board level, where in more depth the consequences of specific strategic 
opportunities of choices have been evaluated. Explicit consideration of these 
consequences may have resulted in higher cue weights for auditors as compared to 
auditing students.  
 
5.4.2 Overall analysis of cue usage: the impact of independent variables on the 
audit manager’s cue usage 
The previous sub-section showed that differences are present in the audit manager’s 
and auditing student’s cue-usage. In this sub-section, it is investigated whether cue-
usage is influenced by personal characteristics of audit managers. The following 
regression model has been developed related to all fifteen cases together. Subsequent 
analyses will focus on the potential influence of personal characteristics of audit 
managers on cue usage in single cases.  
 
Impact on audit risk = α + β1Cue1 + β2Cue2 + β3Cue3 + β4Cue4 + β5GenExp + 
β6IndExp + β7TaskExpWBR1 + β8TaskExpWBM1+ β9Feedback+ β10RiskAversion + ε 
 
Where: 
GenExp  = Level of general experience  
IndExp = Level of industry experience 
TaskExpWBR1 = Level of task-experience related to assessing the impact of business risks on audit 
risk 
TaskExpWBM1 = Level of task-experience related to assessing the impact of entity-level controls on 
audit risk 
Feedback = Level of perceived feedback when conducting audit risk assessment task 
Risk-aversion = Level of risk-aversion in a gamble game. 
 
This linear regression model shows the following results: 
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Table 5.8 Regression model results independent variables audit managers 
 
Model summary 
 R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std.error of 
the 
estimate 
 
 .72 .523 .519 2.87744  
ANOVA 
Model Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 10647.39 10 1064.74 128.597 .000* 
Residual 9712.05 1173 8.28   
Total 20.359.44 1183    
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 B Std.error Beta 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
Constant .617 .411  1.503 .133 
Cue1 3.197 .169 .39 18.899 .000* 
Cue2 3.485 .169 .42 20.607 .000* 
Cue3 -3.202 .169 -.39 -18.926 .000* 
Cue4 -.980 .169 -.12 -5.794 .000* 
GenExp -.024 .014 -.04 -1.707 .088* 
IndExp .000 .000 -.04 -.1571 .116 
TaskExpWBR1 .100 .032 .18 3.102 .002* 
TaskExpWBM1 -.064 .031 -.12 -2.042 .041* 
Feedback -.023 .035 -.02 -.672 .502 
Risk-aversion .004 .004 .03 1.205 .229 
 
From the linear regression model results it follows that general experience, and the two-
task-specific experience variables significantly influence the auditor’s cue usage. It 
should be noted, however, that would the variables ‘feedback’ and ‘risk-aversion’ have 
been excluded from the regression model, the variable ‘general experience’ would not 
significantly influence the auditor’s cue usage. In the following Table, the 2-tailed 
Pearson correlations are shown (correlations excluding outliers). 
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Table 5.9 Correlation matrix cases (one cue present) versus independent variables audit managers  
 Cue0100 Cue0010 Cue1000 Cue0001 Cue1001 Cue0110 Cue0111 Cue1101 Cue1110 GenExp IndExp Wbr1 Wbm1 feedback Risk-
av. 
Cue0100 1 -.006 
(.958) 
.278* 
(.012) 
.039 
(.732) 
.266* 
(.016) 
.648* 
(.000) 
.536* 
(.000) 
.512* 
(.000) 
.490* 
(.000) 
.157 
(.162) 
-.097 
(.391) 
.020 
(.858) 
.015 
(.892) 
-.049 
(.663) 
-.158 
(.168) 
Cue0010  1 -.024 
(.833) 
.414* 
(.000) 
-.073 
(.516) 
.229* 
(.040) 
.241* 
(.030) 
-.131 
(.243) 
.176 
(.116) 
.152 
(.176) 
-.019 
(.866) 
-.021 
(.855) 
-.001 
(.992) 
-.048 
(.672) 
.163 
(.153) 
Cue1000   1 -.001 
(.990) 
.624* 
(.000) 
.305* 
(.006) 
.191* 
(.087) 
.447* 
(.000) 
.368* 
(.001) 
-.060 
(.595) 
-.109 
(.332) 
-.169 
(.134) 
-.134 
(.239) 
-.087 
(.442) 
.129 
(.260) 
Cue0001    1 .326* 
(.003) 
.084 
(.454) 
.180 
(.108) 
.018 
(.877) 
-.071 
(.528) 
.102 
(.365) 
.124 
(.268) 
-.074 
(.513) 
-.094 
(.411) 
-.051 
(.651) 
.203* 
(.075) 
Cue1001     1 .322* 
(.003) 
.339* 
(.002) 
.535* 
(.000) 
.251* 
(.024) 
-.081 
(.473) 
-.004 
(.973) 
-.122 
(.281) 
-.222* 
(.049) 
-.031 
(.784) 
.141 
(.218) 
Cue0110      1 .805* 
(.000) 
.566* 
(.000) 
.734* 
(.000) 
.078 
(.487) 
-.068 
(.545) 
.220* 
(.050) 
.170 
(.134) 
-.001 
(.992) 
-.036 
(.754) 
Cue0111       1 .553* 
(.000) 
.675* 
(.000) 
-.010 
(.931) 
-.114 
(.310) 
.227* 
(.043) 
.153 
(.178) 
-.025 
(.828) 
.111 
(.334) 
Cue1101        1 .650* 
(.000) 
-.023 
(.840) 
-.199* 
(.075) 
.099 
(.380) 
.054 
(.635) 
.056 
(.624) 
.021 
(.855) 
Cue1110         1 -.014 
(.899) 
-.104 
(.356) 
.157 
(.164) 
.188* 
(.097) 
.105 
(.352) 
-.037 
(.745) 
GenExp          1 .021 
(.856) 
.121 
(.285) 
.018 
(.875) 
-.329* 
(.003) 
-.037 
(.749) 
IndExp           1 -.135 
(.234) 
-.266* 
(.018) 
.265* 
(.017) 
-.147 
(.201) 
Wbr1            1 .883* 
(.000) 
-.144 
(.205) 
-.094 
(.414) 
Wbm1             1 -.120 
(.294) 
-.083 
(.477) 
feedback              1 .026 
(.825) 
Risk-av.               1 
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Table 5.9 results in the following observations: 
• In our analysis of Table 5.8, it was noted that general experience contributed to 
cue usage, but only when the variables ‘feedback’ and ‘risk-aversion’ were 
included in the regression model. From Table 5.9 it follows that none of the single 
cases significantly correlates with general experience.  
• In the regression model presented in Table 5.8, it was indicated that industry 
experience did not significantly contribute to cue usage. From the correlation matrix 
presented in Table 5.9, it follows that only in case 1101, a significant negative 
correlation of .199 is reported between industry experience and audit risk 
assessment. Case 1101 is a case where two business risks are present and one 
weak entity-level control. This may be caused by assessing the impact on audit risk 
of cue1 (“financial condition dramatically deteriorated”) lower compared to audit 
managers with less industry experience since this case shows the highest negative 
correlation compared to the cases 0100 (“strategic change”) and 0001 (“more 
specialized personnel”). A reason for this may be that auditors who are not 
experienced in a certain industry assess inherent risk in a specific industry higher 
(i.e., more conservative) compared to industry-specialized auditor’s (Taylor, 2000). 
This explanation is clearly not valid for all cases, where no significant correlations 
were reported.  
• Table 5.8 reports a significant contribution of task-specific experience to cue 
usage. In the correlation matrix, a significant positive correlation between task-
specific experience related to ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risks on 
audit risk’ and the cases 0100 and 0111. Both cases include only the business risk 
cue2 (“strategic change”). A potential reason for explanation of this finding is that 
cue1 (“financial condition dramatically deteriorated”) is classified as a generic 
business risk, which implies that this risk may apply to more than one financial 
statement account, or even to the financial statements as a whole. Task-specific 
experience, hence, may be helpful for assessing the impact of those cues on audit 
risk, which are clearly related to a single financial statement account.  
• With respect to task-specific experience related to ‘assessing the impact of client’s 
entity-level controls on audit risk’ a significant negative correlation has been 
reported related to case 1001, and a significant positive correlation has been 
reported related to case 1110. Auditors with more task-specific experience assess 
the impact of client’s business risk cue1 (“financial position dramatically 
deteriorated”) lower in case 1001 compared to auditors with less task-specific 
experience. Business risk cue1 (see previous bullet) is a generic business risk cue, 
and auditors with more task-specific experience may have allocated the impact of 
this business risk to more than one financial statement account. In addition, this 
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type of auditors is more experienced in assessing the impact of controls on audit 
risk, which may imply that they identified controls based on the case description 
which mitigated the impact of this risk. With respect to the other case (case 1110), 
the positive correlation between task-specific experience and impact on audit risk 
seems to be caused by assessing a lower audit risk-reducing impact of cue3 
(“increased project control”) in mitigating business risk cue2 (“strategic change”).  
• The regression model presented in Table 5.8 showed that risk-aversion did not 
significantly influence the impact on audit risk decision. When this decision is taken 
on a single case, the correlation matrix shows a positive impact of risk-aversion on 
the impact on audit risk assessment related to case0001. Overall auditors 
assessed a relatively low impact of this control cue (“more specialized personnel”) 
on audit risk (i.e., a cue weight of -.12). From the correlation matrix, it follows that 
more risk-averse auditors assess the impact of this single control on audit risk 
significant higher compared to less risk-averse auditors. A higher impact on audit 
risk implies that the control is deemed to be less effective in mitigating audit risk.  
 
None of the cases showed a significant correlation between case sequences (cases 
were distributed making use of three different case sequences) and the impact on audit 
risk decision. This provides some evidence that participants did not act differently 
because of fatigue or boredom and assessed each of single cases separately and 
consciously.  
 
5.5 Auditors’ self-insight with respect to assessing the impact of client 
business risks and entity-wide controls 
Having described the quality of auditors’ judgment performance in terms of stability, 
consensus and cue usage, this paragraph is concerned with another component of 
auditors’ judgment performance, namely the level of auditors’ self-insight. Self-insight 
has been conceptualized as “the extent to which a person acquires analytically-oriented 
knowledge about his or her own intuitive or quasi-rational cognitive processes” 
(Cooksey, 1995, p.97). The individual auditors’ self-insight has been computed as 
follows. First, derived from linear regression statistics, the auditors’ cue weights have 
been computed (standardized beta weights). These weights are called ‘objective’ 
weights. The ‘objective’ weights have been correlated with the auditors’ ‘subjective’ 
weights. These correlations represent the auditors’ self-insight. In order to compute 
subjective weights, participants in the experiment have been requested in the debriefing 
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questionnaire to distribute 100 points of weights they assumed having attached to each 
of the four cues. Finally, the objective weights have been recomputed to make them 
comparable to the subjective weights. This involved recalculation of each of the four 
regression weights to a 100-point basis. Table 5.10 provides an example of this 
recalculation: 
 
Table 5.10 Example of recalculating regression weights to objective weights 
 
 Regression weights Objective weights 
Cue 1 .25 25 
Cue 2 .25 25 
Cue 3 (.25) 25 
Cue 4 (.25) 25 
 - 100 
 
For audit managers, a mean level of self-insight of .69 has been reported. This level of 
self-insight is quite high as it has been measured over a sum of 15 case combinations.  
 
The following table provides an overview of the mean levels of self-insight across the 
various groups related the independent variables.  
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Table 5.11 Overview of mean levels of self-insight 
Panel A: The impact of general experience on the auditor’s self-insight 
 
Level of 
experience 
n Mean Standard 
deviation 
< 10 27 .75 .33 
>= 10 - < 15 32 .65 .45 
>= 15 22 .63 .45 
 
Panel B: The impact of industry specific experience on the auditors’ self-insight 
 
Hours n Mean Standard 
deviation 
0 28 .79 .21 
> 0 - < 250 13 .68 .45 
>= 250 - < 500 11 .61 .46 
>= 500 - < 1,000 14 .60 .45 
>= 1,000 16 .63 .55 
 
Panel C: The impact of task-specific experience (related to the task ‘assessing the impact 
of client’s business risks on audit risk) on the auditor’s self-insight 
 
Task-specific 
experience 
n Mean Standard 
deviation 
<5 15 .50 .58 
>= 5 - < 10 18 .70 .36 
>=10- < 15 30 .71 .39 
>=15 18 .79 .29 
 
Panel D: The impact of task-specific experience (related to the task ‘assessing the impact 
of client’s entity-level controls on audit risk) on the auditor’s self-insight 
 
Task-specific 
experience 
n Mean Standard 
deviation 
<5 16 .56 .58 
>= 5 - < 10 19 .75 .30 
>=10- < 15 26 .64 .43 
>=15 19 .78 .28 
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Table 5.11 (continued) Overview of mean levels of self-insight 
 
Panel E: The impact of the perceived level of feedback on the auditors’ self-
insight 
 
Level of feedback n Mean Standard 
deviation 
< 2,5 19 .65 .50 
>= 2,5 - < 5 13 .52 .53 
>= 5 - < 7.5 28 .71 .38 
>= 7.5 22 .79 .22 
 
Panel F: The impact of the level of risk-aversion on the auditors’ self-insight 
 
Risk-aversion n Mean Standard 
deviation 
<= 50% 25 .66 .47 
> 50% - <= 75% 27 .75 .31 
> 75% 28 .68 .38 
 
Panel G: The impact of case-sequence on the auditor’s self-insight 
 
 
Case-sequence n Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 30  .66 .41 
2 30 .73 .42 
3 23 .66 .41 
 
 
Based on Scheffé tests for multiple post-hoc comparisons, none of the group means 
across the various independent variables differed significantly and, hence, will not be 
further explained.  
 
  
   165
5.6 Does consensus imply accuracy in the study of auditors’ judgment 
performance under the business risk audit approach? 
An important objective of research in individual judgment and decision-making is the 
contribution to the improvement of the quality of the auditors’ judgments. In Chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis the quality of the auditors’ judgments has been measured in terms of 
accuracy (i.e., the level of conformity of the auditors’ judgments compared to the expert 
panel’s judgments) and consensus (i.e. the level of agreement among decision makers). 
While lack of consensus among a group of auditors implies that at least some of the 
auditors are not accurate, high consensus levels need not necessarily imply accurate 
judgments. In the context of ‘assessment decisions’ (as described in Chapter 5) 
accuracy, as measure of judgment performance is not feasible. Hence, it would be 
useful to know the empirical relationship between accuracy and consensus. Given the 
relatively high consensus levels (mean of .72 reported in Chapter 5), combined with the 
moderate accuracy levels (reported in Chapter 4), we would expect that there is no 
relationship between accuracy and consensus. Previous literature (e.g. Ashton, 1985), 
however, suggested that accuracy and consensus are highly positively associated to 
each other (a positive correlation of .84 was reported).  
 
This section first describes the way how both measures of judgment performance have 
been made comparable to each other. Subsequently, the correlations between accuracy 
and consensus will be reported and conclusions will be formulated directed to dealing 
with judgment performance measures in future research.  
Comparison of judgment performance measures Accuracy and Consensus 
The judgment performance measures ‘accuracy’ and ‘consensus’ each measures an 
aspect of judgment performance. To the accuracy measure, as computed in this thesis, 
there is an external criterion available. Accuracy has been defined as the conformity of 
the individual auditors’ judgments with the expert panel’s judgments. To ‘consensus’, on 
the other hand, no external criterion is available. Consensus measures the agreement 
between auditors. Judgment performance as measured by consensus, hence, is not 
related to individual auditors but to groups of auditors.  
 
In order to make both measures more comparable to each other, the accuracy measure 
has been changed from ‘individual performance measure’ to ‘paired performance 
measure’, based upon previous literature (Ashton, 1985). For each pair of auditors the 
 166 
mean level of accuracy has been computed resulting in 3.570 mean accuracy scores. 
These scores have been adjusted for non-normality, using the Fisher r to Z 
transformation (comparable to the computation of consensus). Finally, the pair-wise 
accuracy (adjusted for Fisher r to Z transformation) scores have been correlated with the 
Fisher r to Z transformed consensus scores. This procedure has been performed for all 
four accuracy-scores (1. factor accuracy with respect to the identification of client’s 
business risks; 2. weighting accuracy with respect to the identification of client’s 
business risks; 3. factor accuracy with respect to the identification of client’s entity-level 
internal controls and 4. weighting accuracy with respect to the identification of the 
client’s entity-level internal controls).  
Correlations between accuracy and consensus 
Table 5.12 presents the results of these correlations. 
 
Table 5.12 Pearson correlations between accuracy and consensus (2-tailed) 
 
 Accuracy1 Accuracy2 Accuracy3 Accuracy4 
Consensus auditors -.118 (.000)* -.023 
(.161) 
-.031 (.062)* -.023 (.173) 
Consensus students .114 (.117) -.074 
(.309) 
.201 (.005)* .105 (.150) 
 
With respect to auditors, all correlations between consensus and accuracy are (slightly) 
negative. This result contrasts with findings in previous literature (Ashton, 1985). As far 
as I am aware, Ashton’s research related to the relationship between accuracy and 
consensus has never been replicated although related studies (e.g., Bonner, 1990) have 
been reported. Bonner (1990) examined both a cue selection task (judgment 
performance measured in terms of accuracy) and a cue assessment task (judgment 
performance measured in terms of consensus). This study, however, does not 
statistically compare the findings related to the accuracy and consensus measures. 
Other researchers (e.g. Shanteau, 1984) had the view that experts disagree with each 
other by nature, concluding that consensus as such can by no means be a measure of 
judgment performance. The findings presented in Table 5.12 deviate substantially from 
Ashton’s (1985) findings. Table 5.12 suggests that high consensus levels in general are 
not associated with higher accuracy levels. Only for accuracy3 and accuracy4 in the 
student population, (slightly) positive correlations are reported. In my view, the relatively 
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low correlation levels imply that identification tasks and assessment tasks fundamentally 
differ from each other and are accompanied with different auditors’ judgment biases41. In 
the identification task, the auditors’ activities involve recall from prior experience and 
search for relevant information. Assessment tasks assume that relevant cues have 
already been identified and the information deemed relevant is processed into an 
assessment decision. The difference of the nature of the identification task and the 
assessment task is also clear from a decision aid perspective. Should the tasks be 
similar to each other, one could assume that judgment performance will increase with 
help of the same decision aids. In audit practice, however, identification tasks are, e.g., 
performed with use of (general or industry-specific) risk templates and team brainstorm-
sessions, whereas judgment in a assessment task is primarily based upon experience 
(e.g. general experience in the auditing field, engagement-specific experience, task-
specific experience, industry-specific experience, etc.)42. We, hence, argue that auditors 
having identified the wrong or less relevant risk factors, probably an ineffective audit 
approach will result. Also, the opposite might be true. E.g., relatively high accuracy 
levels are not accompanied with high consensus levels.  
 
 
                                                 
41
 E.g. Conlisk (1996) mentions amongst other limits on human unbounded rationality: the ignorance of 
relevant information (e.g. in the identification of client’s business risk) and the use of irrelevant information 
(e.g. in assessing the impact of client’s business risks on audit risk). 
42
 Conlisk (1996) provides a meta-analysis of studies with mixed evidence related to the concept of 
bounded rationality. According to Conlisk there are a lot of researchers who do not question whether 
people are unboundedly rational. The question is whether they act approximately as if unboundedly 
rational. “Though people’s rationality is bounded they learn optima through practice, in the end acting as if 
unboundedly rational”. “People can learn from experience, suggesting how people come to act “as if” 
smarter than they are. However, the learning logic cuts both ways. Learning is promoted by favorable 
conditions such as rewards, repeated opportunities for practice, small deliberation cost at each repetition, 
good feedback, unchanging circumstances, and a simple context. Conversely, learning is hindered or 
blocked by the opposite conditions.” In the context of this thesis, the relationship between general 
experience and feedback, on the one hand, and judgment performance, on the other hand, has been 
examined. The evidence presented suggests that general experience is not positively associated with 
judgment performance (in terms of accuracy and consensus) and that the level of feedback is positively 
associated with consensus, however, not with accuracy. From this study follows, hence, that the learning 
argument is partially favorably supported by feedback mechanisms (partially, because positive feedback 
effects were only found in an assessment task, not in the identification tasks). 
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Future research directed to accuracy / consensus 
As stated in the previous section, researchers disagree about the appropriateness of the 
consensus measure in measuring the auditors’ judgment performance. The results 
presented in this thesis also give rise to question the applicability of a consensus 
measure in judgment/decision-making research. From a practical point of view, 
however, there is a call for more transparency in audit files. Recently (2004), as a result 
of public scrutiny related to the quality of financial statements audits, the PCAOB issued 
new guidance with respect to the content of audit working papers. Independent 
reviewers, having reviewed the audit documentation, must reach the same conclusion 
as the preparer (or the audit team) has formulated. Audit firms more and more recognize 
the need for team sessions resulting in more uniformity and unity of audit conclusions. 
Additionally, the technical offices of the Big4 audit firms have changed the status of the 
technical office. Auditors, requesting consult from their technical office, are no longer 
free in their choice whether or not to agree with the conclusions formulated by the 
technical office. Technical offices have become directive instead of only consulting and 
sparring. Hence, the audit practice calls for more consensus in audit 
judgments/decisions. It might be expected that, from this perspective, the consensus 
measure might evolve from a ‘confusing’ measure to a ‘standard’ measure during time. 
 
From a methodological perspective, both the accuracy measure and the consensus 
measure have their distinct advantages and disadvantages. E.g., the consensus 
measure lacks an external (validation) criterion; i.e., group judgments represent the best 
available solution. From the start of their career, however, auditors start becoming 
experienced and framed by the engagement-specific issues they experience although 
becoming experienced also contributes to improved auditor performance. In the real 
world, group audit judgments are not readily available as reference material to the 
individual auditor. In the audit practice, the circumstance that groups of auditors who 
actually decide on the same case-setting is rare. Making use of consensus measure in 
auditing research, hence, is not in conformity with the real auditors’ world. However, the 
same “real world” is highly complex. Case-settings in auditing research are often 
simplified representations of this complex world. Indeed, the choice of (simplified) case-
setting can be motivated by the phenomenon of ‘bounded rationality’ (which implies that 
even the auditors’ professional judgment is accompanied with framing effects and sub-
optimality), but a perfect external criterion which should be favorable to making use of 
accuracy measures is also not readily available or not available at all. There is at least 
one criterion that can be used to increase internal and external validation. This refers to 
actual (material) errors in the financial statements. Recently, some evidence has 
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become available of the relationship between the predictive value of audit risk 
assessments to financial statement errors. In my view, auditing research would improve 
making use of a combination of accuracy and consensus measures.  
Recently, the first research studies regarding the auditors’ judgments using the 
business-risk audit approach have been published and more studies on this topic can be 
expected. Audit researchers have become acquainted to the use of accuracy measures 
and consensus measures (although they are not often combined in a single study) in 
examining the traditional audit-risk based audit approaches. Longitudinal research, 
including a comparison of the traditional and modern audit approaches, should include 
both judgment performance measures.  
 
5.7 Summary of empirical results related to the auditors’ ‘assessing the impact 
of client’s business risks and entity-wide controls on audit risk’ 
Chapter 5 has described the empirical results related to the auditors’ judgment 
performance in the task ‘assessing the impact of client’s business risks and entity-wide 
controls on audit risk’. Judgment performance has been measured in terms of judgment 
stability, consensus, cue usage and self-insight.  
For audit managers an overall judgment stability has been reported of .93 (auditing 
students .96) which obviously is a high judgment stability. A significant positive 
correlation between stability and task-specific experience has been reported as well as a 
significant positive correlation between stability and the perceived level of feedback 
when conducting risk assessments. No significant correlation was found between 
stability and the auditor’s risk-aversion. 
For audit managers an overall judgment consensus of .72 (auditing students .64) has 
been reported, which, given the relative novelty of the task investigated, is reasonably 
high. Groups with higher levels of general experience in the auditing field showed a 
significantly lower judgment consensus compared to groups with lower levels of general 
experience (.75 versus .70). Regarding the impact of industry-specific experience, it was 
found that the group of audit managers with highest industry-specific experience (>= 
1,000 hours of industry-specific experience) showed the lowest judgment consensus 
(.59), whereas the middle group of audit managers (between 250 and 500 hours of 
industry-specific experience) showed the highest judgment consensus (.78). On the 
other hand, it has been described that audit managers with the highest level of task-
specific experience report the highest judgment consensus (.77) compared to groups 
with lower task-specific experience. Additionally, the group of audit managers with the 
 170 
lowest level of perceived feedback showed the lowest judgment consensus (.68 and .66 
respectively). Also it was found that the group of audit managers with the highest level of 
risk-aversion reported the lowest judgment consensus (.64). The reported direction 
(positive/negative) of the impact of industry-specific experience on judgment consensus 
was contrary to the direction as hypothesized. On the other hand, the direction of the 
impact of general experience, task-specific experience, and the perceived level of 
feedback on judgment consensus supported the direction as hypothesized. 
Audit managers and auditing students particularly differed in their assessment of the cue 
weight related to the client’s business risk ‘strategic change: from normal homes to 
luxury villas’. Based on a linear regression model it was reported that the auditor’s cue 
usage was particularly influenced by task-specific experience. In this model ‘general 
experience’ also significantly contributed to the auditor’s cue usage, but this was mainly 
found to be present due to interaction effects with ‘feedback’ and ‘risk-aversion’. This 
finding was corroborated by correlation analyses at individual case level. For individual 
cases, industry-specific experience significantly correlated (-.199) with case 1101 
(where two client’s business risks and one entity-level control was present). This 
significant correlation was particularly influenced by relatively lower impact assessments 
on cue 1 (financial condition significantly deteriorated) for more (industry-specific) 
experienced auditors. Task-specific experience significantly correlated with audit risk 
impact assessments in two cases: case0100 and case0111. These assessments were 
particularly influenced by higher impact on audit risk assessments for cue 2 (strategic 
change from normal homes to luxury villas). Finally, a significant negative correlation 
was found between the level of risk-aversion and the impact on audit risk assessment 
for case0001.  
Audit managers overall reported a level of self-insight, measuring the correlation 
between objective and subjective cue weights, of .69 which is, given the relative novelty 
of the task content, reasonably high. Related to the impact of the independent variables 
on self-insight, no significant differences were reported across the distinguished sub-
groups. 
Finally, Chapter 5 investigated the coherence of the judgment performance measures 
‘accuracy’ (Chapter 4) and ‘consensus’ (Chapter 5). A significant negative correlation 
was found between consensus on the one hand and accuracy1 (related to the 
identification of client’s business risks) and accuracy3 (related to the identification of 
client’s entity-wide controls) on the other hand.  
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6 Discussion 
This final chapter contains a discussion of the research design used in this thesis and 
provides an overview of the findings related to the research questions and hypotheses. 
The main theme examined in this thesis relates to the auditor’s judgment performance in 
conducting some specific tasks of the Business Risk Audit is associated. From this main 
theme, the following research questions were developed: 
• Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s level of 
experience, and if so to what extent? Three categories of experience were 
distinguished: general experience, industry-specific experience and task-specific 
experience. 
• Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s perceived level 
of feedback, and if so to what extent? 
• Is the auditor’s judgment performance associated with the auditor’s level of risk-
aversion, and if so to what extent? 
 
6.1 Research design 
6.1.1 Summary of research design 
The research instrument was based on two pillars: (1) a research questionnaire 
(including a case-description of a company in the Construction industry and a debriefing 
questionnaire) and (2) an expert panel. The expert panel consisted of industry leaders of 
the Big 4 audit firms. The questionnaire consisted of two experiments: (1) an experiment 
related to the identification of client’s business risks and client’s entity-level controls, (2) 
an experiment related to the assessment of the impact of these risks and controls on 
audit risk. In other words, the two experiments reflected two specific tasks of the 
Business Risk Audit. For each of these experiments, the auditor’s judgment 
performance was assessed related to the independent variables. In this regards, making 
use of an expert panel had a twofold functionality: (a) selection of cues used in the 
second experiment, and even more important (b) the response of the expert panel 
members were used as a benchmark in order to measure the auditor’s judgment 
performance with respect to the first experiment. A discussion of the findings resulting 
from this empirical study will be provided in the next section. These results are 
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particularly of interest to the auditing profession, since all Big4 audit firms participated in 
the experiments.  
 
6.2 Research findings 
6.2.1 Judgment performance and experience 
An important finding of this empirical study relates to the “expertise paradigm”. Prior 
research has produced mixed results regarding the impact of general experience on the 
auditor’s judgment performance. From approximately 1990 onwards, other research 
studies refined experience into general experience, task-specific experience and 
industry-specific experience, but none of these studies incorporated all three categories 
of experience. This thesis examined the individual impact of the three categories of 
experience on judgment performance as well as their interactions.  
 
In Chapter 4 it was reported – related to the tasks ‘identification of client’s business risks 
and entity-level controls’ - that overall: 
• General experience is not associated with the auditor’s judgment performance; 
• Industry-specific experience is positively associated with the auditor’s judgment 
performance. Further analysis reveals that for the group of auditors with a level of 
industry-specific experience of between 0 and 1,000 hours (over three years) of 
industry-specific experience, industry-specific experience positively contributes to 
judgment performance and for respondents with more than 1,000 hours of industry-
specific experience industry-specific experience is negatively associated with the 
auditor’s judgment performance. 
• Contrary to our expectations, task-specific experience is negatively associated with 
judgment performance.  
 
These findings present the impact of single independent variables on the auditor’s 
judgment performance. In a linear regression model, which incorporated all independent 
variables, it was reported that industry-specific experience is significantly associated 
with judgment performance, and general experience and task-specific experience are 
not significantly associated with the auditor’s judgment performance.  
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In Chapter 5, which described the findings related to the task ‘assessment of the impact 
of client’s business risks and entity-level controls on audit risk’, the following findings 
were reported: 
• General experience shows some positive impact on the auditor’s judgment 
performance; 
• The relationship between industry-specific experience and judgment performance 
shows two peaks, namely for the group of auditors with no industry-specific 
experience and for the group of auditors with between 250 and 1,000 hours of 
industry-specific experience. The figure also shows two dips, namely for the group 
of auditors with between zero and 250 hours of industry-specific experience and for 
the group of auditors with more than 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience. 
The first peak may be explained by the absence of client-specific experience. The 
presence of client-specific experience can result in more biased judgment- and 
decision-making.  
• Task-specific experience is positively associated with the auditor’s judgment 
performance.  
 
 
 
General experience and judgment performance 
From this empirical study, it follows that general experience in the auditing field does not 
(see Chapter 4) contribute or contributes to a limited extent (see Chapter 5) to the 
auditor’s judgment performance. This result is in accordance with our expectations, 
based on prior research. In an overview article, Trotman (1998) reported that prior 
studies on the impact of general experience on the auditor’s judgment performance 
reported mixed results, i.e. both positive impact and negative impact were reported. A 
more recently conducted study related to the identification of risk factors task (Bedard 
and Graham, 2002), reported that general experience did not contribute to the auditor’s 
judgment performance. It is argued in the current empirical study that the findings from 
the conducted experiments can be explained by the fact that an increase in auditors’ 
general experience is accompanied by an increase in engagement-specific experience. 
Underlying this argument is the assumption that individual auditor’s learning curves are 
at least to some extent unique and auditor’s judgments may deviate from auditors’ 
average judgments in comparable circumstances. As such, the findings suggest that 
general experience is not a good predictor of improved judgment performance.  
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Industry-specific experience and judgment performance 
The empirical findings of this study revealed that industry-specific experience is 
positively associated with judgment performance both in an identification task and an 
assessment task. However, concerning the identification task, it was also reported that 
the positive association was related to respondents with industry-specific experience 
upwards to 1,000 hours of industry-specific experience over three years. From the level 
of 1,000 hours and higher, judgment performance tended to decline. An absolute 
number of 1,000 hours in general is quite low, since this equals 300 hours spend on 
industry-specific engagements on an annual basis, approximately one fifth of total 
productive hours on an annual basis. This implies that auditor with this level of industry-
specific experience serve other industries for most of their available working period. It 
was argued that this level of industry-specific experience typically is caused by the type 
of industry. Auditors working in more regulated industries – like, e.g. the industries 
healthcare and financial services – regularly spend approximately 1,000 hours on an 
annual basis on industry-specific audit clients. Audit firms need to carefully consider the 
assignment of industry-specialized auditors to specific audit tasks. It may well be the 
case that auditors become less accurate and skeptical when spending too many hours 
on specific industries. Given the novelty of the Business Risk audit approach, prior 
research studies with which this empirical study directly can be compared, are not 
available. Prior research studies (e.g., Taylor 2001, Solomon et al., 1999) directed 
towards the impact of industry-specific experience on judgment performance related to 
other audit tasks, reported a positive impact. The results reported in this empirical study 
deviate from prior research in this field in the sense that the auditor’s judgment 
performance tends to increase up to some level of industry-specific experience, and 
tends to decline from this level of industry-specific experience. 
 
 
 
Task-specific experience and judgment performance 
The results of this empirical study showed contrary outcomes when comparing judgment 
performance in identification tasks and judgment performance in an assessment task. 
For identification tasks a negative association was found between task-specific 
experience and judgment performance, where more experienced groups of auditors 
performed better in an assessment task. Regarding the identification tasks these results 
are contrary to prior research, and regarding the assessment task these results are in 
accordance with prior research (Bonner 1990; Bonner and Lewis, 1990). A potential 
explanation may be that for identification tasks auditors ‘suffer’ from client-specific 
experiences. This threat is more applicable to identification tasks compared to 
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assessment tasks. In an identification task, auditors need to search for the most relevant 
information inputs in a variety of knowledge databases, and consider comparable 
circumstances they experienced with other clients. What may constitute a significant 
business risk for one audit client may not be a significant business risk for another audit 
client. In other words, experienced auditor’s judgments may be biased by experiences 
with other clients. This bias is less prominent in assessment tasks, where the number of 
cues regularly is low. In addition, with assessment tasks the decision output is only a 
number or a risk-classification (low, medium, high). The variety of outputs is, hence, 
lower compared to identification tasks. A potential way of mitigating the auditor’s 
judgment bias in identification tasks is to make use of generally applicable industry-
specific templates of business risks and controls. This may be complemented with 
group-decision-making procedures instead of individual decision-making procedures, for 
example team-planning events before the audit starts.  
6.2.2 Judgment performance and feedback 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Libby and Trotman, 1993; Ashton, 1990) we would 
have expected that feedback would contribute positively to the auditor’s judgment 
performance. No significant results have been reported with respect to the identification 
tasks. Regarding the assessment task, judgment performance significantly increased 
with an increase in the perceived level of feedback except for the group with the highest 
level of perceived feedback (this group shows a slight decrease of .76 to .72). As a 
whole, our expectation with respect to the direction (positive) of the association was 
supported. It is, hence, suggested that feedback is a good mechanism for improving 
judgment performance. This result is somewhat surprising given the relatively low mean 
levels of feedback for audit managers (on a scale of 0 to 10 – sometimes to often – a 
mean level of feedback of 5.3 was reported). Generally, audit firms are strongly 
recommended to embed to a higher extent providing feedback in the audit process. US 
auditing standards (e.g., PCAOB AS2 and PCAOB AS3, 2004), require adequate 
supervision and review process during the audit from an audit quality perspective. So, 
feedback or review is important for all audit firms, but for Big4 – serving particularly 
SEC-clients – audit firms in particular. In the Dutch auditing profession, the importance 
of external file reviews (e.g., by AFM and CTK) tends to increase. In addition, the 
regulatory environment in the auditing profession is expected to change significantly with 
WTA (“Wet Toezicht Accountantskantoren”). Tan (1995) reported that announced 
reviews, as an ultimate type of (external) feedback, would positively contribute to the 
auditor’s judgment performance as measured by consensus and self-insight. This 
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stresses the importance of both internal feedback (as an audit firm’s control device) and 
the sufficiency of audit documentation.  
6.2.3 Judgment performance and risk-aversion 
In this empirical study, two identification tasks and an assessment task from the 
business risk audit approach were selected for the research design. These three tasks 
share the concept of risk: (business) risk identification, (business) risk mitigation, and 
(audit) risk assessment. As a final independent variable, the concept of general risk-
aversion was included. Risk-aversion, in this thesis, is related to a more general attitude 
towards risk, which every single individual faces in day-to-day circumstances. Risk-
aversion has been measured as the percentage of assurance a respondent needs when 
selecting an uncertain chance to win an amount compared to a fully certain event of 
winning a (lower) amount. The concept of risk-aversion does not have a relationship with 
the nature of business risks or the nature of entity-level controls. Hence, the association 
of judgment performance with risk-aversion was not examined for the identification 
tasks. For the assessment task, the related hypothesis expected that respondents, who 
are more risk-averse, make decisions moving away from the average decision outcome, 
which implies a lower level of consensus. The statistical results supported our 
expectations. In order to keep audit quality at a high level, a high level of judgment 
performance (as measured by consensus) is necessary to audit firms. Based on these 
research findings, it is suggested that audit firms need to be aware of the fact that 
auditors in conducting audit tasks have different general risk perceptions. These general 
risk perceptions potentially result in different audit risk assessments. Audit firms are 
recommended to develop criteria related to audit risk assessments. This may be 
realized by developing a knowledge database incorporating audit risk assessments from 
existing audit engagements including references to the specific audit environment in 
terms of business risk factors, inherent risk factors and control risk factors.  
 
6.3 Judgment performance and the ‘Business Risk audit approach’ 
This empirical study was directed towards the examination of judgment performance in 
two important audit tasks for which the ‘business risk audit approach’ differs from the 
more traditional ‘audit risk based audit approach’. The following two sub-sections 
discuss the auditors’ judgment performance related to these tasks. 
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6.3.1 Identification tasks 
Client’s business risks 
Related to the ‘identification of client’s business risks task’ Table 4.1 reports a mean 
judgment performance of 2.5 (accuracy 1). Accuracy 1 measures the number of client’s 
business risks identified by auditors which match with the expert panel’s list of business 
risks. Compared to the optimum of 5.0, Table 4.1 suggests that substantial room for 
improvement of judgment performance is left. In addition to the independent variables 
examined in this empirical study, the relative novelty of the task, the task complexity, 
and the impact of client-specific experiences are potential reasons for the relatively low 
average judgment performance. Audit firms may consider designing decision-aids which 
guide the auditor’s judgment- and decision-making processes. Industry-specific 
knowledge databases in general and templates of industry-wide significant business 
risks in particular are an example of decision-aids.  
 
Client’s entity-level controls 
Related to the ‘identification of client’s entity-level controls task’ Table 4.1 reports a 
mean judgment performance of 3.68 (accuracy 3). Accuracy 3 measures the number of 
client’s entity-level controls identified by auditors matching with the expert panel’s list of 
entity-level controls. Compared to the mean auditor’s judgment performance in the 
‘identification of client’s business risk task’, the auditor’s judgment performance for this 
task is substantially higher. It can be argued that auditors the identification of controls is 
less novel to auditors compared to the identification of controls since auditors get 
experienced in this area in an early stage in the auditing education. In addition, the 
client’s system of internal controls is probably more stable when compared to the 
dynamics of the risk environment. Auditors can, however, still realize improvement in 
judgment performance. The use of decision aids and team-wide discussions on the 
client’s system of controls may be helpful in realizing gains in judgment performance. 
6.3.2 Assessment task 
The audit risk assessment task is – compared to the identification tasks – less complex 
and probably less novel since the decision output is the same, namely an audit risk 
decision. The audit risk model is also used in the more traditional audit approaches. It is 
therefore not surprising that the mean levels of judgment performance are in conformity 
with prior research related to the audit risk model judgments (e.g., Ashton, 1973). This 
empirical study reports a mean level of consensus of .72. An observation from this 
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study, see Table 4.3, is that auditors’ level of feedback related to audit risk decisions is 
relatively low. A mean level of feedback of 5.27 is reported, measured on a scale from 0 
(never), to 10 (always) is reported. Additional analysis, see Table 5.5, shows that 
judgment generally increases with an increase in feedback. It is, hence, suggested that 
audit firms would consider providing more feedback to auditors when making audit risk 
assessment decisions.  
6.4 Limitations of this empirical study 
The research findings – discussed in the previous section – should be viewed taking into 
account the limitations which are present in this empirical study.  
Identification tasks 
The focal point of this study is the auditors’ judgment performance. The auditors’ 
judgment performance is measured for the business risks- and entity-level controls 
identification task by the variable Accuracy. Accuracy is measured by comparing the 
participants’ judgments with judgments of an expert panel. Other empirical studies make 
use of experiments in which an optimum judgment is calculated which serves as a 
benchmark for calculating the level of professional judgments of other experiment 
participants. For example, in experiments where judgment performance is measured by 
the number of risks or controls identified. In the current empirical study, it was not 
possible to make use of this measure of judgment performance, since the number of 
risks and controls to be identified was limited to a maximum of five risks and controls. 
I.e. the number of identified risks and controls does not tell us to what extent an auditor 
shows a high or a low level of judgment performance. Instead, the quality of the 
identified risks and controls was measured by making use of an external benchmark, 
namely the expert panel judgments.  
 
Another limitation of this study is related to the previous one. The questionnaire, used in 
the expert panel meeting, provided the experts initially with a response format in which 
the four experts were requested to individually identify the five business risks deemed 
most important to the case-setting. This procedure resulted in a list of fifteen business 
risks. For these fifteen business risks the experts were asked to allocate 100 points of 
importance to each of these fifteen business risks. The participants in the experiment on 
the other hand have been asked to identify a maximum of five most important business 
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risks. The (weighting) accuracy-scores of participants were calculated by comparing the 
participants’ allocation of 100 points to five business risks to the expert panel’s allocation 
of 100 points to fifteen business risks. This implied that a skewed distribution would 
have resulted when the (weighting) accuracy would have been calculated by rewarding 
the participant with the expert panel points (out of 100) for each of the identified 
business risks identified by the participant that matched with a business risk identified by 
the expert panel. To (partially) mitigate this measurement issue, I have decided to 
measure (weighting) Accuracy by multiplying the participant’s importance points with the 
respective expert panel’s importance points for matching business risks. With hind-sight, 
it can be stated that the procedure chosen in this empirical study turned out to be more 
complex than necessary. For future research it is recommended to design exactly the 
same procedure for expert panel and experiment. This may be realized by requesting 
the individual expert panelists to apply rankings (1-5) to the total list of risks identified by 
the expert panel. After this step, the researcher is able to derive a list of five risks which 
are the most important from the expert panel perspective. A subsequent procedure for 
the expert panelists may be to individually allocate 100 points to these five risks. The 
means of allocated points may serve as an appropriate benchmark to which the 
experiment participants may be related. In this example design, it is assumed that the 
experiment design procedures remain unchanged compared to the one used in the 
current empirical study. 
Assessment task 
The second experiment was concerned with the auditors’ judgment performance in an 
audit risk assessment task. The research design was based on the so-called Lens 
model, which is regularly used in judgment and decision-making studies across a variety 
of disciplines. An explicit choice in designing this kind of experiments is concerned with 
the number of cues to incorporate in the experiment. From prior research in the 
cognitive psychology discipline, it is known that the number of cues individuals can 
effectively incorporate in their judgment and decision-making is very limited. This was 
used as a basic argument to select a number of only four cues for the experiment in this 
empirical study which resulted in a 24 factorial design or in fifteen cases. These fifteen 
cases were presented to all participants in the experiment. In order to investigate the 
potential risk of participant’s fatigue or boredom, the questionnaires were distributed 
making use of three different sequences of cue combinations. The empirical results 
showed that – to a limited extent – case sequence had impact on the level of 
consensus, average consensus across three groups of participants ranging from .70 to 
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.73. This suggests that participants indeed may have experienced that the questionnaire 
in this format was too long, although this argument was never put forward by 
participants in the debriefing questionnaire. I have assumed that positive and negative 
deviations due to the various case sequences have compensated each other, based on 
the argument that the two basic case sequence materials were entirely opposite to each 
other: the first case sequence starting with a case in which all cues were present and 
the second case sequence starting with a case in which only one cue was present. 
Future research studies may take into consideration the lengthiness of the questionnaire 
and the number of cues to be included in the experiment.  
6.5 Opportunities for future research 
Research design 
The selected research design turned out to be both an efficient way of gathering data 
and an effective way in studying the research questions of this thesis. In addition, 
including an expert panel of industry leaders in the research design contributed in my 
view to existing research methodologies when studying the potential effect of the 
auditor’s level of industry-expertise. This suggests that in future research the selection of 
expert panel members needs to carefully consider the extent to which this selection 
comes close to the definition of expert judgments. Experts need to be individuals which 
obviously show the highest possible level of judgment performance. Future research 
studies may be directed towards categorization of audit tasks of the Business Risk 
Audit, for example like Abdolmohammadi, 1999) including the (functional) levels of 
auditors who conduct these tasks. Based upon such a categorization, future research 
may be able to more properly select: (1) the target population of auditors, and (2) the 
composition of an expert panel, specifically when examining the effect of task-specific 
experience on the auditor’s judgment performance.  
 
Further improvements in research design may be achieved when the research design 
makes use of actual client settings, instead of a hypothetical case description. 
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Research findings 
Implications for “expertise paradigm”  
As mentioned, this study is the first empirical study incorporating three categories of 
experience. By integrating these categories into one study and examining the impact of 
experience on two different audit tasks in a new research field (i.e., the business risk 
audit), new research knowledge originated from this study. For example, the finding that 
only industry-specific experience explains the quality of the auditors’ judgments (to a 
certain extent) in an identification task, where general experience and task-specific 
experience are not associated with the auditor’s judgment performance. In other words, 
both the nature and the size of experience influence the quality of the auditor’s 
judgments. Future empirical studies have many opportunities to extend this research 
area. For example, other studies may examine the auditor’s judgment performance 
when conducting other audit tasks of the business risk audit approach (e.g., assessing 
the implications of identified business risks to actual working programs and substantive 
testing). Additionally, future empirical studies may further examine the skills and 
knowledge related to each category of experience. E.g., in this thesis industry-specific 
experience has been examined as a measure of expertise related to audit tasks, but it 
may well be the case that the objective of audit firm’s industry-specialization is also 
driven by other factors like marketing arguments, fee improvements, etc. Consider for 
example the marketing argument. Audit firms may want to show their industry 
knowledge to existing and potential audit clients. The question in this regard is what this 
industry knowledge really consists of. Is this knowledge related to competitor 
performance in the industry, market positioning of the client, identification of potential 
differences in accounting treatment of industry-specific financial statement accounts, 
etc. This type of research may yield more insight into the relationship between industry-
specific experience and judgment performance in specific audit tasks, e.g. the task 
‘high-level review of financial statements including disclosures’).  
 
This empirical study revealed that – regarding the identification tasks – industry-specific 
experience contributed to the auditor’s judgment performance where general experience 
and task-specific experience did not contribute to the auditor’s judgment performance. 
Industry-specific experience in this empirical study related to the construction industry. 
Organization along service lines, at least for Big4 audit firms, is still at hand. It would be 
of interest to investigate in future research whether and to what extent the results of this 
study can be generalized to other industries.  
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Appendix A: Research materials expert panel meeting (2003) 
Introduction 
Before the expert panel took place in 2003, the expert panelists received a confirmation 
letter of their attendance at the expert panel meeting. The meeting started with a short 
introduction by the researcher on the primary objectives of the meeting. Thereafter, they 
were provided with a case-description of a hypothetical audit client in the construction 
industry.  
 
Case-description 
Case introduction 
Since ten years you have been engaged to the financial statement audit of construction 
company ABC. Currently, it is April 1, 2002. In the near future, the interim (process) 
audit will start and now you are preparing this audit by considering the most important 
points of attention relevant to the audit. Until now, you have conducted a systems-based 
audit approach, based upon risk assessments. You have always been able to provide 
an unqualified audit opinion, without notable discussion issues in the discussion meeting 
with client management. As a result, you have always delivered a short-sized 
management letter. 
 
Organization chart of construction company ABC 
Construction company ABC B.V. is a medium-sized construction company, with 
operations in the centre of The Netherlands, and executes primarily regular projects in 
the segments ‘civil constructions’ and ‘commercial/industrial buildings’. In 2001 revenues 
were generated of approximately € 50 million with a positive net result of € 1 million 
(2%). In recent years, both revenues and net result were consolidated at the current 
levels. Construction company ABC has organized the firm as follows: 
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ORGANIZATION CHART CONSTRUCTION COMPANY ABC 
 
 
 
Objectives and strategy of the company 
Construction company ABC B.V. was founded 40 years ago by the father of the current 
general director. Since then, the company has gradually expanded to her current size. 
Formalized objectives and strategies have never been put on paper. At local billboards 
the company regularly advertised with the slogan ‘ABC aims for the lowest costs’. The 
founder’s device was always: ‘we perform those activities where we have always 
excelled in’. The commercial director regularly gets into contact with the five most 
important principals in the region.  
 
Management (general director; 
commercial director) 
Human Resources (1 employee) 
Engineering (5 employees) 
Technical Department (45 
employees) 
Finance administration (3 employees) 
ICT department (1 employee) 
Calculation, Purchase, Project 
planning (5 employees) 
Project control (4 employees) 
Maintenance department (5 
employees) 
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Projects 
Projects are characterized by serial production. Projects are regularly executed with 
fixed fee contracts. The duration of the projects is two years at a maximum.  
 
Processes 
Having received a request for proposal the Calculation department prepares the 
calculation, which is based on the project specifications. This calculation takes into 
account a premium of 1% with respect to general risks (this percentage is based on 
experience). After being engaged by the principal the calculations are further specified, 
the project is planned, a project-number is opened in the project-administration and the 
contract is prepared.  
 
Based on the detailed project forecast the Purchase Department enters into contracts 
with suppliers (materials) and with sub-contractors. 
 
The forecasted and realized costs and revenues are recorded in the project-
administration which is part of the finance administration. The costs include direct labor 
hours and all directly attributable travel and accommodation expenses of the employees 
(base don weekly timesheets). Recorded hour rates are task- and function dependent 
and are based on the yearly forecasts of the company. All materials used are recorded 
on specific project-engagement numbers by employees of the finance department. 
 
Deviations of original contract 
Contract-variations are executed after oral assignment by the principal. Only in cases 
where the contract-deviations are substantial a new project-forecast is prepared. 
Because of his frequent contacts with the principal and project-managers the general 
director is rapidly informed on specific developments regarding the projects in execution. 
 
Project funding 
Results realized in the past have annually been passed to private accounts of the 
company’s founder. From the time of the sale of the company from the founder to his 
son some years ago, the current general director has aimed to raise the company’s 
capital to a required minimum level. As can be seen from the Appendix (financial 
information) this objective has reasonably been realized in the meantime.  
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Safety and environmental issues 
Construction company ABC strives for good working condition regarding her employees 
and complies with all relevant rules and regulations with respect healthiness, safety and 
environmental conditions. Illness percentages are low and in recent years no specific 
accidents occurred.  
 
ICT 
The level of computerization is low.  
 
Management information 
Periodically a financial overview per project is being composed based on calculations, 
receipts of goods received, time-sheets and production reports. The financial overview 
contains a comparison between forecasted and realized costs per project phase (which 
takes into account the contract deviations) and also shows the invoiced installments. In 
addition, the general director periodically receives an overview of the realized general 
costs (compared to the budgeted costs). The general director only consults the manager 
of the Finance department only in case this overview shows striking deviations between 
forecast and realization. The commercial director himself is responsible for regularly 
contacting the principals and regularly visits projects in execution. 
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Financial information construction company ABC B.V. 
Balance sheet as at December 31
(* € 1,000)
Fixed assets
Tangible fixed assets 500 500
Current assets
Equipment 400 350
Work in Progress 10,000 8,300
Trade receivables 100 100
Other current assets 50 250
10,550 9,000
Cash and cash equivalents 450 500
Total assets 11,500 10,000
Equity 8,000 7,000
Provisions 1,500 1,500
Long-term liabilities 1,000 900
Current liabilities 1,000 600
Total liabilities 11,500 10,000
December 31, 2001
Forecast December 31,
2002
 
Profit and loss
(* € 1,000)
Forecast 2002 2001 2002 2001
€ € % %
Revenues
Net revenues 48,000 48,900 96.00% 97.80%
Change WIP 1,700 1,000 3.40% 2.00%
Other revenues 300 100 0.60% 0.20%
50,000 50,000 100.00% 100.00%
Costs
Costs of materials 41,000 41,210 82.00% 82.40%
Salaries 3,940 3,700 7.90% 7.40%
Depreciation fixed assets 100 100 0.20% 0.20%
Other costs 3,360 3,400 6.70% 6.80%
48,400 48,410 96.80% 96.80%
1,600 1,590 3.20% 3.20%
Financing expenses -60 -50 -0.10% -0.10%
Pre-tax income 1,540 1,540 3.10% 3.10%
Tax -540 -540 -1.10% -1.10%
Net result 1,000 1,000 2.00% 2.00%
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Task 1 Identification of client’s business risks  
Definition business risk: A business risks is a risk that threatens the realization of the 
company’s strategy/objectives.  
 
Task: Identify based on the case-description the most important client’s 
business risks (maximum of five) which are relevant to the audit of 
the financial statement account Work in Progress. Please, be as 
specific as possible. 
  
 Explanation: 
 Amongst other things, you can think about elements of the company’s 
business environment or business risks present in internal processes.  
 
 
Top 5 of business risks relevant to the account Work in Progress 
   
1.  
 
   
2.  
 
   
3.  
 
   
4.  
 
   
5.    
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Task 2 assess relevance of client’s business risks 
All business risks you and your expert colleagues identified as top prioritized client’s 
business risks relevant to the account Work in Progress (Task 1) are presented below.  
 
Task: Assess the relevance with respect to the account Work in Progress of each of 
the business risks presented below.  
 
 You are requested to distribute 100 points of relevance across each of the 
business risks (the more points you assign to a risk, the more relevance this 
risk is). 
 
 
Business risk  Relevance 
assessment 
  
Due to focus on ‘low costs’ risk for long-term profitability  
Due to focus on ‘low costs’ risk of rate control  
Project mismanagement related to projects for which the 
company does not have the required experience 
 
Due to informal culture nobody is responsible for differences 
between forecast and realization 
 
Exit of key personnel  
Contract-deviations related to commercial process  
Control of contract-deviations versus formalization of deviations  
ICT and internal controls   
Stable, small margins regarding current activities  
Dominant general director  
Control of general costs  
Incomplete/inaccurate project reports  
Purchase-risk due to late planning (after contract specifications 
have been prepared) 
 
Responsibility regarding project-status reports  
Calculation errors made by calculation department  
 Sum = 100 
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Task 3 Identification of most effective client’s entity-level controls 
In the preceding tasks you have identified the most important client’s business risks 
related to the case-description. In addition you have assessed the relevance of these 
business risks regarding their impact on the financial statement account Work in 
Progress. The business risks identified by you have been presented below. 
 
Task: Identify for each business risk the most effective entity-level 
control. Be as specific as possible. 
 
Business risks Most effective entity-level controls 
Due to focus on ‘low costs’ risk for long-term 
profitability 
 
Due to focus on ‘low costs’ risk of rate control 
 
 
Project mismanagement related to projects for 
which the company does not have the required 
experience 
 
 
Due to informal culture nobody is responsible for 
differences between forecast and realization 
 
 
Exit of key personnel 
 
 
Contract-deviations related to commercial process 
 
 
Control of contract-deviations versus formalization 
of deviations 
 
  
ICT and internal controls  
 
Stable, small margins regarding current activities 
 
Dominant general director 
 
Control of general costs 
 
Incomplete/inaccurate project reports 
 
Purchase-risk due to late planning (after contract 
specifications have been prepared) 
 
Responsibility regarding project-status reports 
 
Calculation errors made by calculation department 
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Task 4: assess effectiveness of client’s entity-level controls  
In the previous task you and your expert colleagues have identified the client’s most 
effective entity-level controls. A full list of these entity-level controls is presented below.  
 
Task:  Assess the relative effectiveness of each of the entity-level 
controls in mitigating the identified business risks. 
 
You are requested to distribute 100 points across the various entity-level controls. The 
more points you attribute to a single control, the more effective you perceive this single 
control. 
 
 
Entity-level controls Assessment of relative effectiveness 
Performance indicator: return on sales 
 
Communication of business policy 
 
HR management  
 
Shareholder value 
 
Experience of Calculation Department 
 
Project control report 
 
Code of conduct, performance evaluation system 
 
Employee satisfaction measurement 
 
Margin instructions 
 
Description of organizational procedures 
 
Supervision by Supervisory Board 
 
Budgeting procedures 
 
Main contracts with suppliers 
 
Supervision on Calculation Department 
 
Effective project-calculation ex post 
 
Code of conduct related to project-evaluation 
 
Promote culture and commitment to business policy 
 
Procedure notification and registration of projects 
 
Adequate analysis of general costs 
 
Explicit feedback to those responsible for projects 
 
Monitor the relationship with key personnel 
 
 
Sum = 100 
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Task 5 Assess the impact of new client’s business risks on audit risk 
Work in Progress 
The previous four tasks were related to the case-description of construction company 
ABC B.V. From Task 5 and following, you are provided with new information.  
 
Task: On each page43 you are provided with a new occurred client’s business 
risk. You are requested to assess each single business risk (i.e., without 
taking into account previously presented business risks). You are 
requested to assess the impact of each single business risk on audit risk 
of the financial statement account Work in Progress. A positive impact 
implies an increased risk of errors. A negative impact implies a 
decreased risk of errors.  
 
 In addition, you are requested to mark in the margin of the page if you 
consider the presented business risk to be only of relevance to the 
construction industry.  
 
1. The quality of sub-contractors decreases with 10% compared to previous year. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
 
2. An existing competitor of construction company ABC goes bankrupt (number of 
competitors decreases from five to four competitors). 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 For reasons of “saving trees” the business risks are in this Appendix not presented on separate pages.  
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3. The financial position of construction company ABC dramatically deteriorates. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
4. Costs of materials and sub-contractors decrease with 10% due to market developments 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
 
5. Construction company ABC changes her strategy: from regular constructions to the 
construction of luxury villas. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
6. The engagement portfolio of construction company ABC decreases with 25% compared to 
previous year. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
7. A new competitor enters the business market place (from five to 6 competitors). 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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8. Costs of materials and sub-contractors increase with 10% due to market developments. 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
9. Sub-contractors’ quality increases with 10% compared to previous year. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
10. The engagement portfolio of construction company ABC increases with 25% compared to 
previous year. 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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Task 6: Identify the most effective entity-level controls in mitigating 
new client’s business risks  
 
In Task 5 you have assessed the impact of new occurred client’s business risks on audit 
risk of the financial statement account Work in Progress. The table below presents these 
ten new occurred business risks.  
 
Task:  Identify for each of the single business risks the most effective 
entity-level controls  
 
Client’s business risks Most effective entity-level control 
The quality of sub-contractors decreases with 10% 
compared to previous year. 
 
 
An existing competitor of construction company 
ABC goes bankrupt (number of competitors 
decreases from five to four competitors). 
 
The financial position of construction company ABC 
dramatically deteriorates. 
 
Costs of materials and sub-contractors decrease 
with 10% due to market developments 
 
Construction company ABC changes her strategy: 
from regular constructions to the construction of 
luxury villas. 
 
The engagement portfolio of construction company 
ABC decreases with 25% compared to previous 
year. 
 
A new competitor enters the business market place 
(from five to 6 competitors). 
 
Costs of materials and sub-contractors increase 
with 10% due to market developments. 
 
Sub-contractors’ quality increases with 10% 
compared to previous year. 
 
The engagement portfolio of construction company 
ABC increases with 25% compared to previous 
year. 
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Task 7: Assess the impact of new identified entity-level controls on 
audit risk of the financial statement account Work in Progress  
In Task 6 you and your expert colleagues have identified the most effective entity-level 
controls in mitigating the new occurred client’s business risks.  
 
Task: Assess the impact of the identified entity-level controls on audit risk for 
the financial statement account Work in Progress. A positive impact 
implies an increased risk of errors. A negative impact implies a 
decreased risk of errors.  
 
1. Reconsider/tighten contracts with sub-contractors 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
2. Reconsider business market-place  
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
3. Root cause analysis of deteriorated financial position  
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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4. Reconsider pricing during negotiation with principals 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
5. Assign qualified personnel to projects 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
 
 
6. Root cause analysis underlying decreasing engagement portfolio and re-align organization 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
7. Charge cost-increases (materials, sub-contractors) to the principals  
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
8. Due to increase engagement portfolio, reconsider employee planning 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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9. Strategic monitoring of market-positioning 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
10. Improve relationships with banking institutions  
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
 
11. Planned hedge of purchase obligations 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
12. Management of product knowledge/experience  
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
13. Create flexible cost-basis when engagement-portfolio decreases 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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14. Analysis of market position 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
15. Contract-management and fee clauses 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
 
16. Transparent delivery conditions 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
17. Develop commercial strategic objectives/policy statement 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
18. Financial rolling forecast  
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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19. Refine procedures regarding proposals  
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
20. Adjust operational planning after strategic change  
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
21. Tightening conditions of delivery relating to suppliers  
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
22. Charge cost-increases to principals 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
23. Adjust Quality Control manual and other internal control procedures 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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24. Improve margin-instruction when engagement portfolio decreases 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
25. Tightening project control when financial condition deteriorates 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
 
 
 
26. Hire external expertise when strategy changes from regular constructions to luxury villas 
 
 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
no 
impact
positive 
impact
negative 
impact
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Appendix B: Questionnaire and debriefing questionnaire 
This Appendix consists of four parts: 
• Introductory letter to experiment participants; 
• Case-description of hypothetical client; 
• Research questionnaire; 
• Debriefing questionnaire. 
 
Introductory letter to experiment participants 
Dear participant, 
 
 
Please find attached the following documents: 
1. Case-description 
2. Questionnaire (including a debriefing questionnaire) 
 
 
Case-description 
Before completing the tasks of the questionnaire, please read the case-description of 
construction company ABC. The objective of the case-description is to outline a real-
world setting of an audit client through which participants get a shared reference. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire contains four sub-tasks: 
1. The identification of business risks; 
2. The identification of entity-level controls; 
3. Weighing the impact of business risks on the risk of material errors relating to a 
specific financial statement account; 
4. Weighing the impact of entity-level controls on the risk of material errors relating 
to a specific financial statement account.  
 
When completing the questionnaire, the following instructions are applicable: 
• You are kindly requested to complete all questions in order to make your 
response useful in statistical analyses.  
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• You are requested to complete the questionnaire on your own, which means: 
• Without consulting of colleagues; 
• Without consulting of other decision aids like checklists etcetera. 
• You are requested to complete the questionnaire in the sequence the 
questionnaire is presented to you. This means that you are requested to 
complete the questionnaire without looking back to previous questions and 
answers.  
• Completion of the debriefing questionnaire (attached to the questionnaire) is of 
crucial importance to the interpretation of the results of this empirical study.  
 
The empirical results will be presented in a way that they cannot be tied back to 
individual scores of the respondents.  
 
For the sake of completeness we have added a glossary concerning returning concepts.  
 
Glossary  
Business risk 
“A business risk is the risk that client management does not realize the company’s 
objectives”.  
 
Explanation: the concept of ‘business risk’ does not refer to the so-called auditors’ 
business risk (business risks the auditor is exposed to) but the so-called client’s 
business risk (business risks audit clients are exposed to). 
Entity-level control (= definition of internal control based on COSO, 1992) 
“An entity-level control is a process – effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations; 
• Reliability of financial reporting; 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations; 
• Safeguarding of assets.” 
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Risk-analysis (risk of errors in financial statement accounts) 
Risk-analysis in this empirical study is meant as the combined analysis of inherent risk 
and control risk, which is conducted during the planning phase of the audit.  
 
“Inherent risk” is the susceptibility of an assertion to a misstatement that could be 
material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, assuming that 
there are no related controls. 
 
“Control risk” is the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion and that 
could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will 
not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis by the entity’s internal 
control.  
 
 
Case-description 
Refer to Appendix A.  
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Research questionnaire 
Task 1: Identification of business risks 
This task consists of two sub-tasks: 
1 Describe in concise wordings the top 5 of business which you deem important 
when conducting the 2002 financial statement audit. Describe these risks in the 
first column of the table below. 
2 Assess subsequently in the second column the relevance of each of these 
business risks for the hypothetical client as described in the case-description. In 
this column you are requested to distribute 100 points of relevance across the five 
business risks. The more points you attribute to a business risk, the more relevant 
you deem this business risk.  
 
Note: The definition of Business risk in this empirical study is described in the glossary 
(see introduction letter). 
 
Business risk  Relevance 
assessment 
1.  
 
 
2.  
 
 
3.  
 
 
4.  
 
 
5.  
 
 
 Sum = 100 
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Task 2: Identification of entity-level controls 
This task consists of two sub-tasks: 
1. Describe in concise wordings the top 5 of entity-level controls mitigating the 
business risks of the hypothetical client most effectively. Describe these controls 
in the first column of the table presented below. 
2. Assess the relative level of effectiveness of each of the entity-level controls to the 
hypothetical client. You are requested to distribute in the second column 100 
points of relative effectiveness across each of the entity-level controls. The more 
points you attribute to a specific entity-level control, the more effective you deem 
this entity-level control.  
 
Note: the definition of entity-level control used in this empirical study has been described 
in the glossary (see introduction letter)  
 
Entity-level control  Effectiveness 
assessment  
1.  
 
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
3.  
 
 
 
4.  
 
 
 
5.  
 
 
 
 Sum = 100 
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Task 3 assessment audit risk of financial statement account work in progress  
 
Task: 
 
Assess, based on the information provided in the case-description, the level of audit risk for the financial 
statement account Work in Progress.  
 
Response: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 444: Impact of business risks on audit risk of the financial statement account 
Work in Progress 
Introduction: 
 
In each of the sub-tasks 4.1 to 4.3 you are requested to use the case-description as starting position. 
Assume you receive from client management in the meeting preceding the interim audit a number of new 
information-elements (business risks). These information-elements differ across sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2 and 
4.3. You are requested to assess each sub-task as an isolated situation. From the pilot-tests of this 
empirical study there was evidence that spontaneous responses are regularly of qualitative high-level; you 
may, hence, need little time to complete these sub-tasks.  
 
Task 4.1: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
 
                                                 
44
 In the questionnaire used during the experiment, each new task was presented on a separate page. 
For reasons of “saving trees” the tasks are not presented on separate pages in this Appendix. 
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What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 4.2: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 4.3: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
“In addition, the financial position of our construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
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What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
Task 5: assessment of the impact of business risks and entity-level controls on 
audit risk concerning the financial statement account Work in Progress  
Introduction: 
 
In each of the sub-tasks 5.1 to 5.19 you are requested to use the case-description as starting position. 
Assume you receive from client management in the meeting preceding the interim audit a number of new 
information-elements (business risks and entity-level controls). These information-elements differ across 
sub-tasks 5.1 to 5.19. You are requested to assess each sub-task as an isolated situation. From the pilot-
tests of this empirical study there was evidence that spontaneous responses are regularly of qualitative 
high-level; you may, hence, need little time to complete these sub-tasks.  
 
Task 5.1: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
“In addition, the financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
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What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.2: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
“In addition, the financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.3: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
“In addition, the financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
 210 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.4: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.5: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
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Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.6: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.7: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
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Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
 
Task 5.8: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.9: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
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“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.10: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.11: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of our construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
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What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.12: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.13: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
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Task 5.14: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
Task 5.15: 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.16: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
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“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
 
Task 5.17: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“The financial position of the construction company dramatically deteriorated”. 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
Task 5.18: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you that the following entity-level controls have been implemented: 
 
“The project control has been tightened by project control reports”. 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
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What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
 
 
Task 5.19: 
 
 
In the pre-audit meeting (April 2002) preceding the 2002 financial statement audit, client management 
informs you as follows: 
 
“Recently we have changed the company’s strategy from the construction of regular buildings to luxury 
villas.” 
 
Additionally, client management tells you that the following entity-level control has been implemented: 
 
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”. 
 
What is according to your perception the impact of this new information on the level of audit risk of the 
financial statement account Work in Progress? 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
high impact 
on audit risk
low impact on 
audit risk
 
 
 
 
 
Many thanks for completing this questionnaire. Please, do not forget to complete the debriefing 
questionnaire! 
 
End of questionnaire -0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0- 
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Debriefing questionnaire 
General experience in the Auditing field 
 
1. Hoe many years do you have experience in the Auditing field? _____ years 
 
Segment-specific experience 
 
2. Did you ever receive training courses related to the construction industry? 
 
  Yes_____     No_____ 
 
If yes: 
 
How many annual hours on average?    _____ annual hours 
 
Describe in concise wordings which training courses you have received related to the construction 
industry. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. How many days do you spend on average on an annual basis to knowledge acquisition related to the 
construction industry? ____________ days on an annual basis. 
 
 
 
4. How many hours (estimation) did you spend over the past three years on audit engagements in the 
construction industry? ______________ hours over the past three years (cumulative). 
 
 
5. Have you ever been employed outside the auditing field in a construction company? 
 
  Yes____     No_____ 
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If yes: 
 
Describe functional level: _______________________________________________________ 
 
And, how many years of experience do you have, outside the auditing field, in the construction industry? 
____________ years 
 
Personal and task-characteristics 
6. How often (estimation) did you perform in 2002 the following tasks. Please, provide additionally the 
cumulative number of hours you have spent on these tasks (estimation): 
 
 The identification of business risks:     _______ number of times 
 
         _______ cumulative number of hours 
 
 Assessing the impact of business risks on audit risk:      
       _______ number of times 
                
         _______ cumulative number of hours 
 
 The identification of entity-level controls:  
        _______ number of times 
 
         _______ cumulative number of hours 
 
 Assessing the impact of entity-level controls on audit risk:     
       _______ number of times 
 
         _______ cumulative number of hours 
 
7. If you audited last year the financial statements of one or more company’s in the construction industry, 
please describe which business risk most obviously was present? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. How would you characterize your risk-attitude when conducting audit risk assessment in a certain 
financial statement audit: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
risk aversive neutral risk seeking
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9. How often doe you receive feedback from your supervisor having conducting the audit risk 
assessment task? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
never always
 
 
10. How much autonomy do you perceive when conducting the audit risk assessment task? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
none unlimited
 
 
11. If you would have liked to use a decision aid in completing this questionnaire, which decision aid 
would you have used?  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Assume: you are confronted with the following choice. You receive: 
  
 (1) with 100% certainty an amount of € 10,000 or: 
 (2) eventually an amount of € 25,000.  
 
Which percentage of certainty (0 – 100) would you need to choose the second option (an amount of 
€ 25,000)?  
 
____ % 
Other 
13. In Task 5 of the questionnaire you have been provided with varying combinations four or less 
information-elements. Which weights would you attribute toe ach of these information-elements when 
assessing the impact of these information-elements on audit risk for the financial statement account 
Work in Progress? By distributing 100 (weight) points across these information-elements you can 
attribute the weights. A higher number of points implies that you attribute a higher weight to the 
information-element.  
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Information-elements  Weight assessment 
(when assessing the 
impact on audit risk for 
the financial statement 
account Work in Progress  
“The financial position of the construction company recently dramatically 
deteriorated”. 
 
“Recently we have changed our company’s strategy and moved from the 
construction of regular buildings to building luxury villas”. 
 
“Project-control has been tightened by project control reports”.  
“More specialized personnel has been assigned to projects”.  
 Sum = 100 
 
 
14. Should you have any questions or remarks relating to this questionnaire, please enter them below. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Do you appreciate to receive a copy of publications resulting from this empirical study?  
 
  Yes____     No____ 
 
 
End of questionnaire -0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0- 
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Appendix C: List of risk factors 
 
1 Absence of analysis of hours worked 
2 Risk of insufficient innovation 
3 Administrative organization, including the internal controls, is not sufficient 
4 Finance administration is not pro-actively used 
5 Organization structure45 
6 Risk of an informal organization 
7 Risk of competitive position (amongst others, the risk of new entrants) 
8 Risk with respect to internal communication 
9 Risk regarding contacts with suppliers and sub-contractors  
10 Purchase contracts were negotiated afterwards (risk of unknown purchase costs when calculating tenders) 
11 Risk of shifts of recorded hours, materials etc. between projects 
12 Fraud risks 
13 Risk of liability (result of quality of the project)/sensitiveness to claims 
14 Quality of personnel 
15 Recoverability of general costs (‘AK’) 
16 Risk due to low level of information technology 
17 Exit risk key personnel  
18 Business operations are strongly dependent of the director  
19 Risk of insufficient project-control 
20 Risk of changing demand for the projects/services of the company 
21 Debtor risks  
22 Risk of competition on price  
23 Risk of lately invoicing, resulting in high levels of Work in Progress  
24 Risk of not charging principals for costs increases (fixed fee contracts) 
25 Quality of projects is not adequate 
26 Management information deviates from finance administration; Managing is based upon the wrong numbers 
27 Financial position of the company 
28 Risk of absence of monitoring the completeness of the variation status list  
                                                 
45
 Respondents were asked to identify and describe in short wordings the nature of the client business 
risks. In some cases, this wording could be interpreted in multiple ways. 
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29 Risk due to absence of formalized corporate strategy  
30 Compliance risks (environmental regulations, working conditions etc.)  
31 Risk of limited number of principals  
32 Risk of calculation errors  
33 Risk of project losses  
34 Risk of insufficient Work at hand, limited project-portfolio 
35 Risk of discussions regarding variation status list due to insufficient formalization of project variations 
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Appendix D: List of entity-level controls 
 
1 Management information related to Work in Progress (= project control) 
2 Comparison of ex ante (budgeted) and ex post (realized) project-results 
3 Budgeting procedures (including monitoring General Costs, ‘AK’) 
4 Segregation of duties 
5 Compliance-procedures rules and regulations 
6 Organizational structure, including the assigned tasks, responsibilities and authorizations 
7 Properly functioning of project-(sub-)administration  
8 Formalization of confirmations relating to deviations of original contracts (variation status list) 
9 Supervision of the Board 
10 Frequently held meetings of the Board and the principal(s) 
11 Ex ante project-calculations (see also no.2) 
12 Flat organization, including frequently held internal meetings 
13 Procedure in place of negotiating purchase contracts based upon detailed project-budgets  
14 Timesheet administration which reconciles with the finance administration 
15 Procedures in place aiming timely invoicing of installments to the principal 
16 Monitoring procedures with regard to the financial position and capital funding 
17 Code of conduct 
18 Procedures in place in order to make flexible use of company personnel  
19 Adequate information technology 
20 Reconciliation procedures of project-calculations to project-specifications 
21 Control-awareness of/in the control environment 
22 Formalization of strategy process including putting strategy into operation 
23 Authorization procedures regarding timesheets 
24 Procedures related to education and selection of company personnel 
25 Risk analysis 
26 Monitoring procedures regarding debtor position 
27 Registration procedures related to contracts 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
Doel van het onderzoek 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is het verbeteren van het inzicht in de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming van accountants bij controletaken die worden uitgevoerd als onderdeel 
van een op bedrijfsrisico’s gebaseerde controleaanpak. De uit de doelstelling van het 
onderzoek afgeleide onderzoeksvragen zijn gericht op mogelijke determinanten van de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. De in dit onderzoek betrokken determinanten zijn: 
• Algemene ervaring; 
• Taakspecifieke ervaring; 
• Industriespecifieke ervaring; 
• Feedback; 
• Algemene risicohouding. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt beschreven hoe de onderzoeksvragen zich verhouden tot eerdere 
empirische onderzoeken. Voor wat betreft de variabele ‘ervaring’ hebben de eerste 
onderzoeken zich gericht op de mogelijke bijdrage van algemene ervaring aan de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. Hieruit komt naar voren dat er zowel een positieve als 
een negatieve impact van algemene ervaring op de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming wordt 
gerapporteerd. Als algemene verklaring voor deze gemengde onderzoeksresultaten 
wordt gesuggereerd dat de variabele ‘algemene ervaring’ onvoldoende specifiek is en 
daarmee niet eenduidig interpreteerbaar is. Relatief recentere onderzoeken hebben 
sindsdien onderzocht in hoeverre de complexiteit van controletaken een betere maatstaf 
is als determinant van de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. Taakcomplexiteit werd in die 
onderzoeken gemeten door de variabele ‘taakspecifieke ervaring’. Deze onderzoeken 
rapporteerden overwegend een positieve invloed van taakspecifieke ervaring op de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. In het vorige decennium hebben de grote 
accountantskantoren zich steeds meer georganiseerd rond industriespecifieke service-
lines gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat industriespecifieke kennis onontbeerlijk is 
voor een goede kwaliteit van accountantscontrole. Voor in het bijzonder de sterk 
gereguleerde industrieën (bijvoorbeeld de bancaire sector) werden de eerste 
onderzoeken gerapporteerd vanaf eind jaren negentig. Het beeld dat hieruit naar voren 
komt is dat industriespecifieke ervaring positief bijdraagt aan de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming. Tot op heden is er nog geen onderzoek verricht naar de gezamenlijke 
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effecten van de drie genoemde categorieën van ervaring. Deze empirische studie 
voorziet in deze leemte.  
In aanvulling op de drie soorten van ervaring wordt in deze studie tevens onderzoek 
gedaan naar de invloed van ‘feedback’ en ‘algemene risicohouding’ op de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming. De variabele ‘feedback’ is een belangrijke bouwsteen van het stelsel 
van kwaliteitsbeheersingsmaatregelen van een accountantskantoor. Terugkoppeling van 
een leidinggevende over de kwaliteit van uitgevoerde werkzaamheden aan een 
ondergeschikte, draagt naar verwachting bij aan de leercurve van de ondergeschikte en 
daarmee aan de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. De variabele ‘algemene risicohouding’ is 
een algemene persoonseigenschap die naar verwachting ook invloed uitoefent op 
oordeelsvorming met betrekking tot risicoanalyses die in de accountantscontrole worden 
uitgevoerd. Aangezien voor deze variabele geen eerdere empirische studies zijn verricht 
is het niet mogelijk om op voorhand de richting van de invloed van deze variabele op de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming te hypothetiseren. Het betrekken van deze variabele in 
het empirische onderzoek is daarom exploratief van aard.  
 
Onderzoeksopzet 
De opzet van het onderzoek wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift. Het 
doel van dit onderzoek is het verbeteren van het inzicht in de mate waarin ervaring- en 
feedback-, en risicohouding gerelateerde variabelen invloed hebben op de kwaliteit van 
het oordeel van de accountant. Voor wat betreft de ervaring-gerelateerde variabelen 
werd daarbij onderscheid gemaakt naar drie soorten van ervaring die de accountant 
opdoet gedurende zijn carriere: 
• Algemene ervaring, gemeten in termen van het aantal jaren dat de accountant 
werkzaam is in de accountancy; 
• Taakspecifieke ervaring, gemeten in termen van het aantal uur dat de accountant 
in de afgelopen periode heeft besteed aan specifieke taken van het 
controleprogramma; 
• Industriespecifieke ervaring, gemeten in termen van het aantal uur dat de 
accountant in de afgelopen periode van drie jaar heeft besteed aan de controle 
van jaarrekeningen van ondernemingen die activiteiten ontplooien in de 
bouwsector.  
 
Twee specifieke taken die een belangrijke rol spelen in de relatief nieuwe – op 
bedrijfsrisico’s gebaseerde – controlemethodologie zijn nader onderzocht. De op 
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bedrijfsrisico’s gebaseerde controlemethodologie werd medio jaren negentig van het 
vorige decennium ingevoerd. Hierbij wordt voortgeborduurd op de meer traditionele 
controlemethodologie die gebaseerd is op accountantscontrolerisico’s. Met name 
vanwege de noviteit van de herziene controlemethodologie worden de geformuleerde 
onderzoeksvragen naar de invloeden van ervaring op de kwaliteit van het 
accountantsoordeel actueel. Ook vanuit maatschappelijk perspectief bezien, is de 
aandacht voor de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel toegenomen vanwege 
omvangrijke ‘boekhoudschandalen’ die hebben plaatsgevonden.   
 
In het onderzoek zijn de volgende twee specifieke taken begrepen: 
• De identificatie van bedrijfsrisico’s en organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen, 
bezien vanuit de omgeving van een specifieke controlecliënt; 
• De inschatting van de impact van geïdentificeerde bedrijfsrisico’s en 
organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen op het inherente en interne 
beheersingsrisico gerelateerd aan een specifieke jaarrekeningpost.  
 
Aan het onderzoek hebben 85 accountants van het niveau ‘(senior) manager’ 
deelgenomen, die allen werkzaam waren bij de vier grote accountantskantoren in 
Nederland: Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young en PriceWaterhouseCoopers. De keuze 
voor het functieniveau manager is gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat accountants 
met dit functieniveau in de praktijk het meest betrokken zijn bij de uitvoering van de twee 
gekozen specifieke controletaken. In verband met één van de onderzoeksvragen, te 
weten de vraag naar de invloed van industriespecifieke ervaring op de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming, werd de doelgroep onderscheiden in een groep accountants die 
vooral ervaring hebben in een specifieke industrie (in dit onderzoek de bouwsector) en 
een groep accountants die dergelijke ervaring niet of nauwelijks hebben. Aan 
representanten van de vier accountantskantoren werd verzocht binnen hun firma voor 
beide groepen accountants een representatief aantal medewerkers te selecteren die 
konden participeren in het onderzoek.  
  
Aan de participanten aan dit onderzoek is een fictieve casus van een bouwbedrijf 
voorgelegd. Deze casus werd eerst aan een pilot-test onderworpen om het 
realiteitsgehalte ervan te toetsen. Het praktijkonderzoek was ingedeeld naar de twee 
taken die geselecteerd waren voor dit onderzoek. Het eerste deel van de vragenlijst was 
gericht op de identificatie van bedrijfsrisico’s en organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen. In dit eerste deel werden de deelnemers in de eerste plaats 
verzocht om de vijf belangrijkste bedrijfsrisico’s te identificeren op basis van de casus. 
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Aansluitend kregen de deelnemers de opdracht om de vijf belangrijkste 
organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen te identificeren. Het tweede deel van de 
vragenlijst was gericht op het inschatten van de invloed van een tweetal bedrijfsrisico’s 
en een tweetal organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen op het inherente- en interne 
beheersingsrisico, gezamenlijk aangeduid als ‘accountantscontrolerisico’. In dit deel van 
de vragenlijst waren in totaal 15 casusvarianten opgenomen, die elk een mogelijke 
combinatie vormden van de twee bedrijfsrisico’s en de twee organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen. Alle deelnemers dienden de 15 varianten te beoordelen. 
Tenslotte was aan de vragenlijst een ‘debriefing’ vragenlijst gehecht waarin de 
participanten gevraagd is om specifieke persoonskenmerken te vermelden. Deze 
persoonskenmerken waren voornamelijk gericht op de onafhankelijke variabelen (onder 
andere de mate van ervaring en het niveau van gepercipieerde feedback die zij in de 
achterliggende periode ontvingen na het uitvoeren van specifieke controletaken).  
 
Een belangrijk element van de onderzoeksopzet betreft de wijze waarop de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming wordt gemeten. Voor het eerste deel van het onderzoek, gericht op de 
identificatietaken, werd voorafgaand aan het praktijkonderzoek een expert panel 
bijeenkomst georganiseerd. De uitkomsten van deze expert panel bijeenkomst 
resulteerden in een benchmark waaraan de oordeelsvorming van de participanten kan 
worden gerelateerd. Een expert panel is alleen dan zinvol als duidelijk is dat de 
panelleden individueel en gezamenlijk superieure oordeelsvorming hebben vergeleken 
met de doelgroep van dit onderzoek. Daarom werden aan de samenstelling van het 
expert panel hoge eisen gesteld. Het expert panel bestond uit vier partners van de grote 
vier accountantskantoren in Nederland die verantwoordelijk zijn – nationaal dan wel 
internationaal – voor het bouwsegment binnen het accountantskantoor. Dit impliceert 
dat zij zowel een substantiële bijdrage leveren aan de kennisorganisatie van dat 
segment binnen het accountantskantoor, alsook dat zij inzicht hebben in en overzicht 
hebben van datgene wat er zich binnen de bouwsector afspeelt, en dat zij tevens 
betrokken zijn bij de controle van belangrijke cliënten in de bouwsector. Voor wat betreft 
het tweede deel van het onderzoek, gericht op de wegingtaak, werd voor het meten van 
de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming voornamelijk gebruik gemaakt van de variabele 
‘consensus’, waarbij de inschattingen van elke individuele accountant werden 
vergeleken met elke andere individuele accountant. 
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Resultaten 
Identificatietaken 
In hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift worden de onderzoeksresultaten met betrekking tot de 
identificatie van bedrijfsrisico’s en organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen 
beschreven. De eerste onderzoekshypothese verwacht dat de variabele ‘algemene 
ervaring in de accountancy’ de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel verbetert. Deze 
hypothese wordt alleen bevestigd met betrekking tot de identificatie van 
organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen.  
Eerdere onderzoeken, die met name gericht waren op minder complexe taken (zoals het 
inschatten van inherente en interne beheersingsrisico), vonden gemengde resultaten. 
Gegeven de complexiteit van de identificatietaak is het met name verrassend dat de 
factor algemene ervaring niet positief bijdraagt aan de kwaliteit van het 
accountantsoordeel bij het identificeren van bedrijfsrisico’s. Het zou kunnen zijn dat dit 
verklaard wordt doordat elke individuele accountant zich gedurende zijn/haar loopbaan 
op een unieke manier ontwikkelt. Hierdoor is algemene ervaring niet altijd een goede 
voorspeller voor de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel.  
De tweede onderzoekshypothese verwacht een positieve invloed van de variabele 
industriespecifieke ervaring op de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel. De 
onderzoeksresultaten steunen deze hypothese. Echter, uit nadere analyse van de taak 
‘identificatie van bedrijfsrisico’s’ blijkt dat het verband tussen industriespecifieke ervaring 
en de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel niet lineair is. Daarom werd geen ‘gewone’ 
lineaire regressie uitgevoerd, maar een niet-lineaire regressie. Het niet-lineaire 
regressiemodel voorspelt dat de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel vanaf een bepaald 
niveau van industriespecifieke ervaring afneemt. Dit zou mogelijk verklaard kunnen 
worden door het optreden van blinde vlekken wanneer een accountant verregaand 
gespecialiseerd is in een bepaalde industrie en het oordeel met name baseert op 
ervaringen opgedaan bij een beperkt aantal cliënten in zijn/haar cliëntenportefeuille. 
Hierdoor wegen specifieke ervaringen zwaarder in het oordeel dan algemene 
bedrijfsrisico’s die uit industriebrede onderzoeken naar voren komen.  
Voor de derde hypothese, waarin een positieve invloed van taakspecifieke ervaring op 
de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel wordt verwacht, werd geen bevestiging 
gevonden. Eveneens werd geen bevestiging gevonden voor de vierde hypothese, 
waarin een positieve invloed van de variabele ‘feedback’ (het niveau van feedback dat 
accountants percipiëren als zij risicoanalyses uitvoeren in de praktijk) op de kwaliteit van 
het accountantsoordeel werd verwacht. Voor wat betreft de invloed van gepercipieerde 
feedback op de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel met betrekking tot wegingtaken 
worden tegenovergestelde uitkomsten gerapporteerd (zie de navolgende sectie). 
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Daarom dienen interpretaties van deze uitkomsten voorzichtig te gebeuren. Het is 
denkbaar dat de uitkomsten van het onderzoek anders zouden zijn als de variabele 
‘feedback’ op een andere wijze zou zijn gemeten. 
 
Samenvattend suggereren de onderzoeksresultaten dat alleen de factor 
‘industriespecifieke ervaring’ helpt om de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel te 
verbeteren voor wat betreft de in het onderzoek betrokken controletaken. Dit positieve 
industrie-effect geldt echter tot een bepaald niveau van industriespecifieke ervaring. Een 
verdere toename van industriespecifieke ervaring vanaf dit niveau leidt tot een afname 
van de kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel. Uit deze onderzoeksresultaten volgt de 
suggestie voor het management van accountantskantoren om de uitvoering van 
identificatietaken zorgvuldig toe te wijzen aan leden van het controleteam die over 
voldoende industriespecifieke ervaring beschikken, en die tevens ook voldoende 
ervaren zijn in andere industrieën (inclusief de algemene controlepraktijk).   
 
 
Wegingtaak 
Hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift beschrijft de onderzoeksresultaten met betrekking tot de 
inschatting van de impact van twee bedrijfsrisico’s en twee organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen op het inherente en interne beheersingsrisico. Voorafgaand 
aan het analyseren van de mate van consensus tussen accountants is eerst gekeken 
naar de stabiliteit van de oordelen van de accountant. Dit is gedaan door het per 
individuele accountant vergelijken van de inschattingen op vier van de vijftien 
casevarianten met vier herhaalde casevarianten. Uit de onderzoeksresultaten blijkt een 
stabiliteitsniveau van .93. Dit gevonden stabiliteitsniveau kan als zeer hoog worden 
aangeduid.  
Voor de groep van accountants als geheel wordt in het onderhavige onderzoek een 
onderlinge consensus van .72 gerapporteerd. Vergeleken met eerdere consensus-
gerelateerde onderzoeken, welke gericht waren op inschattingen ten aanzien van het 
traditionele controlerisicomodel, is deze consensusscore hoog te noemen. De in dit 
onderzoek betrokken taak is immers aan te duiden als een relatief nieuwe 
controlemethodologie en verwacht zou daarom kunnen worden dat ten opzichte van 
eerdere controlemethodologieën een lagere consensusscore gerapporteerd zou 
worden. Per onafhankelijke variabele worden de volgende resultaten gerapporteerd: 
• De groep met het hoogste gemiddelde niveau van algemene ervaring scoort een 
significant lager consensusniveau vergeleken met de groep met het laagste 
gemiddelde niveau van algemene ervaring (0,70 versus 0,75).  
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• De groep met het hoogste gemiddelde niveau van industriespecifieke ervaring 
scoort het laagste op consensus (0,59). De groep die geen industrieervaring 
heeft scoort relatief erg hoog (0,74). Ook wordt een relatief hoge consensusscore 
gerapporteerd voor de groep accountants die tussen beide ervaringsextremen 
(laag/hoog) inligt (0,78).  
• De groep met het hoogste gemiddelde niveau van taakspecifieke ervaring scoort 
het hoogste op consensus (0,78) vergeleken met de groepen die een lager 
ervaringsniveau hebben. 
• De groep met het hoogste gemiddelde niveau van gepercipieerde feedback 
scoort relatief hoog op consensus (0,72) vergeleken met de groep met het 
laagste niveau van gepercipieerde feedback (0,66).  
• De groep meest risicoaverse accountants scoorde het laagste op consensus 
(0,64).  
 
Tenslotte is gekeken naar het niveau van zelfinzicht dat de deelnemende accountants 
hadden bij het uitvoeren van wegingtaak. Gegeven de relatieve noviteit van de taak is 
het niveau van zelfinzicht van de gehele groep van accountants (0,69) tamelijk goed te 
noemen. Geen van de onafhankelijke variabelen had een significante invloed op het 
niveau van zelfinzicht.   
 
Deze uitkomsten zijn in overeenstemming met de geformuleerde hypothesen voor wat 
betreft de variabelen algemene ervaring, taakspecifieke ervaring en het gepercipieerde 
niveau van feedback en in tegenspraak met de hypothese voor wat betreft de variabele 
industriespecifieke ervaring. Voor wat betreft de variabele risicohouding was niet vooraf 
een verwachte richting bepaald van het verband tussen risicohouding en kwaliteit van 
het accountantsoordeel.  
 
Ook voor de wegingtaak geldt dat toewijzing van specifieke controletaken aan leden van 
het controleteam op zorgvuldige wijze dient plaats te vinden. Waar echter bij de 
identificatietaken vooral de factor industriespecifieke ervaring een belangrijke 
overweging is, zijn voor de wegingtaak andere factoren van invloed op de kwaliteit van 
het accountantsoordeel. De kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel is erbij gebaat 
wanneer de wegingtaak wordt uitgevoerd door accountants die veel ervaring hebben 
met deze taak. Naast taakspecifieke ervaring speelt ook de mate waarin een 
leidinggevende feedback geeft aan degene die de wegingtaak heeft uitgevoerd, een 
belangrijke rol. Het belang van het tijdig geven van feedback is groot aangezien het 
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verder uit te voeren controleprogramma afhankelijk is van de uitkomsten van de 
risicoanalyse.  
 
Beperkingen van het onderzoek 
Om de onderzoeksresultaten in het juiste perspectief te plaatsen, worden hierna de 
beperkingen van deze empirische studie beschreven.  
 
Identificatietaken 
In de eerste plaats zijn er beperkingen ten aanzien van de meetbaarheid van het begrip 
‘kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming’. De kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming is in deze studie voor 
de identificatietaken (namelijk de identificatie van bedrijfsrisico’s en de identificatie van 
organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen) gemeten door de variabele 
‘nauwkeurigheid’. De mate van nauwkeurigheid werd gemeten door de inschattingen 
van accountants te vergelijken met de inschattingen van een expert panel. Andere 
empirische studies hebben in het verleden de variabele ‘nauwkeurigheid’ onder andere 
gemeten door het oordeel van individuele accountants te vergelijken met het optimale 
oordeel van collega accountants uit dezelfde doelgroep. Het meten van een optimum is 
toepasbaar in onderzoeken waarbij nauwkeurigheid wordt bepaald door het aantal 
geïdentificeerde factoren. In de onderhavige studie was deze laatste metingswijze niet 
goed mogelijk aangezien er in de onderzoeksopzet voor was gekozen om de 
participanten per identificatietaak maximaal vijf bedrijfsrisico’s en vijf organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen te laten identificeren. De onderzoeksopzet limiteerde derhalve 
het optimum. De kwaliteit van het accountantsoordeel wordt echter niet bepaald door 
het aantal risico’s of beheersingsmaatregelen dat een participant identificeert, maar door 
de juistheid van de geïdentificeerde risico’s en beheersingsmaatregelen. De kwaliteit 
van het accountantsoordeel is meer gerelateerd aan de aard dan aan het aantal 
geïdentificeerde factoren. Een beperking die voortvloeit uit de gekozen onderzoeksopzet 
is derhalve dat de benchmark waarmee de inschattingen van individuele accountants 
worden vergeleken,  een groepsmaatstaf is (namelijk een inschatting van een groep van 
experts) en niet een individuele maatstaf. Vanuit de literatuur (bijvoorbeeld, Bedard en 
Maroney, 2000) is bekend dat de kwaliteit van het oordeel van een groep personen bij 
bepaalde taken hoger is dan de kwaliteit van het oordelen van individuele personen. Het 
is daardoor theoretisch denkbaar dat de factor ‘groepsoordeel’ mede invloed heeft op de 
uitkomsten van de in deze studie gerapporteerde uitkomsten.  
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De tweede beperking van het huidige onderzoek is ook gerelateerd aan de 
identificatietaken. De deelnemers aan het onderzoek kregen de opdracht om de 
belangrijkste vijf bedrijfsrisico’s en beheersingsmaatregelen te identificeren. Hun 
oordelen werden vergeleken met de oordelen van het expert panel. Tijdens de expert 
panel bijeenkomst kregen de experts deze zelfde opdracht echter individueel 
voorgelegd. Uit deze vraagstelling resulteerde een totaallijst van risico’s en 
beheersingsmaatregelen die groter is dan het toegestane maximum van vijf dat de 
onderzoeksdeelnemers. Deze totaallijst van ‘goede antwoorden’ behoorden alle tot de 
vijf belangrijkste. Het is dus modelmatig denkbaar dat twee individuele accountants tot 
een verschillende top vijf van bedrijfsrisico’s en organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen komen, maar toch eenzelfde mate van nauwkeurigheid scoren. 
Achteraf bezien heeft deze onderzoeksopzet geleid tot een hogere mate van 
complexiteit en daardoor moeilijker te interpreteren onderzoeksresultaten in vergelijking 
tot een andere denkbare onderzoeksopzet. Het is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om de experts 
op basis van de totaallijst aanvullend een ranking van 1 tot 5 aan deze risico’s en 
beheersingsmaatregelen toe te laten kennen. Op basis van deze ranking zou de 
totaallijst van het expert panel teruggebracht kunnen worden tot de vijf risico’s en vijf 
beheersingsmaatregelen met de hoogste ranking.  
 
Wegingtaak 
Een derde beperking van het huidige onderzoek is het aantal bedrijfsrisico’s en 
organisatiebrede beheersingsmaatregelen dat de accountant overweegt bij het 
inschatten van de impact van deze risico’s en beheersingsmaatregelen op het 
controlerisico. Dit is de zogenaamde wegingtaak ter onderscheiding van de hiervoor 
beschreven identificatietaak. In het onderhavige onderzoek werden aan de individuele 
accountants in totaal twee bedrijfsrisico’s en twee organisatiebrede 
beheersingsmaatregelen voorgelegd, waarvan ze in wisselende samenstelling de 
invloed op het controlerisico moesten inschatten. Dit is een zogenaamd 24 (full) factor 
design. Uit de resultaten van psychologische onderzoeken volgt dat een mens, en dus 
ook een accountant, beperkt is in het aantal factoren dat tegelijkertijd in een besluit of in 
een oordeel kan worden meegewogen. Dit was dan ook reden om slechts 4 factoren in 
het design te betrekken. Bij dergelijke onderzoeken bestaat het risico dat de 
oordeelsvorming van de participant mede wordt beïnvloed door factoren als 
vermoeidheid of verveling vanwege het relatief grote aantal case varianten dat aan de 
participant wordt voorgelegd. Om de mogelijke effecten van vermoeidheid of verveling te 
onderzoeken is gebruik gemaakt van drie vragenlijsten waarvan de volgorde waarin de 
case varianten aan de participant werden voorgelegd, verschilde. De 
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onderzoeksresultaten indiceren dat er in beperkte mate (de gemiddelde consensus per 
groep varieerde tussen de 0,70 en de 0,73) sprake is van volgorde effecten. Een 
volgorde effect suggereert dat participanten mogelijk hebben ervaren dat de vragenlijst 
te lang was. Geen van de deelnemers heeft een dergelijk argument overigens gemeld in 
de terugkoppelingsvragenlijst. Daarom kan worden verondersteld dat positieve en 
negatieve afwijkingen ten gevolge van verschillen in volgorde elkaar hebben 
gecompenseerd. Het argument hiervoor is dat twee van de drie volgorden exact een 
tegenovergestelde volgorde bevatten. Evenwel verdient het aanbeveling om in 
toekomstig onderzoek de vragenlijst niet te lang te maken. Ook dient het aantal risico’s 
en beheersingsmaatregelen dat in een onderzoeksdesign wordt betrokken zorgvuldig te 
worden overwogen. In deze studie is uitgegaan van een “full factor” design. Wanneer 
het aantal factoren dat in het onderzoek wordt betrokken, toeneemt, is ook een 
“fractional factor” design denkbaar. In een dergelijke onderzoeksopzet worden niet alle 
denkbare combinaties van factoren aan onderzoeksparticipanten voorgelegd, maar een 
deel (bijvoorbeeld de helft) ervan.  
Suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek 
Onderzoeksopzet 
De in het onderhavige onderzoek gehanteerde onderzoeksopzet leidde zowel tot een 
efficiënte wijze van dataverzameling als tot een effectieve manier van bestuderen van 
de gestelde onderzoeksvragen. Het gebruik maken van een expert panel heeft positief 
bijgedragen aan bestaand onderzoek naar de potentiële effecten van industrieervaring 
op de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. Het verdient aanbeveling om in toekomstig 
onderzoek zorgvuldig te overwegen in hoeverre de selectie van panelleden de definitie 
van ‘expert’ op een bepaald terrein benadert. Experts dienen personen te zijn waarvan 
duidelijk is dat zij de hoogste denkbare kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming bezitten. De mate 
van expertise dient daarbij gerelateerd te worden aan de controletaak die in het 
onderzoek wordt betrokken. Een momenteel nog onvoldoende ontgonnen 
onderzoeksterrein is in dit kader de categorisering van controletaken naar het 
bijbehorende functionele niveau van de accountant. Voor traditionele 
controlemethodologieën is een dergelijke categorisering reeds verricht (zie bijvoorbeeld 
de studie van Abdolmohammadi, 1999). Voor de relatief nieuwe op bedrijfsrisico’s 
gebaseerde controlemethodologie is deze echter nog niet voorhanden. Een dergelijke 
categorisering zal naar verwachting bijdragen tot: (1) een zorgvuldige selectie van de te 
onderzoeken doelgroep van accountants (welk(e) functieniveau(s) worden in het 
onderzoek betrokken?), en (2) de samenstelling van een expert panel, hetgeen specifiek 
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van belang is wanneer de effecten van taakspecifieke ervaring op de kwaliteit van 
oordeelsvorming worden onderzocht.  
 
Onderzoeksresultaten – implicaties voor het “expertise paradigma” 
Deze studie is de eerste empirische studie die tegelijkertijd drie categorieën ervaring 
heeft betrokken in het onderzoek. Door de integratie van deze drie categorieën van het 
relatief nieuwe onderzoeksterrein (i.c., de op bedrijfsrisico’s gebaseerde 
controleaanpak) is nieuwe kennis ontstaan op basis van dit onderzoek. Een voorbeeld 
hiervan betreft het onderzoeksresultaat dat alleen industriespecifieke ervaring in een 
bepaalde mate significant bijdraagt aan de kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. Algemene en 
taakspecifieke ervaring blijken in het regressiemodel niet significant bij te dragen aan de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming. In toekomstige empirische onderzoeken kan hierop 
worden voortgeborduurd. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het onderzoek naar andere 
controletaken van de op de bedrijfsrisico’s gebaseerde controleaanpak, zoals het 
inschatten van de implicaties van geïdentificeerde bedrijfsrisico’s voor het resterende 
controleprogramma waaronder de uit te voeren gegevensgerichte testprocedures. In 
aanvulling hierop zou toekomstig onderzoek zich tevens kunnen richten op de voor de 
uitvoering van specifieke taken benodigde kennis en vaardigheden. In dit onderzoek is 
bijvoorbeeld de invloed van industriespecifieke kennis onderzocht als maatstaf voor 
expertise voor bepaalde controletaken. Uit eerder onderzoek (Lemon e.a., 2000) blijkt 
dat het segmenteren van accountantskantoren naar onderscheiden industrieën niet 
alleen het oogmerk van verbetering van de kwaliteit van de controle heeft, maar dat 
daarmee ook andere doelen zijn nagestreefd. Onder deze doelstellingen vallen 
bijvoorbeeld ook: (1) marketing gerelateerde argumenten (door segmentatie wordt 
industriespecifieke kennis optimaal ingezet ten bate van het leveren van toegevoegde 
waarde aan controlecliënten, welke bijvoorbeeld zichtbaar wordt in interim management 
letters en accountantsverslagen), en (2) verlaging van de in rekening gebrachte 
controlekosten door efficiency-voordelen (bijvoorbeeld bundeling van kennis bij een 
selecte groep van mensen kan leiden tot verbetering van de kennisorganisatie in het 
accountantskantoor). Het verdere onderzoek naar de inhoud en aard van 
industriespecifieke kennis en ervaring kan dientengevolge bijdragen aan het beleid van 
accountantskantoren ter zake van segmentatie alsook aan het toewijzen van individuele 
accountants aan specifieke controlecliënten of aan specifieke taken binnen het 
controleteam. Een specifieke controletaak die nader onderzoek verdient, betreft onder 
andere de bijdrage van industriespecifieke kennis en ervaring aan de kwaliteit van uit te 
voeren cijferbeoordelingen. Is het zo dat een accountant die meer in een bepaalde 
industrie gespecialiseerd is, ook beter in staat is om op basis van cijferbeoordeling 
materiële fouten in de jaarrekening op te sporen? Is deze accountant ook beter in staat 
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om cijferontwikkelingen te begrijpen op basis van ontwikkelingen die zich in een 
industrie hebben afgespeeld in de achterliggende periode (vergelijk de studie van 
Erickson e.a., 2000)?  
 
Dit onderzoek is - voor het beoordelen van de invloed van industrieervaring op de 
kwaliteit van oordeelsvorming – geconcentreerd op de bouwsector. De effecten die in 
deze sector naar voren komen, komen niet geheel overeen met onderzoeken die gericht 
waren op (in termen van overheidstoezicht en regelgeving terzake van externe 
verslaggeving) zwaarder gereguleerde industrieën zoals de bancaire industrie, de 
verzekeringsindustrie en gezondheidszorg. Om te komen tot generaliserende uitspraken 
over de invloeden van industrieervaring verdient het aanbeveling om in toekomstig 
onderzoek meerdere industrieën tegelijk te betrekken.  
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